The celebration of the bicentenary of the founding of Princeton University affords a fitting occasion to review in 1946 the two hundred years of intellectual evolution in which it has participated and to examine the problems which we face today in the perspective of antecedent stages. Such a review is particularly significant, since the evolution of educational institutions brings into clear focus facts which we tend to forget in tracing the history and in celebrating the achievements of other institutions: that the discussion of theories and ideals influences the course of events and that ideas are themselves facts and have their histories in the intellectual and moral formation and action of a people. The problem which this conference has met to discuss—the development of international society—is one of the crucial problems of our times. On its solution may depend the solution of all other problems. The discussion of international society, moreover, is itself a phenomenon pertinent to the statement of the problems to which the discovery or institution of international society would afford a solution. Political and social problems have the peculiarity, shared by other practical inquiries, that the discussion may itself become part of the data of the problem. Inquiry into the development of international society is not merely a possible means toward its realization but evidence of the existence of international bonds and forces, for desire to further the ends of world community and understanding of its implications are themselves effective social bonds.

Any consideration of international society must involve some examination of ends sought in such a society; actual conditions as they bear on its desirability and possibility; and policies, devices, and theories designed to make the ends practicable in the circumstances. Yet the three questions are not independent, although it is easy to separate ends, conditions, and means in the abstract, and they can be distinguished in the context of any program of action or any theory of society. A practical problem exists when a program of action has not yet been arrived at; and agreement concerning action is possible without resolving differences of theory. Practicable ends cannot be chosen apart from conditions, yet there is no simple relation between the actual and the desirable: the end to

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2 Read at the opening session of the Conference on the Development of International Society of the Princeton University Bicentennial, October 11, 1946.
be pursued is not determined by the conditions, and the conception of an end and attachment to it may influence what is taken to be the actual situation. The practicability of objectives depends on some agreement concerning what is the case; but the facts vary as the approach and interpretation are changed. Conversely, ultimate ends and basic theories are not susceptible of rational demonstration or empirical refutation; another man's theory, viewed from without, becomes an ideology which fixes false ends and establishes fictitious facts, and pursuit of his purpose becomes the exercise of force or pressure. This peculiarity of social and political discussion is one of the chief sources of the confusion in which plans for practical action are involved, but it is also a source of hope, since practical problems are sometimes solved tangentially by agreement about means which had been shown antecedently to be inadequate to the purposes or impracticable in the circumstances.

The issues concerning world society will not be determined simply by ascertaining facts or by weighing the desirability and practicability of ends or by reconciling or refuting theories. Yet there is a tendency in the discussion of international society to present the issues in one of three forms of argument, in which international society is conceived so differently as to seem, in turn, already in existence, impossible, and a goal in process of achievement. If material conditions are examined in the interdependence of men and their common needs and dangers and in the improvement of facilities for production, transport, and communication, "one world" is discovered inescapably in existence, and it is argued that world community depends only on recognition of this material basis. If ends and purposes are examined in the actions and statements of men, a clash of ideologies and a neglect of moral issues is discovered, and it is argued that world society is impossible, since it depends on a community of shared values and an agreement concerning ends which have not yet been achieved. If present discussions and current efforts in international co-operation are examined, finally, it would seem that what is needed is the development and improvement of political institutions by which extant political states and international institutions may be oriented to the determination and enforcement of a common policy.

It is the purpose of this paper to argue that the political question is prior to the economic and the moral questions in the development of world society, precisely because the resolution of political questions is a means to the solution of economic and moral questions. The position is difficult to state and to defend, for political problems have economic and moral bases and their solution is advanced by economic and moral means, and this interdependence facilitates their translation to one another or even confusion with one another. The priority of the political—and, indeed, its distinction from the economic or the moral—can be established only by means of questions which cut across political, economic, and moral considerations and indicate their relations in theory, in history, and in purpose.

Questions of theory and policy have, in the first place, become questions of "communication." In the absence of agreement about ends or means, rights or freedom, the problems of international society cannot be discussed in terms of the purposes it is to achieve, the institutions it should employ, or the facts which render it desirable or inevitable. Instead, theories have been treated as abstrac-
tions unrelated to practical situations or as ideologies explained by period, class, or purpose; ideals have become expressions of interests, common or particular, or impractical fantasies; and the actual situation is variously viewed as an extension of the struggle of classes or a stage in the progress of freedom and in the opposition between capitalism and communism or between East and West, the signs of democracy and fascism or of freedom and oppression being detected, depending on the theory preferred, now on one side, now on the other. In their practical form moral, political, and economic issues in international questions become problems of communication, because all the important words—"peace," "welfare," "security," "freedom," "democracy," "national state," "international society"—are ambiguous. In the second place, since these ambiguities are not verbal or subject to arbitrary solutions, proper understanding of them depends on the statement of real issues which can be traced, behind the difficulties of communication, in the development of national states and their international relations. Finally, the purposes of international society, as they emerge from a consideration of theory and history, must be formulated in terms which remove the ambiguities inherent in "peace," "security," "welfare," or any other embodiment of ends in institutions feasible or operative in present circumstances, whatever the oppositions of attitude or theory which remain in the reasons for joining in common action.

I. THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

In the absence of previous agreement concerning fact, purpose, or theory, all practical problems become, first of all, problems of communication, and differences of interpretation, intention, or device set up the opposite poles of persuasion or debate. The discussion of circumstances, criteria, and means depends on some previous agreement, not only to insure the application of statements univocally to the same problem, but also to permit the differentiation and identification of fact, end, and statement. But if theoretical problems become problems of communication and translation in the oppositions of theories, problems of communication are transmuted, in turn, into problems of fact or problems of ends. Purposes and ideas may, on the one hand, be explained by the economic or social conditions of those who conceive them; or the ills of the present may be traced, on the other hand, to an exclusive concern with short-range and material interests on the part of all men or of men in power or of men opposed to right reason and good will. In this circle of translation and reduction there is no means of differentiating between true and false or good and evil, since both are expressions of interest; or, if they are differentiated, false and evil seldom have any clear distinguishing mark other than that they follow from the point of view opposed. Yet in the discussions in which theories and policies are opposed and in the debates in which the resolutions of such differences become problems of communication, it may be argued, by either side, that theories, policies, and even modes of expression are determined by what uniquely is the case or by what imperatively should be, and problems of communication are therefore presented either as problems of fact to be ascertained scientifically or problems of ends to be inculcated morally. All discussions of practical problems may thus be treated as examples of the opposition between those who defend science or lament attacks on the use of scientific methods and
those who defend ethics or lament departures from moral ideals. The distinction between fact and ideal—when all problems, theoretical as well as practical, are made problems of communication—becomes in the statements of philosophers and sociologists a contrast between realism and idealism, ideology and utopia, or power and justice.

Once questions of theory have been transformed into the dialectical opposition of theses in discussion and communication, history and fact are fitted easily to the support of either side or either theory. It is apparent from examination of man’s actions and statements, no less than from study of the evolution of his ideas and ideals, that the nature of things as he conceives them and the objectives which he sets for action are shaped by the conditions of his life. The sociology of knowledge makes place not only for the ideas that express current social and economic patterns but also for ideas that set new patterns for future action, and no philosophy is so lost in utopian speculation as to neglect the actual situations which contain the potentialities of ideal fulfillments or the marks of a perfection from which they are degradations. Ideas of justice are expressions of interest, whether they are defenses of the status quo or expressions of revolutionary aspirations; and, however determined, ideas of justice are at once dependent on the support of adequate power and themselves instruments of power. Yet only the more theoretic of the realists are prepared to defend the thesis that “might makes right”; and when justice is defined as the interest of the stronger, the fuller elaboration of the position runs into the difficulty, which Socrates forced even Thrasymachus to recognize, that the “stronger” is strong only if he has knowledge of his true interests, and in the long run his interests involve considerations of justice. In these exchanges of compliments, the sociologist and the economist can explain the philosopher’s predilections and purposes by the material conditions under which he developed them, and the philosopher can detect the principles which underlie social and economic explanations and raise questions concerning the ideals implicit in them.

Since theories of “communication” and “language” exhibit the same ambivalence as the theories to which they are applied, the opposition between the treatment of ideals in terms of facts and the interpretation of facts in terms of purposes is not resolved by the efforts of semanticists to explain philosophic antinomies and resolve social problems by clarifying the symbols in which they are expressed. It has been fashionable to treat communication in terms of the multiplicity of languages, the ambiguity of statements, and the manipulations of propaganda and to consider ideas, convictions, and theories, if at all, in terms of the findings of opinion polls, the development and use of instruments of mass communication, and analyses of content in communications designed to isolate the means for planting opinions. Human motives, loyalties, and beliefs are treated largely in terms of human types, classes, races, or nations; statements are examined in terms of deceptions worked contrary to true interests; and education is planned in terms of information, propaganda, group solidarity, or welfare programs. At the other extreme there is a growing tendency to view the problems of communication in terms of the reformulation of cultural ideals, many of which have found expression in art, literature, religion, philosophy, and social institutions. The analysis of the conditions and instrumentalities of communi-
cation seems to preclude consideration of the ends of communication, except as determined by circumstances and available means; while the discussion of ends seems divorced from action, even to the extent of providing no means for their realization other than the pious hope that a moral reform may make ideals effective as they have not been in the past.

The separation of facts and purposes so sharply that the distinction between power and justice is made a source of opposition in theory and of contradiction in the interpretation of fact has consequences in both the discussion of theory and the debate of practice. In the discussion of theory the very nature of morals and of the social sciences, as well as their relation to other sciences which treat of nature and facts, has been subject of debate. Philosophers and social scientists who differ in most other respects, from Plato through Hobbes to the modern "realists" in jurisprudence and political science, have argued that the treatment of human actions and institutions will become "scientific" only when the facts of action and association are formulated in laws comparable to those discovered in mathematics and the physical sciences. Other philosophers and social scientists, who have little else in common, from Aristotle through Kant to Dewey, have argued that the regularities of social behavior must be distinguished from those of natural phenomena, since purposes are not irrelevant to investigation in the social sciences but are themselves to be numbered among the facts and since the possibility of change is affected by the desire for change. In the debate of practice both sides in opposition on a particular issue may be subjected to the same criticisms from opposed points of view, and opposite courses of action may be defended by the same statements of ideal and fact. A course of action advanced as "democratic" is usually criticized as despotic, authoritarian, or fascistic and opposed by another course defended as truly democratic. Recent discussions of the freedom of the press, the conduct of elections, and the conditions of trade in enemy or newly liberated nations have afforded abundant examples of the opposed meanings which "freedom" and "equality" may assume, and the discussion of peace treaties and applications for membership in the United Nations are impressive illustrations of the facility with which nations may tolerate in the states which they support faults which they exorciate in states which they oppose.

The solution of the problem of communication in theory requires reconciliation or reduction of the differences of social scientists; but, fortunately, the problems of communication in practice in a world community need not wait for that happy insight and decisive demonstration, for practical problems may be resolved by distinguishing the three related considerations which make the nature and existence of an international society ambiguous and by providing a means of coming to agreement concerning actions which may serve both to resolve material problems and to prepare for a community of ideas by clarifying the relations of ends and ideas to each other. Material circumstances, economic contingencies, and military dangers are not themselves sufficient to force any manner of association on men who think themselves in opposition. If the physical universe has been contracted by recognized interdependences of needs and problems and by increased speed of communication and travel, the process has not led to a greater understanding of
common problems and aspirations or even to accurate statements or sympathetic interpretations of differences. Nor, on the other hand, is it plausible that moral preachment can lead to sufficient unanimity in philosophic doctrine, religious dogma, or economic theory to weld together a world community. In spite of the fact that every force and creed that ever was thought to unite men—religious belief; moral doctrine; social, economic, legal, psychological, or even biological compulsions—has been suggested again as the means by which an international society will finally be constituted, man is further from a community of shared values, continuous tradition, and common meanings than he has been at other times in his history. The greatest hope for the survival and advancement of civilization lies not in founding a world society on the solution of economic problems or in seeking its conditions in a preliminary moral community, but in the strengthening of an international organization and in the institution of a world state, for it is conceivable that men may agree upon actions, within stipulated limitations, when they have not agreed about theories or creeds. Such a political organization in practice could at the same time provide opportunity and guidance for the solution of the material problems which have set the nations of the world in opposition and contribute by action to removing misapprehensions and quieting fears which stand in the way of a community of understanding. It could in theory escape the false opposition of modern realists and idealists, for it could claim the support of both. Communities based on force depend on a statement of doctrine and purpose, and they are opposed effectively only by other ideals backed by adequate force; and communities based on common understanding and aspiration depend on power adequate to bring opposed interests and beliefs into harmony with the common good of the community. Recent history has shown the dependence of the political institutions on material sufficiency and on some semblance of formulation of basic principles; but it is no less clear that political devices are instruments which operate in lieu of economic force or moral suasion in the solution of economic problems and in the resolution of the conflict of doctrines.

II. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONS IN A WORLD COMMUNITY

The ambivalence of theories and the confusion of communication are particularly apparent in the discussion of international political organizations and in the history of attempts to set them in operation. An international society is ultimately a form of association of the men and women of the world; but the members of such a society, whether it is actual or yet to be realized, are united by different needs and purposes in many groups and associations, and those communities of interest are the source of both aids and hindrances to the formation of a more inclusive society. Economic and social forces which make for unity may be interpreted from antagonistic points of view and become the basis for intellectual and moral opposition. Common ideals may be translated by ideological differences into material oppositions and require the protection of spheres of influence and the definition of policed boundaries. Many philosophies besides stoicism and many religions besides Christianity have conceived of men as brothers or as citizens of the world; but, since the concept of the "household" has more than merely an etymological con-
nection with "economics," the conflict of economic classes may be thought to be a necessary preliminary to a classless and nonpolitical society; or, since the generations of the family of mankind have led to differences of races and species, the unity of the world may be projected in terms of the rule of the fittest; or, finally, since economic interests or cultural ideals may be embodied in political organizations, the fate of an international society may turn on the issue of the struggles of nations. The ambiguities of "force" and "justice" confuse the issue of an international society, whether these preliminary struggles are thought of in terms of the conflict of proletariat and capitalist, of underprivileged and privileged peoples, or of despotic and democratic forms of government. We have fought a war to prevent, in the interests of justice, a unification of the world by force; and we have discovered that the organization of political instrumentalities to achieve justice and prevent further appeal to force encounters difficulties because the pursuit of justice by opposed interests, ideologies, and sovereignties assumes the appearance, or the suspicion, of force. The terms of the problem of an international society are set by the situation. A society depends on material sufficiency and spiritual community, and political institutions may serve to separate questions on which agreement is necessary for action from questions on which disagreement need not lead to action detrimental to society and from questions which need not have the same solution for the entire community; but, to effect that separation, political institutions must possess power adequate to enforce agreements concerning necessary action. The problems of a world state may, therefore, be formulated in terms of the constituent parts of which it must be composed and in terms of the manner of its organization and operation.

Whether international political institutions are set up by peaceful means or by force, the extant nation-states will be the instruments effecting the change. It seems probable, likewise, that they must be, whether in their present form or modified in the assumption of their broader responsibilities, the units of the eventual world organization or world state. Such doubts as have been suggested concerning their ultimate function in relation to an international society have arisen from the varied history of the development of modern nations and the consequent ambiguities of the term as it is applied to the present nations of the world. Those ambiguities may be summarized in terms of the economic, cultural, and political differences which contribute to the confusion of modern theory and communication. The great nations which emerged and assumed their characteristic form in the nineteenth century could take advantage of a separation of political and economic considerations and set up political institutions, rights, and duties on the assumption that at least the broad lines of a laissez faire economy were in effect; the states of the twentieth century have taken more and more economic functions, and the boundaries of states are crossed more and more by economic interests and responsibilities. The criteria for the definition of a nation and the fixing of national boundaries were sought in the nineteenth century in the ideals of "self-determination" and the "liberation of oppressed peoples"; but the attempt to apply such ideals in the Covenant of the League of Nations failed to take account of modern developments and oppositions of military and economic power. Finally, victory in the war which was to make the
world safe for democracy led, rather, to innovations in despotism; and a second peace settlement is faced with the problem of redefining the "freedom," "equality," and even "democracy" which it seeks to secure. Freedom conceived in terms of political rights and guaranteed by equality before the law and equal access to the courts is defective when detached from the ideals of economic and social equality and freedom conceived in terms of social responsibility; and the ideology of liberal democracy has been opposed to the development of instruments of mass democracy. A world state might contribute to the resolution of these antinomies, if their resolution is not a condition antecedent to the setting-up of a world state, but the problems which a world state must solve cannot await the resolution of these related problems.

The immediate problem of forming a world state turns on the form of co-operation adapted to the oppositions of nation-states and adequate to the solution of their common problems. Viewed abstractly, there are three possibilities. States may associate in treaty, confederacy, or league without surrendering to the larger unit of association any sovereignty or any powers directly over their citizens; states may unite with other states or be subjected to another state in a new unitary state which is sovereign over all subjects or citizens; and, finally, states may form a federation in which the federal government operates for certain purposes directly on the citizens of the constituent states, not indirectly through the medium of those states, while the constituent states retain their authority, each over its own citizens, in all matters not assigned to the jurisdiction of the federal government. Attempts to establish a world state by force, in the distant and the recent past, have sought justification on the ground that violence and revolution were essential to effect a transition to a form of corporate life which might, once instituted, operate on the principles of justice. Even apart from the fact that force has never been sufficient and moral community has never been universal, there are good reasons to doubt, also, the desirability of referring all problems to a single central government. Recent efforts to develop leagues have proceeded on the hope that "common opinion," the "harmony of interests," or "respect for law" would be a sufficient basis for co-operation or, failing that, would provide a transition to the point at which the new international institutions would be endowed, in consequence of their successful operation, with power adequate to enforce their decisions. A federal organization could depart from the impotence of a league in questions which endanger the peace of the world without sacrificing the full sovereignty of nations or the rights and responsibilities which citizens enjoy under them.

A federal structure would make possible the exercise of a genuine legislative function by the central government, whereas the conventions or agreements of a league require ratification or enactment by the member-states. A strict rule of law would then be available for enforcement by the executive arm of the world government and for interpretation by the federal courts, in the place of observation of agreements at the will of the component states and arbitration by the parties to a dispute according to principles attributed to the law of nature. Such power could be vested in a world federal government, in turn, only if the power bore on individual men and women, who were citizens of the world federal...
state as well as of their particular nation, and only if the power were limited to the matters specifically assigned to the federal government. Two interrelated anomalies peculiar to leagues would thus be removed by a federation: a coercive power would restrict the principle of free agreement of states and restrain the competition of states for freedom of action, and the operation of law on men and women, to be treated as free and equal, would be substituted for the principle of equalities of states. The possibility of a federal government—and of world law-enforcement and world citizenship—depend, in turn, on the possibility of dividing sovereignty and of defining the proper ends of world government.

III. THE PROBLEM OF THE FUNCTION OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

The political problems of an international society can be solved justly only by the delegation of adequate power to a supra-national political organization, and such a federation is possible only if the constituent states yield some part of their sovereignty. The delegation of power and its limitation are both defined by the ends of government: if the world federal government is to be effective, it must possess power adequate at least to maintain peace; if the world federal government is to be instituted and brought into operation, the rights and privileges of extant states must have adequate safeguard. This is the statement either of a hopeless dilemma or of a rule for action. There is no simple formula by which to measure the limits of what is adequate in either case or to formulate the safeguards of either definition in terms of quantities of power; but a separation of functions may be made the basis of a dynamic interrelation by which men and their corporate associations may determine those limits, without resort to physical violence or departure from legal justice. If a central political organization is given the power to legislate concerning the manufacture and possession of the instruments of extreme destruction which have given the present international crisis an urgency different in kind from previous threats of war and concerning other questions which involve the threat of armed conflict, there may be time and inclination to try the resolution of problems of economic, social, cultural, and moral adjustment by voluntary co-operative action of associations of men and nations and by study and recommendation of advisory organs of the federal government. Within the frame of even limited federal homogeneity, states or groups of people may federate for particular political purposes or associate for the achievement of economic, moral, or intellectual ends, and large units may federalize into smaller units more appropriate for specific purposes. In the complex of such associations the problem of mutual understanding may be attacked in the context of a developing common tradition and common trust. The central problems of federation for these purposes are new in the history of federal organizations, for they turn on the possibility of a federal organization of which the parts are diverse in their economies, their political forms, and their ideologies. If peace depends on the resolution of all such differences, the practical difficulties faced by statesmen will continue to be masked in ambiguities which permit opposed policies to claim identical ideals, and the theoretic difficulties treated by philosophers and sociologists will continue to be set forth as an opposition between those who neglect spiritual values and those who op-
pose science, between realism and idealism, ideology and utopia. If, on the other hand, political institutions can be set up for the discussion and resolution of problems, it is conceivable that agreement on action and policy may be possible even in economic questions without agreement concerning theory, and the resolution of problems of action may, in turn, contribute to the clarification of differences and coincidences of theory. The very ambiguities that distract the discussion of problems will contribute to the possibility of action, for most of the nations of the world and all the great powers make use of common political terms and conceptions—the election, the representative assembly, the ideals of freedom, equality, and even democracy; and, although they differ so widely that either extreme of practice or conception seems to the other sophistic and unprincipled, analogous contradictions, found within the practices of a single country or in the evolution of its institutions, are ground of hope for an evolution to homogeneity of world practice and polity.

The separation of political institutions from economic issues and moral and intellectual principles and the limitation of the end of world government to the maintenance of the peace, however, are themselves open to misinterpretation. The separation of functions is made in recognition, not in denial, of their organic interrelations, for the multiplicity of men's purposes and needs leads to the association of men in a multiplicity of organizations, and the fate of an international society depends on discerning the international public which will exercise the political functions of that society. Any statement of ends for those political functions will be subject to the ambiguity of which the opposition of "power" and "justice" is a sign in modern discussions. "Peace" may be defined in a minimum sense as an absence of change; but the history of the last twenty-five years furnishes a multitude of reasons for suspicion of the ideal of "peace" and "collective security" conceived in terms of resistance to "aggression," for, in the absence of a power to enact and enforce laws, the judicial treatment of aggression tends to be a defense of the status quo; justice tends to be determined by the "haves" and power to be employed by the "have-nots"; and "liberal democracies" tend to be opposed to "mass democracies," and "pluto-democracies" to "people's democracies." "Peace" and "security" have also a broader definition, and the "harmony of interests" is determined in that broader sense by considerations of "welfare" and the "common good," for peace is ultimately achieved only by the harmonious functioning and interaction of the parts of a society. The legislative power vested in a federal government is the instrument by which such an order and interrelation may be established, since it provides a means by which international relations may depart from past theories and past establishments. Peace can be achieved only if provision is made for change as well as stability, and security is conceivable only if revolutions can have a peaceful issue and control. In a dynamic interrelation of associations in an international society, political institutions directed to the maintenance of peace and invested with power adequate for that function will succeed in the long run either by the development of other agencies for social, economic, and intellectual co-operation or by the growth of legislative power. They will fail if the power delegated for the task is insufficient or if requirements of justice are unsatisfied.
The ambiguities which are found in the theoretic statement of the problems of international society and the dilemmas which impede action in its interests are not independent of each other, nor, on the other hand, are they solved by the same devices. Three major theses have emerged in the consideration of means by which practical may be distinguished from theoretic problems in the interests of peaceful co-operation and agreement concerning action.

The first thesis asserts the priority of the political in modes of coming to agreement concerning courses of action. In discussions of international society and in efforts to act in recognition of its needs, economic, social, moral, and intellectual problems are closely interwoven. Yet that interdependence is conceived and stated in many ways: it is thought that moral and intellectual problems will be resolved if men can agree about means of removing material needs and inequities, and it is thought that economic and social inequalities will disappear if men can agree about the nature of justice and goodness. Antinomies and ambiguities occur not only in the opposition of theory to theory and in the contradiction of fact by fact, but also—since these oppositions and contradictions are possible only because of the mutual relations of theories and facts—in the confusion of theories and purposes with facts and evolutionary developments. In the discussion of theories, ambiguities and antinomies are removed by careful definitions bearing on the situation under consideration; and, when the discussion and theory are about a practical problem, the existence of differences of interpretation and purpose in the minds of men and groups of men is part of the factual situation. In the discussion of practice, ambiguities and antinomies which arise in the opposition of the parties to the debate are differences not only of theory and purpose but also of interpretation of facts and therefore are not effectively removed by definition or readily modified by empirical inquiry.

Since action and co-operation cannot await the removal of sectarian differences, the political means of coming to agreement concerning courses of action provides the one alternative both to the unjustified use of force (whether in the manipulation of material advantages or in the imposition of economic theories or moral criteria) and to the ineffective use of intellectual and moral suasion (whether for the distribution of material goods or for the definition of justice). The application of this thesis to the problems of international society suggests the conclusion that the formation or discovery of world society depends on the constitution of supra-national political institutions in which ambiguities of theory and interpretation may be avoided in the concreteness of agreements about particular courses of action.

The second thesis asserts the priority of the political in forms of association. It follows as a consequence of the thesis of the priority of the political in modes of coming to agreement concerning courses of action, for, as the first thesis seeks in the establishment of political institutions which might contribute to the eventual solution of economic and moral problems a political mean between the extremes of stating problems exclusively in economic or moral terms, the second thesis seeks to avoid the unreal separation of power and freedom either by the elevation of power to moral right or the reduction of freedom to moral indifference, and to provide a political mean between these extremes in the recognition of a multiplicity and order of human associations.
among which political associations take their place. If political institutions are essential to agreement concerning action in a world society, those institutions must be associations of the men and women of the world, and they must find their place among other human associations. They will satisfy these conditions most readily if they are federal in distribution of functions and powers, for a federal world government would legislate directly on the men and women who are citizens of the world state and would reserve the exercise of specific functions to the nations of the world or to the parts of nations or to the combinations in which nations or their parts or groups of men might associate. The alternatives to federation are the league or the unitary state. Since the league does not possess legislative powers and its member-states operate as sovereign and separate units, the only means of coming to agreement which it provides are indirect (for decisions must be ratified by the member-states) and incomplete (for decisions are binding only on states which ratify them and they may be further restricted on important matters by the principle of unanimity). The unitary state, on the other hand, tends to obliterate the multiplicity of human associations, since it does not provide for the distribution of functions that might be exercised better by small units or for the protection of the legitimate aspirations of states; and non-political functions may therefore be assimilated to the exercise of political power, and social and cultural differences may be reduced to a common mold in the centralizing of political power. In general, since action and co-operation are impossible in any group if the minority is at all points free to withdraw from the execution of decisions or if the uniform course of action is imposed exclusively by the use of force, the political form of association provides the one alternative to anarchy when persuasion is insufficient to bring about agreement and to despotism when power is sufficient to enforce it. The application of this thesis to the problems of international society suggests the conclusion that federation is the form of organization in which the antinomies of action and the ambiguities of justification may be controlled by the limitation of power to specific spheres and purposes.

The third thesis asserts the priority of the political in the selection of ends for corporate action. There is general agreement among the peoples of the world in seeking peace and in requiring that the conditions of peace be just, since an unjust peace will not endure. There is little agreement concerning the actions that will bring about justice or even concerning the eventual conditions to be sought as embodying justice. Between the two world wars, justice was sought, without adequate examination of the consequences in fact or the assumptions in theory, both in the stabilization of the status quo and in the institution of revolutionary changes, and the use of force in jeopardy to the condition of peace was detected both in actions of aggression and in defenses of privilege. We are no clearer, after the conclusion of the second World War, concerning what is desirable in the accessibility of materials or the distribution of rights. We have, however, come to a widespread recognition that men must defend their “freedoms” and that they can do this by means of “democratic” institutions, while recognizing that both “freedom” and “democracy” are ambiguous in the statements and actions of nations. We have come to a widespread agreement
that "peace" must be preserved, while recognizing that "peace" is not a mere cessation of hostilities consequent on isolating parts of the world from each other or subjugating some parts of the world to others. Since peace is impossible without justice and since the advancement of justice has been involved in a dilemma in which the defense of political rights and freedom seems to some to endanger economic rights, while cooperative action to further economic rights seems to others to lead to curtailment of political rights, the political selection of ends for corporate action provides a way of viewing peace as a world order in which the nations function in healthy and harmonious interrelation. The application of this thesis to the problems of international society suggests the conclusion that the criteria of peace so conceived may be evolved by employing the ambiguities and indeterminacies found in the forms of "democratic" government to preserve, on the one hand, the multiplicity of agencies which should be brought into relation in an international society and to extend, on the other hand, the use of political power in the just resolution of economic and social problems.

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