The history of freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of unrestricted spontaneity and the freedom of purposive accomplishment, may be traced in the fate of books as well as in the ideas expressed in them. The structure of that history in the culture of the West is determined by the interaction of Greek books and Christian books. Greek literature and culture, as we know them, are the result of three stages of production, preservation, and organization. The classics of Greek literature owe their origin to Hellenic authors, their form and interpretation to Hellenistic editors, librarians, and historians, and their adaptation to uses in other cultures to Roman rhetoricians and philosophers. Greek literature did not present itself in one guise or perspective for adjustment to the books of the Old and New Testaments. The early Councils of the Church formed canons of the authentic books of Scripture, of the beliefs or doctrines set forth in them, and of the orthodox and heretical interpretations of those doctrines. The Roman Church sought in Greek literature doctrines that might lead to heresy or might reinforce orthodoxy. The Jews in framing their canon of the Old Testament sought in Greek literature philological methods of establishing texts and critical methods of interpreting them. The Muslims sought sciences and scientific laws that were in accord or disaccord with the law of the Koran. The Greek Church departed from the institutionalized canons of Latin popes and Councils to form a canon of literature. Greek literature in these various guises—as philosophy, criticism, science, or letters—was adapted over the centuries to the institutionalized canons of the Roman Church, and the evolution of judgments to accept or prohibit books followed the altering forms taken on by books and interpretations of books. The history of ideas finds its materials in surviving books and
constructs the history of freedom of thought and expression, of innovation and conservation, from the production, preservation, and use of books, and from the doctrines, interpretations, sciences, and literary forms found in them.

* * *

The history of freedom is the record of what men have said and done and the interpretation of the remains of what they have made. The history of freedom of thought and expression, the history of literature and of criticism, is constructed by inference from those records and remains. The documents and artifacts in which thoughts are embodied and expressed and in which historians detect ideas and uncover their consequences in thought and action are the primary matter of the history of freedom of thought and expression. The production of books or other modes of expression, their preservation, dissemination, interpretation, and use are results at each stage of the interplay of freedom and restraint, spontaneity and judgment. The freedom of writers to write, the freedom of readers to read, and the freedom of critics or judges or censors to select criteria which establish communities united by common opinions, beliefs, or institutions supplement and delimit each other.

Viewed in terms of books, Western culture took on its form, its contents, and its values from the formation and interpretation of two sets of books. It is a Christian culture, based on the interpretation of sacred books, which adapted pagan books to its uses. Even in the first centuries of the Christian era, Christian Apologists drew up canons of the authentic books of the Old and New Testaments and canons of authentic and heretical interpreters, and the early Councils of the Church continued the work of completing a canon of beliefs or doctrines, a canon of sacred books in which they are found, and a canon of orthodox and heretical interpreters. From the beginning, Christians were divided in a controversy, which was to continue throughout the Middle Ages, between those who held that pagan doctrines were the sources of heresy and those who held that they were consistent with or even preordained preparations for Christian doctrines.

In its influence on Christian thought pagan literature did not pre-
sent itself as a collection of books, a library classified according to the parts of literature, or the organization of knowledge, or the disciplines of arts and sciences. Greek literature as it presented itself to early Christians, and indeed to us, was the product of an evolution which proceeded along several lines, and Greek literature emerged in different forms in the different perspectives. Athens, from the age of Pericles to the death of Alexander the Great, provided the freedom in which the works which laid the foundations of culture and art in the West were produced. Athenians were free and Athens was the school of Greece, as Pericles proclaimed, yet poets, artists, and philosophers, including Pericles’ master, Anaxagoras, were imprisoned, exiled, or put to death. Only a small portion of the books of that period has survived. Greek literature and culture as we know them were formed and structured in the Hellenistic period, when scholars, librarians, and historians edited books, organized them in catalogues of arts and sciences, and traced the sequences of schools and the development of men of letters. Only fragments and later reports of Hellenistic works of scholarship have survived. Scholars were free to shape or neglect, interpret or suppress the works of earlier writers. Our knowledge of Hellenistic learning is mediated by works written during the Roman republic and empire which adapt them to the preservation and development of the values and institutions of another culture.

The progressive formation of Greek literature was a process which affected not only the preservation and interpretation of books. It produced the books, gave authors their characters and places, developed modes of interpretation which determined what was sought and found in books, and established the common beliefs, preferences, or tastes that associated men in schools or heresies. Homer’s epics became books in Athens. Aristotle is reputed to have prepared an “edition” of the Iliad for Alexander the Great, but the first critical edition of Homer is credited to Zenodotus of Ephesus, the first librarian of the Alexandrian Library. The text of the Iliad and the Odyssey as we have them, including their division into twenty-four books each, and like editions of orators, dramatic and lyric poets, and historians, and their interpretation in commentaries, introductions, and “arguments,” are the work of a succession of librarians. Homeric criticism, and literary criticism in general, was divided in a controversy based on two theories of language and two philosophies. Alexandria used Peripatetic distinctions in support of an analogical interpretation and concentrated on the text of the poem; Pergamon used Stoic arguments in support of anomaly and developed allegorical interpretations. Crates of Mallos, librarian of the Pergamene Library, taught that Homer was the source of all knowledge and the guide of all conduct, and his disciples refuted Platonic criticisms of Homer. The librarians also prepared tables or canons of the branches of literature and of authors. Roman writers did not preserve Greek litera-
ture, or Greek literary works. They adapted them to Roman uses. The Latin translation of the *Odyssey* by Andronicus served a fundamental place in Roman education as its original had in Greek until the *Aeneid* of Virgil took its place as a source of knowledge and a basis of Roman culture. The New Comedy of Menander survives only in fragmentary remains, but it is continued in Plautus and Terence and through them in Molière, and the themes of the Greek tragedies show traces of variations by Seneca when they reappear in modern versions.

Philosophy does not have a place in the Alexandrian canon of literature, but the librarians who edited Homer and Hesiod, Aeschylus and Sophocles made canons of Plato's authentic works and organized them in tetralogies, on the analogy of the dialogues of the tragic poets, or in trilogies. They did not edit Democritus, who was a voluminous writer, praised for the beauty of his style and the subtlety of his dialectic, and author of one of the earliest treatises on Homer, fragments of which survive. They did not edit Pythagoras, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, or any of the Sophists. The treatises of Aristotle were edited in the first century B.C. in Rome by Andronicus of Rhodes, tenth head of the Lyceum. They seem to have been little known at the time, although his dialogues were widely read and admired. Only fragments of his dialogues survive today, but his treatises have come to us much as Andronicus organized them. Plato's "Lecture on the Good" has not survived despite its wide renown, but his dialogues have come to us much as they were edited in Alexandria.

There is some uncertainty concerning when philosophy passed from oral to written presentation. The Socratic Dialogues were among the first forms of philosophic writing. Memorabilia of conversations were distinguished from memoirs of thoughts, and *hupomnemata* came to mean the record or "treatise" of rhetoricians, artists, historians, geographers, and philosophers. After Andronicus' edition of Aristotle's works, Peripatetics and Platonists wrote glosses, epitomes, and commentaries on them in which they developed a variety of interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine. Prior to that time, Peripatetics, like other philosophers, used a problematic method to establish doctrines which departed from those of Aristotle or treated subjects which he had not considered. It is difficult to determine what the doctrines of Plato were from the dialogues without the aid of his treatises. Hellenistic scholars and historians disputed concerning whether Plato expounded doctrines or presented only the discussion of doctrines. Those who held that he was a dogmatist distinguished the dialogues in which he expounded his own views or refuted false views concerning subjects about which he had clear convictions from those in which he suspended judgment about obscure views. His own views are expounded by four persons, Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger, and the Eleatic Stranger.

The transformation of "Platonic" doctrines goes further, however,
than the classification of doctrines in the dialogues. The "Platonic division of philosophy" into logic, ethics, and physics is traced to Plato. It is only "virtually" in the dialogues, however, and it is said to have been stated explicitly by Xenocrates, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics (Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* vii. 16, i.e., *Against the Logicians* i. 16). The followers of Plato, like Xenocrates, who sought doctrines in his dialogues, classified his doctrines and therefore the subjects of his dialogues according to that division of the sciences. Aristotle used it as a dialectical division of problems and propositions (*Topics* i. 14. 104b 19–29). He divided philosophy into theoretic, practical, and poetic sciences. To use ethics, physics, and logic as a classification of philosophical knowledge is to reduce Aristotle's philosophy to dialectic and to make it a kind of Academic Platonism. The Stoics organized their philosophy in those three parts. Aristotle was treated by Hellenistic scholars (and their modern descendants) as a Platonist. The Academic and Stoic schools began, in a controversy concerning the true form of Platonism, a skeptical, eclectic treatment of all opinions or a systematic organization of all the truths of the arts and sciences. Roman writers did not preserve Greek philosophy or Greek philosophical works. They reported Greek doctrines and developed arts of discussing them skeptically, eclectically, systematically, and, with the coming of Neoplatonism, transcendentally.

During the formative centuries in which Christianity moved from persecution as an illicit religion to toleration, influence, and finally authority in judging doctrine and prescribing action, it encountered pagan philosophy and literature in several guises and divergent orientations. Christian Apologists and Church Fathers learned from Cicero to treat philosophy in terms of oppositions of doctrines, real or apparent, and to seek to unite wisdom and eloquence, philosophy and the arts of discourse. The arguments of the Christian Apologists were framed in the oppositions of judicial or forensic rhetoric. The Apologists wrote their tracts when the Second Sophistic was the dominant mode of literature and oratory. Sophists spoke with inspiration and moved their audiences to insight and enthusiasm. They invented themes and innovated styles. In the second century A.D. Greek was the learned and philosophic language in Rome, and the mystery religions were spreading. Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his memoirs in Greek, cultivated the Sophists, and was initiated into the mysteries. The Apologists used the style and themes of demonstrative or display rhetoric in their tales of their search for truth and their conversions. In the fourth century A.D. when the first general Councils met and the Church Fathers wrote, Emperor Julian—"Julian the Apostate" or "the Divine Julian"—relied on the Sophists in his efforts to reorganize the empire by returning to Greek culture and literature from the crudities of Christian doctrines and the inanities of Christian writings. His predecessors and successors learned
in like fashion from Christian bishops, versed in rhetoric, how to re-orient Imperial policy and practice from pagan to Christian doctrines and how to apply Christian methods of scriptural interpretation to pagan literature and history. Christian as well as pagan Sophists taught literature in the schools. Christian and pagan alike used Neoplatonic philosophy as a basis on which to develop literary criticism and history from the techniques of deliberative or forensic oratory. Plotinus and his disciples were divine and worked wonders, both on educated men and on unlearned masses, in their inspired discourses. Their discourses were not abstract intellectual or emotional factual presentations; they prophesied, performed wonders, projected actions, and effected cures, and their interpretation of Greek literature opened up insights which made at once the final step in the formation of Greek literature as it was to be known to the Christian world, and at the same time the first step in the innovation of kinds and styles to be developed by departing from ancient models and criteria. The Neoplatonists related what men said to transcendental truths and values beyond human comprehension and inexpressible in human speech, which provide the structure and content of whatever is said and done. Pagan Sophists and Christian apostles spoke the word of God and worked wonders.

After St. Paul preached the word of the Lord and worked wonders in Ephesus, people who had practiced magic brought out their books, valued at a considerable sum of money, and burned them publicly (Acts 19:19). The development of the Church was guided by the formation of a canon of institutions extending the authority of the apostles, a canon of authentic books stating divine truths and divine laws, and a canon of doctrines or beliefs interpreting and organizing those statements. The earliest surviving systematic statements of these canons are attributed to apostles or to companions of the apostles, who might be included in the canon of apostles. The *Pseudo-Clementine Apostolic Constitutions* was given authority by being attributed to St. Clement, who in turn was reputed to have been the fellow-worker of St. Paul (Phil. 4:3) and the third successor of St. Peter as pope, and to have written two Epistles to the Corinthians. Among other prescriptions, the *Apostolic Constitutions* instructs the faithful concerning what books to read and how to read them. When at home, he should read the books of the Laws, the Kings, and the Prophets, sing the hymns of David, and study the Gospels, which are their completion. He should abstain from all heathen books, which are foreign discourses or laws of false prophets (*Constitutions* i. 5–6). The *Apostolic Constitutions* ends with eighty-five canons of which the last is a canon of the books of sacred Scripture. The list closes with the two Epistles of Clement, the Apostolic Constitutions in eight books (which is not to be given general distribution because of the mysteries it contains), and the Acts of the Apostles.

The *Pseudo-Gelasian Decretals* went under the title “Decretal on
Books that must be Accepted and Books that must not be Accepted, written by Pope Gelasius with 70 most Erudite Men, Bishops in the Apostolic Seat of the City of Rome.” It was not written in the time of Gelasius, who was pope from 492 to 496, but it incorporates earlier genuine canons, and its list of books became canonic. The later *Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals*, which was not written by Isidore of Seville, includes genuine canons and the pseudo-Gelasian canon of books and adds deliberate forgeries, which earned it the name of “The False Decretals.” The canons of books that must be read and books that must not be read are not bibliographies but regulations, not lists but canons, rules for the recognition of apostolic statements of Divine truth. Apostolic authority is needed to identify apostolic truths, however, and as a paradoxical consequence authoritative compilations of canons tend themselves to be spurious, pseudo-works attributed to apostles, companions of apostles, or earlier popes or theologians with authority to speak for the apostles.

The *Pseudo-Gelasian Decretals* contains the canons of the Synod of Rome under Pope Damasus in 382 in two parts: first, a semantic “explanation of faith” which expounds the septiform spirit present in Christ, the multiform name of Christ, and the application of “Holy Spirit” to all the persons of the Trinity, not merely the third, and, second, a canon of the sacred writings accepted by the Church, arranged in four orders, the Old Testament, the Prophets, the Histories, and the New Testament. The title of the last three parts of the *Decretals* specifies their purpose to list “Books that must be Accepted and Books that must not be Accepted.” The third part describes the Church founded on these writings by the grace of God: a single universal Church, founded by the apostles, with three seats, Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch, among which Rome takes priority. The fourth part lists further writings (*scriptura*) needed for the building of the Church: the Church Councils come next in authority after the Bible, then the writings of the Church Fathers, the Decretals of the Popes, the Acts of the Martyrs, and finally writings of historians and poets. The fifth part is a list of books written by heretics and schismatics: apocryphal books of the New Testament and apocryphal treatises, including works of Tertullian, Lactantius, and Arnobius as well as the *Physiologus* which was written by heretics and attributed to St. Ambrose. The *Decretals* identify the first four general Councils by the heresies they condemned: Arius at Nicaea, Macedonius at Constantinople, Nestorius at Ephesus, and the Nestorians, Eutychians, and Dioscorus at Chalcedon. This is only a selection from the heresies condemned at these and other Councils, and the explanation of the faith which the Councils constituted went beyond the semantics of the Spirit of God and the Incarnation to the elaboration of the Apostles’ Symbol or Creed. The memory of these canons was still fresh in the seventeenth century when Hobbes wrote the third book of the *Leviathan*, “Of a Christian Com-
monwealth." "The first enumeration of all the books, both of the Old and the New Testament, is in the canons of the apostles, supposed to be collected by Clement, the first (after St. Peter) bishop of Rome" (Leviathan 3, chap. 33). Hobbes, however, argues that Tertullian, far from being a heretic, expressed the primitive Christian doctrine that God and the soul are body, and that Arnobius, Hilary of Poitiers, and others held that the soul, in this life, is corporeal, a doctrine consistent with the Nicene Creed.

"Pseudo-Clement" was not only author of the first canon of sacred books, which was itself included among the sacred books; he was also credited with writing a narrative of wandering and adventure which may be numbered, among human books, with the first novels, if it is not the first, the date of its author being uncertain. The pseudo-Clementine Recognitions is an account of the family of Clement, father, mother, and three sons, who became separated after Clement leaves for the Holy Lands to hear Jesus but arrives after his crucifixion; the family wander through parts of the world in search of each other and through a variety of doctrines—religious, philosophic, and gnostic—in search of truth. They are brought together by St. Peter, and the tales they tell of their search build up a recognition of each other in a recognition of the truth of Christianity. In the twentieth century an American novelist, William Gaddis, adapted the tale of search to modern circumstances in a novel which he called The Recognitions.

Justin Martyr tells a like story in his Dialogue with Trypho, a Jewish rabbi. Philosophy is fragmented into schools which study the doctrines and language of celebrated masters rather than the truth. Justin studied in turn with a Stoic, who taught him nothing about God, with a Peripatetic, who thought himself penetrating but was more interested in fees than in philosophy, with a Pythagorean, who set competence in music, astronomy, and geometry as prerequisites to the study of philosophy, and with a Platonist, who convinced him that he was becoming wise and that he would soon see God. Then he met an old man on a seashore who characterized his search as one undertaken by a lover of words not of deed or truth, by a professor of rhetoric not of effective work. He told Justin about the prophets who had lived before the philosophers and who spoke by the spirit of God and foretold the future. Jews and pagans had a partial revelation of the truth fully revealed in Christianity, Jews by the prophets of the Old Testament, pagans by natural reason which uncovers the imprint of the Word found in nature.

Lucian, who was a contemporary of Justin, tells a skeptical version of the search in Hermotimus, or the Rival Philosophies. Hermotimus, who had been studying Stoic philosophy for twenty years, having begun at the age of forty, and anticipating that another twenty years would be needed barely to start on the path, quotes Hesiod to liken the ascent to Virtue to a long steep climb in which one is aided by a golden cord of
discourse let down by one’s master (Hermotimus, sec. 3). His friend Lycinus asks him how he chose the Stoic philosophy among the many possible paths, and he changes the figure of speech from a mountain climb to a choice of ways which might lead or not lead to the city of virtue where citizens do not pursue money, pleasures, or honors, but lead a serene and happy life of legality, equality, liberty, and all other good things (Hermotimus, sec. 22). Lycinus argues that the voyager should make sure that the path leads to the city he seeks and not to another and should examine other professed paths, a task which would take twenty years for each philosophy. The searcher should perfect himself in the arts of demonstration and disputation to be able to make that selection. Finally, he should make sure that the master he chooses knows the doctrines he professes to teach and exemplifies in his life the perfect virtue and knowledge he professes in doctrine and action. Since Hermotimus knows no such exemplar of virtue and wisdom, and since the study of philosophy has consisted in the interpretation of words and the solving of riddles which have nothing to do with the problems of living, Hermotimus expresses his gratitude to his friend and abandons philosophy.

Philostratus’ account of the Life of Apollonius of Tyana is a sophistic variant on the theme of the search for and expression of the divine truth. Apollonius was a wonder-working sophist who travelled to Egypt, Babylon, and India to see things (he discovered the chains that bound Prometheus and the laurels that Bacchus planted) and to meditate with wise men or sophists (he was initiated into the science and discipline of the gymnosophists, the Magi, and the Brahmans, and was accepted as a god). Apollonius attacked the concept of “imitation” in art and substituted for it “imagination” while discussing the art of the temples with an Egyptian priest. The Sophists evaluated the Life of Apollonius of Tyana as they did any other discourse as an expression of divine truth for the understanding of facts and the guidance of actions. The Christians—from Eusebius, Lactantius, Jerome, John Chrysostom, and Photius to Voltaire—considered it a phantasmagoric parody of the life of Christ. Sophists found many applications of their wisdom, divination, and wonder working, from the religious insights of the naked sophists or gymnosophists to the thaumaturgic cures of the iatrosophists, and the account of their inquiries and discussions is preserved by Athenaeus in his record of the Deipnosophists or Sophists at Dinner or Of Dining.

The Jews also drew up a canon of the Old Testament, but Greek literature took on a different form and perspective in the uses they made of it. The Christians institutionalized a canon of doctrines and books; the Jews formulated a canon of interpretations of books. The Jewish texts and allegorical interpretation of them were in turn institutionalized by the early Councils and the Church Fathers in the fourth century. Judaism had been hellenized in Alexandria in the last three centuries
b.c. when the Septuagint, a Greek translation of the Old Testament, was prepared for Jews who were unable to read Hebrew and Aramaic, and when Philo Judaeus, who lived in the time of Jesus, adapted Greek methods of literary interpretation to expound it. Pagan Homeric scholars discovered the sciences of mathematics, discourse, military tactics, technical inventions as well as other disciplines in their interpretation of the poems of Homer. The schools of Alexandria not only discovered arts and sciences in the books written by Moses and the prophets; they transformed the world into a poem of which God was the poet or maker. In the arts of interpretation, the art of interpreting things took precedence over the art of interpreting words. Philo's essay “On the Account of the World’s Creation [kosmopoiia] given by Moses” relates the account of Moses (unlike other lawgivers, he did not merely present the law or dress it up with myths, but gave an account of the creation of the world showing the world to be in harmony with the Law and the Law with the world) to the creation presented in the account (the active cause is the perfectly pure mind of the Universe, transcending virtue, knowledge, the good and the beautiful, which make the most perfect work, this world). The Father and Maker (poietes) brings the world into existence and cares for it.

The Christian Fathers Basil, Ambrose, and Augustine adapted Philo's method of interpretation. Augustine presents his discovery of the allegorical method of interpretation, in his account of his search for divine truth in his Confessions, as a crucial step in his conversion. The Greek Septuagint is the oldest surviving text of the Old Testament as a whole. The writers of the New Testament quote the Old Testament in the Septuagint version, and the Latin Christians used the Septuagint as a bridge by which to return from earlier Latin versions to the Hebrew version. Jerome began his translations of the Bible, at the request of Pope Damasus, to remove discrepancies in the Old Italian versions, then enlarged his project by seeking the veritas Graeca in the Septuagint and by consulting Origen's Hexapla which tabulated in six columns the Hebrew text in Hebrew characters, the Hebrew text in Greek script, and the Greek translations of Aquila, Symmachus, the Septuagint, and Theodotion, and finally sought the veritas Hebraica in the Hebrew version. Eusebius had synchronized the chronologies of the kingdoms of the world in his Chronicles; Jerome continued the Chronica to the year 378—his continuation contains the earliest reference to Lucretius and the circumstances of the composition of his poem. Jerome made available as instruments of interpretation On the Situation and Names of Hebrew Places, based on Eusebius' Onomasticon and a Book on Hebrew Names, based on a Greek lexicon wrongly attributed to Philo or Origen. A thousand years later Erasmus resumed Jerome's textual studies, and Luther returned from medieval glosses and commentaries to Augustine for the reformation of the Church. Jerome's quarrel with his friend Rufinus
turned in part on Rufinus' translation of the pseudo-Clementine Recognitions, which survives only in Rufinus' Latin version.

In the fourth century, when Councils and popes drew up canons of doctrines and books, Greek had become a rarer accomplishment in Rome than it had been in the second century. The canons of books of the Hellenistic librarians contributed to the formation, preservation, emendation, and disappearance of books. The Christian canons of books were not lists of books available or not available, but prescriptions of books that must be accepted and books that must not be accepted. Since the acceptability of books depended on the doctrines they advanced and propagated, the discussion of Greek doctrines and discourse did not contribute to the preservation or translation of books. Roman philosophers and authors, usually retired officials like Cicero and Boethius, conceived it to be an extension of their civic duty to make Greek arts and culture available to their countrymen. They made occasional translations and drew up occasional grandiose schemes of translation, but for the most part they expounded doctrines and disciplines in dialogues and treatises. Fragments of Cicero's translations of Aratus, Homer, and the Greek tragedians survive, but his philosophical dialogues and his treatises and dialogues on rhetoric have contributed to the formation of the history of Greek literature and rhetoric as we know them. Christian Romans followed the tradition of pagan Romans and relied on Latin secondary sources for their knowledge of Greek ideas—on Cicero, Apuleius, Macrobius, Martianus Capella, Aulus Gellius, Suetonius, Censorinus, and others.

Augustine derived his conception of Greek thought from the Ciceronian tradition of wisdom and eloquence, philosophy and rhetoric, which permitted him to apply the arts of things and the arts of words to the demonstration of truth and the refutation of error, and from the Plotinian tradition of dialectical ascent to a transcendent One, which permitted him to relate the three sciences, physics, logic, and ethics, to the three persons of the Trinity. He wrote several treatises on the liberal arts, and several others passed currency as his: a "Grammar," a "Principles of Rhetoric," a "Principles of Dialectic," a "Ten Categories plucked from Aristotle," and an "On Music." His "On Christian Doctrine" applies the rhetorical arts of things and of words to the New Testament. His "On Music" makes the movement of music depend on unmoving spiritual numbers (De Musica vi. 17) and the appreciation of music depend on motion from delight in the order of things to love of god (viii. 14). His reduction of the parts of philosophy to the persons of the Trinity is part of the differentiation of the history and institutions of terrestrial cities from those of the City of God.

Boethius, a century later, reinforced the Neoplatonizing tradition of thought in his exposition of the liberal arts, in his reformulation of Augustinian theology in accordance with the arts, and in his account of
his search for truth in the *Consolation of Philosophy*. He had planned to translate all of Plato and all of Aristotle and to demonstrate the accord of their philosophies. He translated Porphyry’s *Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle*, Aristotle’s *Categories* and *On Interpretation* and wrote commentaries on them. He may have translated other parts of Aristotle’s *Organon*, but he wrote no commentaries on them, and the writings of philosophers of the next few centuries who used his works show no sign of their direct influence. In the absence of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*, Boethius’ *Commentary on Cicero’s Topica* and his *On Topical Differences*, which analyzes and combines the commonplaces of Cicero and Theophrastus, completed the Neoplatonizing of logic by substituting dialectical principles for demonstrative principles. The arts of words became the art of dialectic. Boethius wrote treatises on Arithmetic and on Music, based largely on Nicomachus of Gerasa, and he probably wrote one on Geometry based on Euclid, but the treatise on Geometry published under his name is not his.

In the ninth century, John Scotus Eriugena translated the *Celestial Hierarchy*, the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, the *Concerning the Names of God*, and the *Of Mystical Theology* of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, attributed to the Dionysius who was converted by St. Paul at the Council of the Areopagus (Acts 17:34), where Paul had been taken by Epicurean and Stoic philosophers with whom he had debated (17:16–19). The works were probably written in the fifth century under the influence of Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus. Eriugena also translated Maximus the Confessor’s *On Ambiguities in Saint Gregory Nazianzen* and Gregory of Nyssa’s *On the Formation of Man*.

Isidore of Seville (ca. 560–636) did not draw up the canon of books and interpreters contained in the *Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals*, but he did expound the disciplines of the liberal arts, medicine, and law, the subjects they treat, and the communities they form by analysis of words. The first five of the twenty books of the *Etymologiae* are devoted to the seven liberal arts, medicine, and law. The sixth book treats books and ecclesiastical offices, beginning with the books of the Old and New Testaments, going on to libraries, translators, kinds of books, to the canons of the Evangelists (chap. 15) and the canon of the Councils (chap. 16), which is an expansion of the pseudo-Gelasian account of the first four general Councils and the heretics they condemned. Isidore explains that “canon” is the Greek word for “rule.” The seventh book turns to the subjects interpreted—God, angels, and saints. It opens with the reminder that Jerome, who was learned in many languages, first translated into Latin the interpretation of the names of the Hebrews, and proceeds to the interpretation of the ten names of God. The eighth book sets forth the communities formed by faith—church, synagogue, heresy, sect, and schism. The Greek word “heresy” is derived from election or selection: everyone elects what seems to him best. Isidore gives two examples of
heretics, those who elect to be Peripatetic, Academic, Epicurean, or Stoic philosophers, and those who excogitate a perverse doctrine and withdraw from the Church. There is no need to rely on our own judgment, for our authors are the apostles of God, who, in turn, induced nothing from their own judgment but faithfully promulgated to the nations a discipline they accepted from God. Isidore then lists Jewish heresies and Christian heresies.

John of Damascus (ca. 674–749) produced the first synthesis from earlier compilations of Christian doctrines, a long list of heresies and numerous refutations of heresies, which includes the Jews and the Muslims, and a search for the Christian truth which takes its beginning from Buddhism. He pursued a civil, medical, and theological career in Damascus without Muslim restriction, and his geographical location freed him from the consequences of Byzantine anathemas. He wrote a *Fount of Knowledge*, divided into three parts: a philosophical introduction in which he set forth the best that Greek philosophy has to offer, an historical introduction in which he enumerates aberrations from the truth in the course of world history in order to follow the truth more closely by recognizing the lie, and an exposition of orthodox faith. He also synthesized moral doctrines in *Sacred Parallels* in which scriptural texts and texts of the Greek Fathers and of Philo and Josephus are assembled and arranged to clarify Christian moral and ascetic teachings. The Greek version of the *Life of Barlaam and Josaphat*, which exists in independent Arabic, Georgian, Hebrew, and Greek forms, is attributed to him.

The first part of the *Fount of Knowledge*, which was translated into Latin under the title *Dialectica*, presents in sixty-eight chapters definitions of basic terms derived from Aristotle's *Categories* and Christian additions to them, like "term," "division," "genus," "species," "substance," "nature," "form," "hypostasis," "enhypostaton," and closes with six definitions of philosophy, four dialectical methods, and an explanation of expressions applied to things, like "necessity," the "elements," "generation" and "motion," "time" and "times," and meteorological phenomena. The second part, which was translated into Latin under the title *On Heresies*, enumerates 103 different heresies, followed by a profession of faith. The first eighty are taken verbatim from the *Panarion* of St. Epiphanius, and the next twenty are taken from other earlier writers. Among the last thirteen, the Damascene includes a long notice on the Ishmaelites or Saracens, followers of a false prophet named Mohammed, who had chanced on the Old and New Testaments and had conversed with an Arian monk. The parents and archetypes of all heresies are four: Barbarism, Scythism, Hellenism, and Judaism. There were four Greek heresies: the Pythagoreans or Peripatetics, the Platonists, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. The third part, which was translated into Latin under the title *On Orthodox Faith*, was divided in the Latin tradition,
probably under the influence of the division of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, into four parts: On God, On God's creation, visible and invisible and particularly man, On Christ, and On things after the Resurrection, including the sacraments, ending with the Resurrection. It is a synthesis in the Greek tradition, departing from the institutionalizing canons of the Latin tradition, and omits all analysis of the Church and its institutions. The story of Josaphat is an account of the conversion of an Indian prince to Christianity. His father had been forewarned of the conversion in a dream. Despite his father's strenuous effort to prevent it and to reverse it after its occurrence, the hermit Barlaam led Josaphat by parables and apologues (which are repeated often in Western literature, as in Shakespeare's use of the four caskets in the *Merchant of Venice*) to Christianity along a way reminiscent of the way the Buddha travelled, abandoning power, wealth, and family in the middle of the night and meditating under the bo tree.

Problems continued to arise in which authoritative statements could be found to support opposed resolutions of new questions, and Councils continued to condemn new heretics. Philosophers did not prove to be safe guides or reliable interpreters. Bishop Hincmar of Rheims consulted Scotus Eriugena in the controversy on predestination. Eriugena's treatise *On Predestination* was condemned at the Council of Valence in 855 and at the Council of Langres in 859. Philosophers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries developed liberal arts of discourse and of thought, and they accused one another of errors resulting from applying verbal arts and human reason to divine things. They had learned from Porphyry that the five "words," or "predicables," or "universals" could be viewed as things, or ideas, or words, and they argued in their controversies concerning the nature of the universals or concerning the attributes of God that their opponents were guilty of reducing divine things to verbal or mental or transient existences.

Contradictions, real or apparent, among authoritative statements and interpretations of divine truths by authoritative authors or offices, presented problems, practical and theoretical, literary and philosophical, which stimulated developments in human arts—to differentiations in matters of discourse, inventions in literary genres and styles, and changes in philosophical forms and demonstrations. In the course of the development of canon law, the art of rhetoric, which takes into account the character and authority of speakers, the circumstances and sensibilities of audiences, and the modes and styles of communications, was transformed into an art of interpretation by which apparent contradictions of conflicting canons might be removed or justified by consideration of differences of audiences, circumstances, and intentions as they determine differences of meaning in what is said. In the course of the development of theology, the art of dialectic, which proceeds by disjunction and assimilation of antithetical positions, was given concrete appli-
cation and universal scope by applying dialectical principles and arguments to the summation of doctrines arrived at by the rhetorical resolution of disputed questions.

Abailard's method of setting authoritative answers to 158 important questions in opposition in his Sic et Non, or Yes and No, in the twelfth century, was a continuation of the customary method of canon law, not an innovation of skepticism or a departure of free thinking. Many of the questions and citations of the Sic et Non are borrowed from the long line of canonists, culminating in Ivo, bishop of Chartres from 1091 to 1116 and author of three collections of canons, the Tripartita, the Decretum, and the Panormia. Abailard used the citations assembled in the Sic et Non in his theological works in which he sought to solve problems rather than assemble varieties of positions presented for their solution, ordering them dialectically and reinforcing the steps of his ordered argument rhetorically by citing concordant and refuting discordant authorities. He was condemned for doctrinal error, not for methodical doubt, at two synods, at Soissons in 1121 and Sens in 1141, and his Introduction to Theology was burned.

Abailard borrowed the method of the Sic et Non from canon law, but he gave it a new turn, for he sought not only to determine what was meant (under the circumstances) but also to discover and establish what was true (unconditioned by accidents of circumstances or prejudgments of commitment). He made this change by placing the contradictions of canons in the context of the matters and the methods of resolving them: that is, he moved from problems of resolving adversary oppositions by determining the meanings and applications of propositions to problems of demonstrating the truth of propositions by discovering their principles. The "Prologue" of the Sic et Non expounds the method of interpreting statements according to their circumstances. It is followed by selections from the Pseudo-Gelasian Decretals listing the canon of books that must be read and the canon of authentic interpreters of those books. These are followed by another collection of selections from a work of St. Augustine, one of the canonic interpreters. In his Retractiones St. Augustine reviews the long list of his writings, one chapter for each work, to explain how he had later changed his mind concerning the interpretations and doctrines set down in that work. The body of the Sic et Non is a collection of discordant answers given by authorities, without resolution or comment. Citations from the authoritative works of St. Augustine far exceed in length and number those of any other authority. Laws and truths are canonically certified because they depend on and reflect the truth which cannot be comprehended by human reason or be expressed in human discourse, but adumbrations of that transcendental truth are conveyed without human distortions to men by prophets and apostles, and they are certified by the apostles in canons—a canon of books to be accepted and to be avoided, a canon of interpreters orthodox and heret-
ical, and a canon of doctrines, the creed or symbol of the apostles. Yet interpreters who are certified for creditability in the interpretation of these unquestionable statements which are canonic for life, thought, and aspiration, change their minds about them. The meanings of statements and canons depend not only on the circumstances in which they are made but also on the arguments by which they are proved, that is, are tested and justified.

The method of the *Sic et Non* transforms the rhetorical problem of resolving contradictions in interpretations by reconciliation or refutation into a dialectical dilemma of choosing among incompatible criteria and principles of choice or proof. Contradictions may be removed by considering who said what to whom at what time and under what circumstances. The dilemma of establishing and giving force to a conclusion or resolution may be resolved practically by choosing an authoritative interpreter or theoretically by discovering a certain interpretation. The dilemma of interpretation is a dilemma of judgment or action and a dilemma of criticism or knowledge. It is resolved practically by ordering interpreters or judges in a hierarchy of power under a supreme judge who has authority to judge judgments and judges as part of the judgment of what is to be interpreted and prescribed. It is resolved theoretically by ordering knowledge needed for interpretation and criticism in a schema of interdependence under an architectonic science which provides principles for the criticism of critics and criticisms as part of the critical knowledge of what is to be interpreted and known. The method of the *Sic et Non* prepared for the judgment of conflicting canons in the codification of the *Corpus of Canon Law* and for the criticism of ungrounded sentences in the systematization of the *Sums of Theology*. These resolutions and organizations, in turn, prepared for revolutions in interpretation and interpreters, in judgment and laws of judgment, in criticism and matters of criticism, and in differentiation and interrelations of arts, and practices, and sciences. Interpretation, judgment, and criticism take on many meanings and applications, and critical knowledge is derived from architectonic sciences which give primacy in turn to theoretical, practical, or artistic principles.

In canon law, Gratian’s *Decretum* or *Concordance of Discordant Canons* (ca. 1150) borrowed questions and canons from the *Sic et Non* and added commentaries and occasional resolutions. In 1234 Pope Gregory IX departed from the tradition of collections by canonists of conflicting decreta by codifying authoritative judgments in his *Decretals*, and so initiated the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, in which the *Decretum* of Gratian became the first part, the *Decretals* of Gregory IX the second, and later decretales were codified as subsequent parts. During the Renaissance and the Reformation the vast body of decreta of canonists and decretales of popes declined in authority and utility as means of interpreting the canon of Scripture. Humanists and reformers used one of the earlier canons of
authentic works in their return to Scripture, and they made a choice in the canon of Church Fathers for methods of interpretation, but they undertook the task of interpretation themselves and made available devices of interpretation for all men to become interpreters as well as judges and critics of interpretations, and to form by interpretation their own credos rather than repeating an Apostle's Creed. The Council of Trent retained and reformulated the apostolic canon of doctrines as a mark and a bond of the community of the Roman Catholic Church and as a base for the authoritative decretals of canon law formulated in this framework of canons of books and of interpreters. Erasmus returned to Jerome, Luther to Augustine, but they transformed the methods of interpretation which they borrowed, and they continued, in their use of their chosen methods, an opposition of modes of interpretation which goes back to the opposition of Alexandria and Pergamon in the interpretation of Homer and persists to modern times in the opposition of the lower and the higher criticism. The determination of the nature of literature and the nature of criticism has always turned on the opposition between interpretation as the establishment of the text and interpretation as the criticism of what is said in the text.

In patristic and medieval interpretations that opposition was developed in the framework of Philo's distinction between a literal and an allegorical interpretation, or varieties of allegorical interpretations differentiated by Origen and by medieval interpreters, including Dante, until four interpretations could be distinguished in biblical hermeneutics and literary criticism—a literal-historical, an allegorical-typological, a moral-tropological, and an anagogic-projective interpretation. Jerome established the text of the Vulgate translation by removing contradictions in earlier versions, and in his commentaries he expounded its meanings, literal and allegorical. Texts, good and bad, had meanings, and considerations of meanings entered into the establishment of the text. Augustine differed sharply with Jerome concerning the importance of a new Latin text. Augustine's commentaries were based on the old or the new translation, tending toward the Vulgate as it became more widely known, and he elaborated different means allegorically in the interpretation of the same text. Erasmus returned to Jerome's concern with the text of the New Testament, but he did not use Jerome's methods or find Jerome's meanings. He published a Greek edition and a Latin translation of the New Testament based on a study of manuscripts, and he expounded its meaning, not in literal and allegorical interpretations, but in a monumental set of literal paraphrases. Luther returned to Augustine's concern with understanding and interpreting Scripture. He published a vernacular translation of the Bible intelligible to the common man, and he sought its literal interpretation guided by the single canon for understanding divine truths, that Christ alone provides man's justification before God.
It is a mistake to read the history of these changes as stages in the establishment of texts free from the mythologies of allegorical interpretation and the dogmatisms of authoritative interpretation. They are understood more significantly as opposed modes of resolving the dilemma of interpreting texts by establishing them and by understanding them. The explicit vocabulary of the fourfold interpretation of texts went out of fashion, but the making of allegorical literature and the appreciation of allegorical insights has sparked a series of subsequent revolutions in literature and in criticism, and the distinctions on which the fourfold interpretation is based can be restated as the reasons which induce any reader at any time to read any text—to learn facts or what has happened, to comprehend meanings or what he should believe, to judge connections or what he should do, and to foresee consequences or where the trends of happenings will end. The mode of resolving the dilemma of interpretation by devising arts and disciplines to understand what is said works on the assumption that texts have meanings. But since the arts of interpretation uncover a variety of meanings, complementary, supplementary, or independent, one mode is faced at each stage of its development by the plausibility of the opposed mode of resolving the dilemma of interpretation by establishing what is said as a text which has no meaning in itself but acquires meanings from consideration of its author, its audience, its times, its language, its genre, its message, its effects. But the arts and disciplines and sciences devised to show how texts acquire meanings have the paradoxical effect of fragmenting or destroying the meanings of the text except as they illustrate and substantiate the larger historical, sociological, psychological, cosmological, or therapeutic meanings interpreted by the discipline.

Pico della Mirandola and Colet read the Bible as literature, and they are guided to the meaning of the text by considering Moses and Paul as poets. But when the methods of paleography and philology are applied to editing and interpreting the Bible, Genesis loses its literary unity of structure and meaning, and Moses ceases to be the poet of the composite four-level text. Paul ceases (as a kind of paradoxical aside on the continuity of the Testaments) to be the author of the Letter to the Hebrews, and the Gospels are seen to have doctrinal similarities and differences rather than a canonic doctrine. The discordant canonic interpretations of the text disappear in a discordance of texts whose conjuncture in a transmitted book is accounted for by history, or folklore, or mythology, not by internal structures of matter treated or meanings expressed. The new historical, philological, literary, linguistic, and scientific edition and interpretation of texts disintegrated them into many texts with many authors or one author who passes through a history of changing ideas, styles, or purposes. The study of contents may concentrate on persons and become a search for historical personages, like the historical Jesus,
who tend to elude discovery and disappear; or it may concentrate on what they say or do and what is said about them and become an investigation of factual connections, like the histories of kings and prophets or the acts of apostles and martyrs, which tend to lose literal objectivity and move from history to mythology; or they may concentrate on the message or kerygma, like the promulgation of divine truths, which tend to cease to be canonic expressions of transcendental truths and become anthropological or existential adaptations of revelation to current ideas. The two modes of interpretation continue to be practiced in opposition because the two purposes of interpreting what is said and what it means are to discover a valid or true or right interpretation and to justify the right of all to interpret. A supreme judge of meanings establishes a code of laws or prescriptions; an authoritative critic of texts initiates a bill of rights and freedoms. Laws governing actions and communities have their effects on the discovery of laws governing nature, thought, communication, and speech; freedom of worship develops in a context of the development of freedom of thought, speech, and action into a proclamation and extension of rights for all men.

In theology, Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* (1150–1152) borrowed questions and sentences and sequence, oppositions of disputation and order of demonstration, from the *Sic et Non*. The same materials entered into the establishment of the institutions and offices of a community and the certification and organization of knowledge. But the authority of judges terminates disputes by enforcing practical precepts, while the authority of critics guides perceptions by disclosing theoretical principles. The authority of practical precepts is challenged by changes in communities and in judges; the authority of theoretic principles is weakened by changes in knowledge and in critics. Commentaries on the *Sentences* came to be the basic course in theological education in the thirteenth century, and the Scholastic method of disputation and demonstration gave form and organization to the science of theology, but the long series of commentaries on the *Sentences* did not resolve theological disputes with the finality achieved in the resolution of the discorances of the same canons in the *Corpus of Canon Law*. However, the authoritative systems of practical decisions led to the establishment of new communities and new judges, and the conflicting theological demonstrations led to the constitution of new sciences and new critics. Commentators on the *Sentences* criticized the *Sentences* and enumerated articles of the Master of the *Sentences* which were not "commonly held," from the list of eight errors by Bonaventura in the thirteenth century to the list of twenty-two by Nicolaus of Emeric in 1397 or to the list of twenty-five in the critical edition published in 1916. The commentaries selected different questions for commentary and ordered their treatment differently for insight or proof in theological sciences which were affective or cogni-
tive, intuitive or demonstrative, theoretical or practical, which contained or subsumed all sciences and all arts and set the criteria of all modes of speech and all modes of conduct.

It is a mistake to comb out the history of these changes into sequences in which the sciences were liberated one by one from the domination of theology, and human literature, history, law, and culture were separated from confusion and contamination with sacred letters, prophetic history, divine law, and the celestial city. They are understood more significantly as opposed modes of resolving the dilemma of interpreting experience by establishing the existence of objects of experience and an understanding of what they are. Principles are beginnings or bases of knowledge or of living; they are organizers or measures of sciences or of cultures. The two modes of interpretation or criticism yield criteria of things and of words expressive of things, of ideas and of actions informing ideas. They yield arguments demonstrative of conclusions arrived at and of things generated and arguments formative of structures of action and plots of narrative. They are mutually exclusive and in adversary oppositions and mutually coherent and in supplementary orientations. They can be formulated and established in critical architectonic sciences which give them an ontological, an epistemic, a pragmatic, or a verbal foundation for the organization of all experience and objects of experience as sciences, arts, languages, or laws. They resolve the dilemma of interpretation by identifying and using principles recognized by the manner in which they are perceived—by sense, imagination, reason, or intuition—and the manner of existence or being attributed to them—phenomenal, elemental, mathematical, or transcendental.

The principles of theology, like all other scientific principles, may be perceived immediately or be discovered from experience. When the Aristotelian and Arabic sciences became available in the West in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they were reconciled, once purified of unchristian doctrines, with the doctrines of Christian theology in two ways. Bonaventura fitted them into the structure of Augustinian theology arguing that Augustine had combined the wisdom of Plato with the science of Aristotle, that the principles of all sciences are perceived in the same way by intuition, and that all arts and sciences are reduced to theology. Treating theology as a cognitive science, Aquinas differentiated revealed theology in which the principles of salvation are known by revelation from natural theology in which the principles of human knowledge are discovered by induction from experience and ordered by a posteriori demonstrations of the existence of God. Natural theology separated from revealed theology, after controversies concerning whether they were necessarily concordant or necessarily contradictory, prepared the way for deism and through Raimon Sebon as expounded by Montaigne to the skeptical reorientation of knowledge to the indi-
vidual and to the initiation of the essay as a modern genre of literature. Treating theology as an affective science, Bonaventure examined the itineraries which man follows as a wayfarer tracing his way back to God and prepared for La Bruyère's adaptation of the Characters of Theophrastus to the study of the characters and cultures of his times and to the initiation of the book of characters and the comedy and tragedy of characters as genres. The literary genres, styles, and arguments cultivated during the Middle Ages left their marks in terms like exemplum, sententia, historia, parabola, fabula which were to be the sources of new literary genres and new literary methods which transformed old genres after the Renaissance. The Emblemata of Alciati is a concentrated assemblage of such devices—an aphoristic statement of truth, rendered visibly clear in an engraving, and given emotional poetic appeal in a "sonnet." The apophthegm, the adagia, the maxim became essential parts of literary and philosophical expression for Erasmus and Francis Bacon, and they took on specific forms and uses in the novel and short story, in comedy and tragedy, in the essay and the treatise, in lyric poetry, and in the forms each borrowed by adaptation from the others. Cervantes' parable of Don Quixote continued and replaced the romance; La Fontaine's fable expounded a moral tale learned from animals instead of saints; and Fielding's history of Tom Jones turned from the words and deeds of illustrious men to the misadventures and deceptions of common men. Among other changes the reflexive reciprocating relations of literature and criticism were altered. In the Middle Ages the liberal arts were the seven arts of the trivium and quadrivium, the arts of words and of things, which could be applied, each, to interpret any form of letters. In the Renaissance the liberal arts became the branches of learning—literature, history, and philosophy, to which science was added in the liberal education of colleges of arts and sciences—which developed particular arts of criticism for each division of learning, and developed battles of books and of criticisms, ancient against modern, theological against scientific, fine against useful, artistic against apodictic, inventive against demonstrative, and then borrowed forms of organization and methods of criticism from each other.

The Muslims made use of Greek literature in a perspective which had little in common with the Greek literature used by the Christians and the Jews. The Muslims found in the works of the Greeks a canon of knowledge and an organization of sciences which they used or avoided in their interpretation of the Divine Word and Law. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century this body of knowledge was translated into Latin and adapted to the Latin canon of doctrines and arts. The Koran is a revelation of eternal law made accessible by returning to the covenant of Abraham, rather than the law of Moses, undistorted by human prophecies, institutions, or speculations. The classics of Greek mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and philosophy had been translated
into Syriac by the Christians and in the eighth century, after the coming of Islam, from Syriac and later from Greek into Arabic. The controversy concerning the use of Greek arts and sciences, which turned on doctrines and arts of words and things in the Christian tradition and on texts and interpretations of books in the Jewish tradition, turned on sciences and laws in the Muslim tradition, between the Mutazilites who held that any human formulation of the divine nature was false and the Mutakalmoun, the "dialecticians" or "speakers," who developed a speculative philosophy of the *kalam* which, like *logos*, ranges in meaning from "word" or "argument" to related applications of "law."

The translation of works of science into Latin began with Arabic medical texts in the eleventh century and continued until in the thirteenth century all the works of Aristotle had been translated together with Muslim commentaries and treatises on the organization of the sciences. The Neoplatonizing of Aristotle continued with the inclusion in the corpus of Aristotelian writings of the *Liber de Causis*, an extract from Proclus' *Elementatio Theologica*, and the *Theologia Aristotelis*, borrowed from Plotinus. Unlike the earlier canonizations of Greek literature in the West, the introduction of the Arabic sciences into the Christian canon of doctrines, arts, and institutions was a contribution to the preservation and interpretation of books. The thirteenth century was a period of communication among cultures, proselytizing, and intolerance. The Talmud and the Koran had been made available in Latin in the twelfth century. Latin philosophers quoted Maimonides correctly, borrowed arguments from him, and often agreed with his positions. The positions of Arabic commentators on Aristotle were known in detail and not inaccurately. The purpose of conversion of the Gentiles was merged with the search for and illumination of the truth. Aquinas discussed issues concerning which Christians, Muslims, and Jews might agree in the first three books of his *Summa Contra Gentiles* before treating specifically Christian doctrines in the fourth book. The translations of the Talmud and the works of Maimonides were burned by the Inquisitors, and the Koran was prohibited. The inclusion of the sciences in the canon of doctrines involved two processes and had two sets of consequences. The doctrines of the new sciences were examined by authorities in the institutions of the universities and the Church to determine what doctrines and books were to be condemned and banned and what doctrines and books were to be accepted and used. The arts of words and things, of invention and judgment, were applied to the new data and new methods, and transformed the study of conventional subjects like logic and theology into forms which prepared for the coming of modern science as the Muslim encyclopaedias and commentaries had not.

In the early years of the University of Paris, the Council of Paris prohibited the "reading," *lectura*, in public or private lessons, of Aristotle's works on natural philosophy or commentaries on them. In
the disputes concerning the relation of Aristotle's doctrines to Christian doctrines, whether they were mutually contradictory or could be made consistent with each other by purging the Aristotelian philosophy of errors introduced by Muslim interpretations, the faculties of the universities drew up lists or canons of doctrines, which were then prohibited by the Church. Muslim doctrines exposed Christian doctrines to dangers which gave animus to the controversies and the condemnations: the possibility that Augustine might have Avicennized and come close to pantheistic doctrines, and the possibility that Aquinas had Averroized and come close to the doctrines of a double truth. In 1277 the Archbishop of Paris condemned 219 errors drawn up by the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris, and two weeks later the Archbishop of Canterbury condemned a shorter similar list of errors prepared by Oxford University. The statements of the doctrines are ambiguous, and the doctrines of Aquinas as well as the doctrines of the Latin Averroists may be fitted to statements of errors listed. The Masters of Theology removed the ambiguity in judging the Masters of Arts, and Siger of Brabant and his associates were condemned of Averroistic errors. The collected judgments of the faculties of European universities concerning erroneous and heretical doctrines during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is a massive compilation.

Even during the times of the early Councils, Greek Fathers were prominent among those who expressed suspicions of councils. Gregory of Nazianzus wrote that personal squabbles took precedence over questions of faith in the discussions at councils, and he avoided them since he had never seen a council which ended well or cured ills. The Latins borrowed dialectical arguments from the Greeks for adaptation to forensic disputation concerning doctrines and heretics but suspected or condemned the systematic subtleties of the Greeks. The Greeks took into account Latin statements of problems, causes, and issues, but were suspicious of the authority of popes and councils as means of establishing canons of doctrines or beliefs. The departure of the Greek Church from the institutionalization of canons of the Latin accelerated step by step with the separation of the two empires and the two Churches. The Greek Church recognized the first seven universal Councils but not the eighth, the Fourth Council of Constantinople in 869–870, which excommunicated the Greek Patriarch Photius. The response of Photius put in question both the canon of institutions and the canon of doctrines of the Church: he excommunicated the Roman pope and questioned the insertion of *filioque* in the Nicene creed. The Greek Church did not recognize the thirteen universal Councils held after the schism of the Eastern and Western Churches in 1054.

The formation of Greek literature in the Byzantine tradition was a return to Greek authors for the restoration and preservation of the Greek Empire and the Greek Church by Greek culture. It laid the foun-
dations of philological, historical, and critical studies of literature, and developed the dialectical method and Neoplatonic principles of the Second Sophistic. In the ninth century, Photius wrote a Bibliotheca or Myriobiblion, a Library of critical accounts of 280 prose writings, many of which are now in large part lost, primarily in theology and history, but also in oratory, romance, philosophy, science, and medicine. He also wrote a Lexicon, a literary glossary, and an Amphilochia, a compilation of questions and answers on difficult points in Scripture. The Suda or Suidas is a lexicon, compiled during the tenth century, of information about authors and books sometimes based on the original texts, as in the case of Homer, Sophocles, Aristophanes, and the Greek Anthology, but more often on secondary compilations and lexicons. In the eleventh century, Psellus wrote a De Omnifaria Doctrina or All-inclusive Instruction which ranges through mathematics, music, astronomy, physics, metaphysics, ethics, theology, alchemy, demonology, medicine, jurisprudence, and topography. He also wrote paraphrases of the Iliad and of Aristotle's Categories, an abridgement of Porphyry's Introduction, a commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation, a treatise on Plato's Phaedrus, and an allegorical interpretation of Homer. He was learned in classical and patristic literature and an enthusiastic partisan of Plato and the Neoplatonists.

The Byzantine encyclopaedias and glossaries entered into the stream of translations from the Greek during the Renaissance and were subjected to the institutionalized canons of doctrines and arts of the West. Ficino translated the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus, and edited a volume of Neoplatonic writings which included Iamblichus' On the Mysteries of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Porphyry's On Divine Beings and Demons, Synesius' On Dreams, Pythagoras' Golden Verses and Symbols, and wrote a Book of Pleasure (Liber de Voluptate). The Platonism of the Academy of Florence embraced Iamblichus and Proclus as well as the Hermetic writings, the pseudo-Dionysius, and the Caballa. Pico della Mirandola wrote a Heptaplus or Septiform Enarration of the Work of the Six Days of Genesis. Moses spoke to all men, enveloping the light of his knowledge in simple words, so that the most humble could understand, but the wise could see more profound truths in his words. The Bible is the book of all secrets, and Moses embodied the Idea of the Writer, the Exemplar of the Prophet. John Colet, having heard Pico in 1496, applied his idea of the prophet as poet to the apostles in his study of St. Paul: sacred writers do not undertake to make us understand God, but to love him. Erasmus published new editions of the works of Aristotle, and of many of the Latin Church Fathers; and contemporary translations of Aristotle which replaced Medieval Latin with an approach to classical Ciceronian Latin, including the Book of Six Principles of Gilbert de la Porrée, written originally in Latin in the twelfth century, which had secured a place in the Aristotelian corpus.
Theologians returned from the interpretation of the sentences of interpreters to the interpretation of the words of the prophets, apostles, and Church Fathers. The prose accounts and poetic formulations of the search for a transcendental source of truths and values gave way to accounts and presentations in prose and verse of loves and seductions, educations and degradations, conflicts and betrayals, successes and expropriations of men. Divine letters and human letters began to follow clearly different paths, and separate agencies of ecclesiastical approbation and governmental registry were instituted to authorize the publication of books marked with imprimaturs and licenses. The Hellenistic and Roman lives of illustrious writers and the medieval lives of ecclesiastical writers were succeeded by bibliographies of books in all fields and by indexes of prohibited authors and books. Seventeenth-century philosophical speculation concerning freedom prepared the way for the inclusion of freedom of speech and of the press in the French and American bills of rights in the eighteenth century. Spinoza argued, in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, that the bases of morals, religion, and politics are distinct, and that freedom of thought and speech may not only be granted without prejudice to piety and public peace, but that they may not be withheld without endangering piety and public peace. John Locke argued, in his first *Letter concerning Toleration*, that the commonwealth is constituted for civil interests which do not include the salvation of souls and that toleration of differences is an essential part of Christianity.

The history of ideas finds its subject matter in existing books which discuss and illustrate freedom of thought and expression, and which testify by their existence to the operation of freedom and restraint of expression. The history of ideas is not an inquiry into the truth or falsity of the ideas an author expressed or opposed. The words of any author or work that is judged historically are ambiguous and have already been interpreted in more than one way. What is said may be judged to have been effective and to have been considered true by a variety of criteria which the historian of ideas finds in the discussions of the time or in later critical analyses by use of any among a number of methods of historical inquiry and criticism. The historian of ideas discovers and illuminates ideas and meanings in historical statements and actions. Critical judgment operates on three levels in the process: the judgment of the historian interpreting ideas and their consequences; the judgment of the author expressing and communicating ideas; and the judgment of the reader of histories and authors discovering ideas in books and events in the light of their histories. The history of ideas is not a judgment of truths or of entities: any historical period or literature, like the Hellenic period or Greek literature, takes on many forms in interpretation and use; any canon of doctrine or art of interpretation produces interpretations discordant with other interpretations; any historical or doctrinal
account of ideas is formed in a context of opposed histories and definitions. The freedom of thought and expression has contributed to the production, preservation, and interpretation of books, and the history of ideas contributes to the preservation of a plurality of judgments as a basis for the preservation of freedom of thought and expression in the production of books, judgments, and arts of judgment.