is guided by precepts, commands, and rational rules, which determine the forms, and therefore the definitions, of virtues and artistic productions. The method of the practical sciences is directed to operation, while the method of the theoretic sciences is directed to knowledge. The artist and the moral agent use actual situations to achieve possible ends, whereas the physical scientist uses actual natures and ends to infer necessary antecedents. As a result of their similarities, nature and art are frequently run together in a single example when Aristotle treats of one or the other; as a result of their differences, distinctions which are difficult in the one are made by analogies borrowed from the other. Ends and necessary conditions cannot be separated in nature as they can be in the arts, for in nature they are successive stages of a single process, while in art the end is in the mind of the artist, the conditions in his materials. Aristotle therefore usually distinguishes efficient from final causes, necessity from end, and even formal from final cause, in the physical sciences by isolating them in the builder and his house, or in the sculptor and his statue. On the other hand the definitions of the practical sciences cannot have the precision of scientific definitions: therefore Aristotle borrows devices from mathematics (as when the virtues are defined by an adaptation of proportions) or from physics (as when the "life" and "soul" of a tragedy is sought in its plot or the state is likened to a living being).

The differences and likenesses which can be found in the subject matters of the practical and the physical sciences, as well as in their methods, are crucial also in determining the character of the practical sciences themselves and their relations to each other. The question of subject matter in ethics and politics may be stated partly in terms of the difference between the "natures" studied in physics and the "actions" studied in political philosophy and partly in terms of the differences between the political determination of rules for action by the state as opposed to the ethical determination of actions to the potentiality of the individual. The question of method is a consequence of the peculiarity of the subject matter of ethics and politics, for if actions, virtues, and institutions are not fixed and determinate, strict scientific definitions and demonstrations are impossible and it would follow that the dialectical method is appropriate to the political sciences.

Aristotle tells us that Socrates first of the philosophers turned to the consideration of moral and political questions. Yet the distinction between "natural" and "conventional" was old when Socrates undertook his moral inquiries, and his effort to introduce some scientific rigor into them was made in opposition to the many current forms of the doctrine that virtue and the good are determined wholly by convention, and that things and actions are in themselves indifferent. Socrates' solution, as emphasized by Plato, was to identify virtue and knowledge; Plato's solution, as Aristotle is fond of reiterating, was to identify the good and being. In opposition to Socrates, Aristotle denied that virtue is knowledge or that men do not voluntarily do evil; in opposition to Plato, Aristotle denied the substantiality of the Good. Yet with Socrates and Plato he contended that moral and political actions involved more than arbitrary decisions concerning questions of power and convention. Since they are actions, Aristotle was
convinced they must be understood, as are the like processes studied in physics, by the material potentialities they realize and the purposes they achieve; that is, by their necessity and their ends. Nature is encountered in political problems at two extremes, in the "natural" passions and powers of individual men and in the "natural" associations which are essential to life and the ends of living. The proper subject matter of political and moral philosophy, however, centers between these two manifestations of nature in actions and more particularly in habituations, which result from actions and which in turn determine actions. Happiness and the virtues are determined in part by potentialities found in the individual; they are determined in part by institutions which are brought to bear on the actualization of those potentialities in family, social relations, and state. Happiness and virtue are acquired; they are not the gift of nature, of providence, or of chance, nor are they imparted by teaching or acquired by learning, although the acquisition of happiness or virtue is often influenced by the effects of inclination, fortune, or precept; happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, and the virtues are habits formed through the performance of actions like those which are in turn consequent on virtue.

The many problems of morality as they affect the individual cannot be separated from each other or from problems of political association in the fashion in which the substances and motions studied in physics can be separated and defined. Consequently ethics and politics are not separate sciences treating of independent subject matters but rather dialectically distinct approaches to common problems. Those problems may be considered in terms of the capacities and potentialities of individual men, and, so considered, moral actions reflect the influences exercised by social groups and by the state on men. They may be considered as they bear on the relations and ends of communal life, and, so considered, the practicability of social aims and actions is determined by inquiry concerning the individuals who participate in the group. The state is one of the determining influences in ethical considerations, and conversely the solution of political problems would be indeterminate if no account were taken of the character, occupations, and material environment of citizens. The two may on occasion be distinct and antithetical rather than complementary, for the moral characters of the citizens may be hindrances to, as they are also materials for, political aims in a given state; and the political constitution of the state may either systematise or disrupt the forces which operate toward the acquisition of virtues and toward the ends of moral aspiration. Laws may aid men to virtue or supply in part the lack of virtue, but they do not alone make men good; the virtues may incline men to social consciousness, but they do not in all states make men politically effective. In the ideal case, however, ethics and politics approximate to each other, for in the perfect state the good citizen would coincide with the good man. (Fn.3)

In the relation of the two branches of practical philosophy, political philosophy, in the narrow sense in which it is limited to consideration of the associations of men in social groups, assumes priority over moral philosophy, in the narrow sense in which it is limited to consideration of the actions and virtues of men, for the former treat of ends and the latter of the means
to such ends. Aristotle therefore refers to both ethics and politics as political philosophy and treats politics as an architectonic science and the art of arts, under which all arts and sciences fall for supervision. The functions assigned to political philosophy indeed seem at times to put it in competition with metaphysics, and in some subsequent philosophies, politics supersedes metaphysics for reasons which are treated by Aristotle, but the supervision which politics exercises on the sciences is in no danger of confusion in his philosophy with the treatment of scientific principles in metaphysics. All that is required is a dialectical distinction, for metaphysics is a consideration of scientific principles to the end of determining their adequacy to demonstrations and their appropriateness to subject matters, while politics involves the consideration of arts and sciences to the end of determining whether training in them is appropriate or permissible for citizens. (Fn.4)

The Nicomachean ethics and the Politics may be viewed as parts of a single inquiry or of a single science in which what is assumed in the one approach constitutes the problem for the other, and what is fixed and natural is now the passions and actions which must be regulated by habit, and now the needs which must be satisfied and the ends which must be achieved by association. The Nicomachean ethics begins with a search for some acceptable conception of the good, of happiness, and of activity according to virtue, and finds a basis for such a conception at last in the passions and actions of the human soul; it ends, after having treated of the virtues and happiness, friendship and pleasure, with the recognition that knowledge is insufficient in practical questions and that if something is to be done about them, appeal must be made to the law.

But it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if one has not been brought up under the right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason their nature and occupations should be fixed by law; for they will not be painful when they have become customary. But it is surely not enough that when they are young they should get the right culture and attention; since they must, even when they are grown up, practise and be habituated to them, we shall need laws for this as well, and generally speaking to cover the whole of life; for most people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense of what is noble. (Fn.5)

The Politics, conversely, begins with an inquiry into the natural bases of the various forms of human association preliminary to schematizing the kinds of states suited to supply the natural needs and ideal ends of men variously endowed and variously associated; after enumerating the kinds of states, ideal states among others, and after treating the individuals in the state, their influence in determining the constitution of the state and the influence of the institutions of the state in forming the character of its citizens, the treatise ends with a consideration of preserving or destroying states. (Fn.6)

The things which are the subject matter of the two treatises, actions and associations, virtues and constitutions, have no natural or absolute status in existence and yield no essential or scientific definitions. The inquiry into natural bases in both cases serves to fix points of reference for definitions which determine and differentiate habits and constitutions, not according
to natural kinds, but according to criteria of practical appropriateness, effectiveness, and value. The actions and passions of man supply such principles in moral inquiry, since the virtues are defined as habits which regulate or perfect man's powers. The traits and functions by which men and classes of men supplement one another in association, supply similar material principles in politics, since constitutions and citizens are defined by the manner of their association. Consequently, laws may, in the absence of virtues, supply an end which substitutes the single virtue of justice for all virtues; and virtue may, in the absence of proportion in a state, restore a balance by the revolutionary institution of a better-grounded constitution. Neither men nor states, neither citizens nor associations, are absolute in substance or fixed in quality. Either may effect the alteration of the other, and inquiry is possible concerning either, therefore, only if the other is held fixed. This is done, since the ends of men and states are the same, by consideration of material potentialities, since "nature" is found, for moral inquiry, in the powers and passions which may be regulated according to rational principles, while for political inquiry "nature" is found in the powers in citizens which cause them to balance and supplement each other for the promotion of a common good life in the constitution of states.

The dialectical character of the practical sciences is apparent, then, from their subject matter, which resists "natural" delimitation and "essential" definitions. It is no less apparent in the fashion in which problems are stated or in the methods used for their solution, for the "things" on which practical questions turn ultimately are men's actions, and the distinction between the "opinions of men" and the "nature of things," which marks the difference between dialectical and scientific methods, is no longer simple. This means more than that the basic problem of the Nicomachean ethics, that is, the problem of the nature of the good, is stated dialectically and is forthwith solved dialectically; parallels to both the manner of statement and to the initial solution could be found in the theoretic sciences. A preliminary difference between the dialectical treatment of theoretical and practical problems may be seen in the greater importance given to the opinion of ordinary men in the assessment of common opinions about the good. The treatment of the problem is typically dialectical, for there is wide agreement in the statement of a solution, but difficulties arise in interpreting; the significance of the terms in which it is expressed.

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. (Fn.7)

Both the philosophers and the run of people undertake to define happiness by means of an end to which action is directed, most people identifying it with the attainment of some simple and obvious objective, like pleasure, wealth, or honor, but the philosophers seeking some self-subsistent cause of the goodness of all things.
Such inquiry into the nature of happiness is reminiscent of the method which Aristotle used in psychology, where functions were investigated by examining the unique objects of those functions, but according to Aristotle, the problem and therefore the method of moral inquiry are distinct from those of physics. A more pertinent difference between the dialectical treatment of man's moral opinions and the dialectic used on his predecessors' scientific theories lies in the fact that, while he recognizes in his customary fashion that there must be some truth in these opinions, (Fn.3) and while he shows against the mass of men that their simple objectives are not adequate ends, and against Platonists and like-minded philosophers that the good has no claim to independent existence, Aristotle's own solution does not depend on the identification of one or more substitute ends, but on the identification of powers by which ends are not only determined, but achieved. Happiness is activity of a certain kind, not an activity to a certain end; it is activity in accordance with virtue, and the kinds of virtues are determined, not by a "natural" good to which they are directed, nor by a "natural" action in which they are found, but by the powers, rational and irrational, discernible in the soul, (Fn.9) The method of ethics is precisely the reverse of that of psychology, for in the investigation of the sensitive, or the nutritive, or the intellectual powers of man, Aristotle begins with the object and infers from it the nature of the act and the power which is uniquely directed to such acts and such objects, while in ethics he begins with a power indeterminately oriented to actions which may be good or evil and seeks the habit or rational rule which would regulate or advance action in accordance with criteria so specified.

The distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues is made in terms of psychological powers. The moral virtues are habits which regulate that portion of the activities of the irrational part of the soul which, though capricious and irregular, is susceptible to the influence of persuasion and capable of submission to a rational principle, that is, those functions of the soul which involve appetite and desire, for not all irrational activities (such as, for example, the vegetative functions) can be made to share in a rational principle. The intellectual virtues are habits which perfect the activities of the rational part of the soul, and are concerned therefore with the perfection and formulation of regularities and laws, sometimes for application in the regulation of life, sometimes to no other end than the acquisition and contemplation of truth. Since moral and intellectual virtues differ thus in nature, the ways in which they are acquired are different too, for moral virtues are developed by habituation and discipline, intellectual virtues by study and instruction. Finally, their definitions, as well as the methods by which their definitions are established and by which the species of virtues which fall under each are determined, reflect formally the differences of the virtues themselves, for although both are "habits," the actions in which the intellectual virtues eventuate tend to ends which may be considered apart from their relation to individual agents, while the actions in which the moral virtues eventuate can be judged and defined only relative to the experiences and character from which they spring. The problems of ethics center, therefore, about the moral virtues, while in the intellectual
virtues (to which Book VI of the Nicomachean ethics is devoted) the problems and method depart from purely moral considerations and approximate to the problems and methods of psychology. The definition of the moral virtues is a dialectical construction formed of elements borrowed from psychology, the arts, and the intellectual virtues. For their genus Aristotle chooses dialectically among the three "things in the soul" which a virtue might be (arguing that it is a habit or state of character, not a passion or a faculty); for their differentia he first draws an analogy from natural and artistic excellence to moral excellence (inferring that the habit in question disposes one to choose in the right way among actions and passions, and that the right way involves a mean between extremes) and then, since virtue involves knowledge if its nature is conceived and stated in proportions, although it may be present in action because of habit without knowledge, he translates the proportion into a rule which is formulated, when it is explicit, by an intellectual virtue. The marks of this diverse origin are apparent in the final definition: "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it." (Fn.10) This composite definition is made possible by the use of the four causes. The matter of the virtues was shown to be actions and passions; unlike physical definitions in morals need take no more specific account than that of the material cause. The definition of virtue, thus, makes use of the remaining three: the efficient cause, habit concerned with choice, constitutes the genus, and the formal and final causes supply formulations of the differentia. This definition in turn serves as the genus of the particular moral virtues, (Fn.11) and further specification comes by determining the proportions which enter in the determination of each moral virtue: courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, pride, ambition, good temper, friendliness, truthfulness, shame, justice.

The list of the moral virtues culminates, in good dialectical fashion, in justice, which is the whole of virtue in one sense, that is, not absolutely but in relation to our neighbor, and which in another sense is merely one of the virtues. (Fn.12) In the individual, justice consists in fairness; but in relation to others, justice is lawfulness, and the law may provide, at least in the case of overt actions which affect others, for contingencies arising from dereliction of other virtues in the individual. This dialectical ambivalence, which gives "justice" two significances as it is related to the individual himself and to individuals associated in a group, is a mark of the device by which ethics and politics are joined, and a like ambivalence will be found again in the intellectual virtues which treat of formal principles operative in choices made according to the moral virtues. The rational part of the soul is distinguished, by means of the objects to which its activities are directed, into two parts, the "calculative" which is concerned with variable things, and the "scientific" which is concerned with invariable law. Further differentiation of these two kinds of objects permits the distinction of five intellectual virtues. There are two virtues of the calculative part of the soul, which bring a true course of reasoning to bear respectively on "making" (this is the intellectual virtue "art") and on "doing"
(this is the virtue "prudence" or "practical wisdom"). Prudence, like justice, has two forms, for the same habit may be concerned with the action of an individual or it may be directed to the regulation of a state and in the latter case it is called "political wisdom." (Fn,13) There are three virtues of the scientific part of the soul, which are distinguished as the habits equivalent to the actions which contribute to the making of a science: "scientific knowledge" is a capacity to demonstrate, "intuitive reason" a capacity to grasp first principles, and "wisdom" the culmination of all other human activities, and therefore discernible under two guises, since it may be found in the most finished and perfect practitioners of any of the arts, and it is also the most finished of all the forms of knowledge, combining scientific knowledge with intuitive reason in the consideration of the highest objects. (Fn,14) As justice is a habit in which the individual virtues conceived as habits are brought in contact with the habit which ensures submission to the law, and as prudence is a habit in which calculation of the consequences of individual actions is brought in contact with calculation of the practicable ingredients of the common good, so wisdom is a habit in which all the excellences of all conduct, art and knowledge are brought in contact with the basic and pervading traits of things.

The sprawling mass of moral problems requires treatment in a great diversity of ways, for it is not a question only of classifying things, but of bringing the judgments of men - the opinions of the run of mankind as well as the knowledge of the wisest men - to bear on their solution, and it is further a question, not only of advancing reasons which are persuasive concerning the truth of solutions, but of using all possible motivations to put those solutions into operation. Pleasure and pain must be considered as well as virtue and reason, as must also honor and praise, continence and friendship, and all the various signs and indirect indications of actions and virtues and values. The consideration of any of them - for example, friendship - may be analogized to furnish a schematism for all communities, constitutions, and associations; the consideration of some of them - for example, pleasure - may be renewed again and again for statement and restatement, not so much in correction of previous doctrine as in adjustment from one perspective to another. Yet there is a fixity in all the relativity of such dialectical changes in orientation, for the relativity is laid on a schematism of which the guiding lines are determined by nature and discerned by wisdom. The "natures" of the men who act are the material of ethics, and although they permit latitude in choice, they determine a standard of good and bad relative to individuals. The "nature" of men, therefore, also supply the ends of action in the rational rules which are at once the product of human activity and the approximation of human activity to the truths and processes of science. The "matter" of morality is in the actions and passions of men; the "form" of morality is in the rules of reason; but the region which lies between the two, in which actions and passions are regulated and precepts are applied, is vast and indeterminate except as repeated actions have sketched lines which may be checked against the determinations of the prudent man. 

Ethics is a part of the science of politics, or, more precisely, it is the selection and treatment of those aspects of
the problems of conduct which are pertinent to determination by the virtues and susceptible of control and judgment in the individual man. Ethics is therefore contrasted in its very conception to the approach made to the same problems in politics. As it was assumed in the opening sentence of the Nicomachean ethics that every action is directed to some good, and thereafter the problems involved in achieving the ends of action are treated relative to the potentialities and materials present in individual men; so it is assumed, conversely, in the opening sentence of the Politics that every state is a community of some kind and that thereafter the problems involved in constitutions are treated relative to co-operations which fulfill natural needs and achieve ends that transcend individual powers. The natural basis of the state is found in ends as the natural basis of virtues was found in potentialities. The simpler forms of association, such as the family and the village, derive their origin and nature from the union of male and female, master and slave, parent and child, none of whom could exist or continue in existence without the other, and the natural basis of the household is to be found, therefore, in those interdependencies. The state is "natural" for the same reason, although its end is loftier and its organization more complex.

Then several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficient is the end and best. (Fn.15)

It is in this sense that man is "by nature a political animal," (Fn.16) not that he is obtrusively cognizant of the responsibilities and ends of political action, but that he is incapable alike of existence and of a good life without political associations. These two directions in which "nature" is sought in ethics and in politics, in material potentialities and in ends, are reflected in the different manners in which Aristotle refutes Plato in those two sciences. In the Nicomachean ethics, the Platonists are criticized for the doctrine of a self-subsistent good which is inadequate to the multiplicity of goods and ineffective to aid in their pursuit; (Fn.17) multiplicity of being and practicability of application are both achieved by seeking the natural basis of virtues in actions and passions. In the Politics, Socrates and Plato are criticized for the reduction they make in the Republic of all forms of association and all kinds of rule to one, for their attempt to unify the state by making it a kind of family and by making all citizens the same, and for removing, in so doing, all stimulus to social action; (Fn.18) multiplicity of associations and efficacy of appeal
to social motivations are maintained by seeking a natural basis for association in the multiplicity of ends actually achieved by association. In moral and political philosophy, as in physics and metaphysics, multiplicity of classifications and pluralism of kinds are marks of Aristotle's solution of philosophical problems.

The course of further analysis is completely determined, once the state has been shown to be natural; for being composite, the state must be analyzed, on the analogy of natural composite bodies and organs, by considering its parts and its ends: the constituent parts of the state are the citizens; (Fn.19) the ends of states are their natures or constitutions, and these are revealed in the manner and proportion in which the parts are combined. (Fn.20) The kinds of constitutions are then organized schematically according to final causes under six main heads (which are the Aristotelian reformulation by means of three pairs of good and bad states of basic ideas which doubtless go back to Plato's scheme of five states in progressive stages of decline from the perfect state), and the ends which states pursue and attain are combined with the possible distributions of powers and magistracies in states to indicate and order some instances in the infinitely diversified series of political possibilities under these six heads. But it would be a mistake to think of Aristotle's massive classifications
of states as simply functional and mathematical determinations of possible political combinations, institutions, and ends. They are, rather, the multiple development, by means of the four causes, of the basic political question of how institutions and constitutions depend on and influence citizens associated in various communities, as well as all the ramifications of that problem, such as the value, appropriateness, and stability of constitutions.

The basis of classification of political problems may be compared with that of the classification of biological problems in the History of animals, for in biology a double classification is used to set forth problems and to classify phenomena, a combined classification of animals and of parts of animals, and in politics, too, a double classification is introduced — once the doctrines of predecessors and the example of good states have been dismissed in Book II — a classification of classes of citizens, which form the parts or states, and of states, (Fn.21). Since the first classification of the Politics is in terms of aims or final causes, states are classified as good or bad dependent on whether or not they are directed to the common good, and the comparison of states eventually leads to the treatment of the best state in the abstract, much as the consideration of motions in the physics led to the final cause and unmoved mover. In the best state the relation of part and whole is simple, for the end of the state and the end of the citizen are the same, and the good man is the good citizen; the chief problem in such a state is therefore concerned with the education by which to continue citizens at the high level of perfection which makes alone the state possible. (Fn.22) Such single-minded pursuit of the good, however, is rare if not unexampled in political history, and the philosophic discussion of the perfect state would be impractical if its precepts were treated as rules to be followed literally, rather than the limiting case in which consideration of particular conditions may be omitted. States must therefore be differentiated into the varieties of kinds, not merely as good or bad, but as suited to the situations, characters, educations, and employments of citizens, and if the question of the suitability of political institutions to particular situations is to be treated, the function of the state must be differentiated as well as the traits of its citizens. The analysis of the best state, which resulted from the consideration of final causes suited to the realization of the best potentialities of man, is supplemented therefore by a second analysis, not of what is best in the abstract, but of what is best under given circumstances. That change of emphasis is brought about by consideration of the material instead of final causes of states, that is, the characters of possible citizen bodies, must as a similar reorientation was achieved by the use of material causes in On the heavens. The potentialities of any actual group of men fall short of the ideal potentialities of man, and the bad as well as the good forms of constitution are treated in terms of the consequent deviation of the justice of a state from justice as such and the coincident deviation of the good citizen from the good man. (Fn.23) But there is a third form in which the problems of politics might be considered; that is, in addition to asking what is the best state in the abstract, and what is the best state under the particular circumstances, one
must also ask what is the form of government which is best suited to states in general. The question can be answered by examining the proportions and functions of the parts and agencies of a state, and so determining their formal causes. In pursuit of formal causes Aristotle systematized a distinction which has had a long history of diversified applications of the parts of the state into legislative, executive, and judicial functions, which as formal cause correspond to three of the senses of the intellectual virtue of prudence, considered as political wisdom. (Fn.24)

The manner in which these three analyses are used may be judged by their application to the six kinds of state. All six are treated in the first analysis, but since it culminates in the best state, emphasis is laid particularly on aristocracy and monarchy among the customary six states. It is unnecessary, since monarchy and aristocracy are good without qualification, to take them up again in the second consideration of states which are best under particular circumstances, and they are therefore omitted in the second analysis, while the remaining four are treated in detail. (Fn.25) The claims of polity and tyranny to consideration, however, are entirely due to their defensibility under the press of particular situations, for those states are not of themselves truly constitutions, the polity being a fusion of oligarchy and democracy, and the tyranny being either indistinguishable from monarchy or no form of government. (Fn.26) They have no place, therefore, in the consideration of what is best in states in general, which depends on formal perfections of organization in the state apart from any consideration of occasional outstanding virtues or possible degradations of citizens. Only two states, democracies and oligarchies, remain for consideration under this third head, and they are treated, not in terms of ends nor in terms of distinctions in classes of citizens, but in terms of common qualities of citizens and in terms of proportions in the exercise of the three functions of the state. (Fn.27)

The problems of politics might, finally, be posed in totally different terms, and might turn on consideration, not of what is best in the abstract or in this particular case or in general, but rather of how a state of any given kind is initiated and set up, how it is continued and preserved once established, and how it is overthrown. This is a consideration of the state in terms of efficient causes which are alone suited to solve problems of generation, destruction, or preservation, and pursuit of efficient causes led Aristotle to his shrewd analysis of revolutions, of the means by which to foment them or thwart them, and the precautions to be taken against them. (Fn.28) In all details of its pursuit this inquiry into political problems is, then, the reverse of the inquiry into moral problems pursued in the Nicomachean ethics: the inquiry concerning morals begins with the efficient causes of the good life, the habituations which supply the genus in the definition of virtue and the end with the final cause of human life, happiness; the inquiry concerning the state begins by considering the state a final cause and ends by inquiring into the means by which to generate or destroy states.

The moral and political theories of Aristotle have been widely influential over long periods of time, but their influence has been in small fragments set in opposition to other small fragments. The influence of the Aristotelian ethics, though great, was seri-
ously distorted for centuries by the preservation and presence in Christian moral theory of the eternal goods which Aristotle criticized in Plato. Subsequent to the Renaissance, discussions of ethics continued to seek in good Platonic fashion existent entities on which to fix moral standards; eternal goods have never been wholly without defenders, but even apart from avowedly Platonic theories, moral questions have been treated since the Renaissance largely by reference to functions of the mind or meanings of words, and inquiry has centered therefore not on habits, which are relative, but on reason, moral sense, common sense, intuition, or some like power supposed to be possessed by all men, or on "good" or "value" or some like term supposed to have single or comparable meanings in each of its applications. Aristotle's influence in ethics has thus been limited largely to the repetition in uncongenial Platonic contexts of his wise sayings concerning the virtues, choice, deliberation, free-will, friendship, prudence, wisdom, pleasure, happiness; yet however inadequately and variously his doctrines have been understood, their echoes and influence have been almost omnipresent.

The political theory of Aristotle has been continued and extended in like dismemberment. The analysis of states in terms of final causes, in which his theory approximates most closely to that of Plato, has frequently led to the removal of the basis of the state and human associations from changing conditions to some changeless pattern of "natural law" (Fn.29) or Reason or Will. More specific to his influence, later classifications of kinds of states have tended to repeat Aristotle's schematism, and they frequently become, as in Montesquieu's, use of Aristotle's material classification, objective descriptions of how men have lived and do live, while the formal distinction of the parts of the constitution has been made, by way of Montesquieu, into a practical precept of the division of powers. The concept of the common good has been translated into an efficient cause sought in some manifestation of a common will or universal reason; and political associations have been made, at one extreme, into natural groups and, at the other extreme, into conventional associations established in social contracts. The influence of Aristotle is torn in this fashion between the two end terms of his dialectic, the individual and the state, which have in recent years been transformed into an absolute opposition of Individualism versus the Common Good, and in the numerous forms which that debate has taken Aristotle may be quoted on either side. Of all these transformations, however, the most persistent and pervasive is the subtle tendency, comparable to the corresponding tendency in physics, to transform all causes to efficient causes (as the "contract" theory has been made to account for the pursuit of the "common good", and as his division of powers has been made the cause for the persistence of states, not the form of their organization), and it is significant therefore that one of the first and most influential of modern political theories, that of Machiavelli, should be based almost exclusively on considerations, derived from Aristotle's consideration of efficient causes, of means to move or maintain a state. One must look to other regions than those of political and ethical speculation for the influence or the continuation of the method of Aristotle's political theory, for in the philosophies which have abandoned the distinction between theoretic and practical
sciences, the method of the practical sciences may be found, universalized and extended to all subjects. In pragmatisms, functionalisms, operationalisms, and positivisms, some vestiges of the dialectic of morality, with its emphasis on outcomes, its concern with organic interrelations, its limitation to relative and proximate causal influences, have been made to supply properly disguised substitutes for the uncongenial conclusions of a metaphysics which would look for first principles beyond the things modified or made by man.

Footnotes to Part 8:

1 Nicomachean ethics vii. 9. 1151a15: "For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy first principles, and in actions the final cause is the first principle, as the hypotheses are in mathematics; neither in that case is it the argument that teaches the first principles, nor is it so here — virtue either natural or produced by habituation is what teaches right opinion about the first principle." Ibid. iii. 3. 1112b12: "We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means, they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all investigation appears to be deliberation — for instance mathematical investigations — but all deliberation is investigation), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming." Cf. ibid. i. 7. 1098a30. Metaphysics vii. 7. 1032a22: "The active principle then and the starting-place for the process of becoming healthy is, if it happens by art, the form in the soul, and if spontaneously, it is that, whatever it is, which is the starting-point of his making, for the man who makes by art, as in healing, the starting-point is perhaps the production of warmth, and this the physician produces by rubbing." 2 Nicomachean ethics ii. 2. 1103a26: "Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely now we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced, as we have said," Ibid. x. 9. 1179a35: "Surely, as the saying goes, where there are things to be done the end is not to survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do them; with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good." 3 Politics iii. 5. 1278a40: "As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public
affairs." *Ibid.* iii. 13 1283b42: "And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed. He differs under different forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue." *Ibid.* iv. 7 1293b5: "In the perfect state the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government." The importance of this limiting case in which moral and political considerations coincide may be judged by the frequency with which Aristotle returns to the problem of the relation of the good man to the good citizen; cf. *ibid.* iii. 4-5 1276b16 ff; 3 1288a37; vii. 14 1333b11; *Nicomachean ethics* v. 2 1130b28. Such important problems as the relation of law and morality and the function of the state in the regulation of education are concerned with aspects of the relation of man and citizen. The extension of these problems to philosophy itself is well expressed in the saying attributed to Aristotle (as it was also to his friend Xenocrates): "When asked what advantage he had ever gained from philosophy, he replied, 'This, that I do without being ordered what some are constrained to do by their fear of the law!'" (*Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers*, v. 20).

4 *Nicomachean ethics* i. 2. 1094a25: "If so we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it (sc. the good) is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this; e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man." Cf. *ibid.* 9. 1099b29: "...for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts." *Politics* iii. 12. 1282b15: "In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in the highest degree a good in the most authoritative of all - this is the political science of which the good is justice, in other words, the common interest." These judgments are not in contradiction with the frequent statement that wisdom or first philosophy (that is, metaphysics) is the most authoritative of the sciences nor with the explicitly stated judgment that politics is not such a science. Cf. *Metaphysics* i. 2. 982b4: "And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences; and this end is the good in each class, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question ('Wisdom') falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end and aim, is one of the causes." *Nicomachean ethics* vi. 7. 1141a18: "Therefore wisdom must be
intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge - scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion. Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or political wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world."

5 Ibid., x. 9. 1179\textsuperscript{b}31. Aristotle observes in this context that the problems involved in laws had not been examined by his predecessors, notwithstanding the interest in moral questions which he remarked as dominant among philosophers since Socrates. Cf. ibid. 1181\textsuperscript{b}13: "Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability our philosophy of human nature."

6 Statements concerning the sequence of questions treated in the Politics are rendered somewhat questionable by the uncertainties scholars have felt concerning the order of the books in that work. The precise grounds of those uncertainties need not be examined here, since the dialectical character of the discussion and its treatment of individuals in associations is unaffected by the choice of order. Two possible relations of citizen and state are relevant to the consideration at all points: the relation of citizens to a state when the ends of men and state coincide, and the relation of citizens to a state when the ends of men differ from those of the state. In the order of the books of the Politics which has been preferred by scholars in recent years and which is reproduced in the text published in this edition, the discussion culminates in the former of these two possibilities, which is achieved, except for momentary accident, only in the best state. The state is treated in terms of matter and form; it is conceived as related to citizens and lesser social groups as a whole is related to the parts and is analogized to a natural compound (since the qualities and functions of the composite whole cannot be inferred simply from the qualities and functions of the simples which enter the composition; cf. Politics vii. 7. 1328\textsuperscript{a}21), yet notwithstanding that disparity of part to whole which makes it necessary that services indispensable to the state be determined by the state and be imposed on citizens, the end of individuals and of states is in general the same (ibid. 15. 1334\textsuperscript{a}11). That coincidence is specific in the case of the best man and the best constitution, and it would be appropriate therefore that the relation of citizen and state receive its final treatment (as it does in the latter portion of Book VII and Book VIII) in the consideration of the rearing and education of children which are crucial means for the preservation of a perfect state. On the other hand, in the traditional order of the books, which is dialectically preferable and which is followed, therefore, in the Introduction, the discussion culminates in differences between the ends of individuals and states rather than in their coincidences. The discussion proceeds from the consideration of the perfect state (Books VII and VIII which were formerly IV and V) through the differentiation of the various types of constitution (Books IV and VI which were formerly VI and VIII) to conclude with a discussion (Book V which was formerly VIII) of revolutions and their causes, as well as the means which might be used in any state for
the preservation of its peculiar constitution. Revolutions are explained by means of the relations of individuals to each other and to the constitution of the state. "In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and proportionate equality, although mankind fail in attaining them, as indeed I have already explained... all these forms of government have a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal), but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so. There is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank; for they are thought noble because they spring from virtuous and wealthy ancestors" (ibid. v. i. 1301a25).

In terms of this distinction among the kinds of equality found in men as associated in states, Aristotle differentiates two kinds of revolution, the one effecting a change in the constitution of the state, the other effecting a change in the administration of the government without altering the constitution, that is to say, changes respectively in the character of the state and in the persons of the officials. In all cases revolutions arise from a disproportion of men, or more precisely from a disparity between the ends of men and the state. "Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion—for instance, a perpetual monarch among equals; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion" (ibid. 1301b6).

The treatment of revolutions and of the means of preserving states, carried out in shrewd and ingenious detail, not only forms an appropriate emphasis in which the dialectic of the Politic... might be expected to eventuate, but it supplies still one more indication of the rigorously practical character of Aristotle's approach to political problems, for only the stress of circumstances has in the subsequent history of political theory brought revolutions and the preservation of states periodically (as at present) to the center of political inquiry. The order of problems, finally, which is stated in the last lines of the Nicomachean ethics and which culminates in the discussion of the conditions of the perfect state, would in a dialectical interpretation be viewed properly as a list of subjects to be treated in political inquiry but not necessarily in that order since the topics would envisage the contribution of political theory to ethics rather than the proper procedure of political inquiry.

7 Nicomachean ethics i. 4. 1095a14.
8 Ibid. 8. 1096b26.
9 Ibid. 13. 1102a25 ff.
10 Ibid. ii. 6. 1106b35; cf. ibid. 5. 1105b19 ff.
11 Ibid. iii. 5. 1114b26 ff.
12 Ibid. v. i. 1139b25 ff.
13 Ibid vi. 8. 1141b23: "Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by the general name 'political wisdom'... Practical wisdom is also identified especially with that form of it which is concerned
with a man himself - with the individual; and this is known by
the general name 'practical wisdom'; of the other kinds one is
called household management, another legislation, the third politics
and of the latter one part is called deliberative and the other
judicial." These distinctions differ from the lists of meanings
of terms which are given in physical and metaphysical inquiries,
since in those sciences a difference in essence permits a
differentiation of univocal terms, that is, terms with a single
meaning each, while in moral and political sciences the different
essences are envisaged and treated by an identical habit or state
of mind, and that identity is preserved in the analogical terms
which relate things which are separate in themselves by habits
which are identical in the agent or knower.

14 Ibid. vi. 7. 1141b9; 1142a3.
15 Politics i. 2. 1252a25. Cf. ibid. 1253a18: "Further, the
state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the indivi-
dual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part."
16 Ibid. 1253a3. 25-35; iii. 6. 1278b19.
17 Nicomachean ethics i. 6. 1096a17.
18 Politics i. 1. 1252a7; ii. 2. 1361b14 ff.
19 Ibid. iii. 1. 1274a27 ff.
20 Ibid. 6. 1276b6 ff.; iv. 3. 1289b 27.
21 Ibid. ii. 4. 1277a5; iv. 4. 1290b25-33.
22 The double classification is stated in Book III, the char-
acteristics of the best state, its citizens, and their education
are treated in Books VII and VIII. In the traditional order of
books, as opposed to the recent scholarly ordering which separates
them, they followed as Books III, IV, and V. The traditional order
is followed throughout in the application of the causes to the
problems of the Politics that follows.
23 Ibid. iv. (olim. vi). 1. 1288b21: "Hence it is obvious
that government too is the subject of a single science, which has
to consider what government is best and of what sort it must be,
to be most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were
no external impediment, and also what kind of government is adapted
to particular states. For the best is often unattainable, and
therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted,
not only with (1) that which is best in the abstract, but also
with (2) that which is best relatively to circumstances. We
should be able further to say how a state may be constituted
under any given conditions (3); both how it is originally formed and,
when formed, how it may be longest preserved; the supposed state
being so far from having the best constitution that it is unprovided
even with the conditions necessary for the best; neither is it the
best under the circumstances, but of an inferior type. He ought
moreover to know (4) the form of government which is best suited
to states in general; for political writers, although they have
excellent ideas, are often impractical. We should consider,
not only what form of government is best, but also what is possible
and what is easily attainable by all." The best state has been
considered; the state that is best under the circumstances is
treated by consideration of the various citizens of various states
in the first ten chapters of Book IV.
24 Cf. above footnote 13.
26 Ibid. iv. 8. 1233b30; 10. 1295c1.
9. RHETORIC AND POETIC

Reflections on philosophic method and treatment of moral questions were no older, according to Aristotle, than the inquiries of Socrates, but Aristotle makes no similar mention of the pioneer work of Socrates in submitting rhetoric and art to philosophic analysis. On the contrary, although in Rhetoric he criticizes the writers of textbooks for neglecting to treat of arguments and persuasions, and so missing the essentials of art, Aristotle makes no reference there to earlier philosophic analyses, and one might have the impression from his Poetics that no previous philosopher had treated of poetry. It was not that Aristotle had grown forgetful of Socrates and Plato, for the Socratic Dialogue is instanced as an art form in the Poetics, while both philosophers are quoted for examples and precepts of rhetoric. Aristotle's silence concerning the treatment of rhetoric and poetry in Plato's Dialogues, notwithstanding his tendency to criticize Plato on all other subjects, may be taken as the sign of total departure from previous methods, making the example of his predecessors irrelevant to the problems of poetry and rhetoric as he conceived them.

Socrates treats rhetoric by arguing, against the orators in the Phaedrus, that the good rhetorician must know dialectic, and, against the sophists in the Gorgias, that rhetoric is a sham art which is substituted for justice. He makes frequent use of the example of artists and artisans in the arguments Plato records, but he sets up no fixed differences among the arts, usually running through some series of analogies such as would connect the poet in turn with the physician, the carpenter, the cobbler, and the shepherd. His judgment of poetry is based on the Republic (if Socrates can be separated from Plato in that work), as is Plato's in the Laws, on consideration of educational, practical and rhetorical effects, and it leads ultimately to moral disapproval and political censorship. The treatment of rhetoric and poetry in the Dialogues of Plato would not lead Aristotle to attribute originality to its author in fields beyond dialectic and morals. Aristotle's philosophic method, on the other hand, permitted him the originality of considering rhetorical arguments for the first time in terms of the devices of persuasion apart from the truth of what is persuaded or the predilections of the person persuaded, and of considering poetry for the first time in terms of the structure of the poem apart from its tendency to stimulate moral or immoral conduct. In the theoretic sciences, the method of Aristotle entailed the constitution of independent sciences for independent classes of things; in moral and political science, it permitted the dialectical differentiation of two aspects of human conduct as analyzed in terms of the individual and in terms of the state. As applied to the arts, the same method makes possible the separation of problems presented by the mode of existence of an object.