produced by art (which might properly be treated in physics and
metaphysics) as well as problems, presented in its effects, of
human susceptibility and reaction (as treated in psychology, morals,
and politics) or of doctrinal cogency and emotional excitation (as
treated in logic and rhetoric) from problems which bear on the
traits of an artistic construction consequent simply on its being
a work of art. As applied to rhetoric, the method permits the
recognition that rhetoric is derivative from ethics, that it is
a counterpart of dialectic, that it borrows from sophist, and that
it is used as a sham substitute for politics, and at the same
time permits the treatment of the devices of persuasion apart
from those analogies.

Like the sciences and the moral virtues, art may be considered
in a variety of ways. It may be taken as virtue or a habit of
the mind, or as a class of objects, or as the skill which initiates
and guides production, or as an instrument of education, or as an
end of human activity. In this diversification, however, art
presents a complexity beyond that found in theory or politics. The
arts are distinguished from the practical and theoretic sciences,
as from all other activities and inquiries, by the ends they pursue.
The physical sciences, thus, study motions which follow from the na-
ture of things, and their end is the acquisition of knowledge for
its own sake. The moral sciences study the natural grounds and
natural consequences of voluntary motions, and their end is not
merely knowledge but action according to the virtues. But knowledge
functions in a double relation to art: as an intellectual virtue,
art is a kind of knowledge which guides the actions by which art-

tificial things are produced, much as prudence sets the rational
rule of virtue; but the objects produced by art may themselves be
studied, as natural objects are studied in natural science, for no
other end than knowledge of artificial things. Art has greater
latitude of choice than morals, and admits less determination of
knowledge than physics. The productions of the artist are not
fixed by a natural end as are the actions of a moral agent; the
objects produced by art are not fixed by a natural form and there-
fore cannot be treated in strict definition or scientific demon-
stration as can natural objects. Art, as a consequence, is not
only distinct from the practical and theoretic sciences in its
final cause, and therefore, since the end indicates the nature, in
its formal cause, but it is also like the theoretic and the prac-
tical sciences in respects that are differentiated by the other
two causes. Art is similar to the virtues in its mode of acquisi-
tion, for both are produced by exercise of actions like those
which they in turn cause; both are destroyed by the same cause that
produces them; and both are directed to ends which are intermediate
between two extremes. (Fn.1) The similarity of art to physics is
to be found in the likeness of their objects, for the objects of
art are produced as nature would have produced them, and both in the
processes of production and in the objects produced, art imitates
nature. (Fn.2)

The treatment of art, therefore, requires a double classifica-
tion, since art is both a kind of action comparable to moral and
political action, and a kind of knowledge comparable to scientific
knowledge. The first of these classifications is implicit in the
treatment of political science. The two intellectual virtues of
the calculative part of the soul, which treats of rules of action,
are distinguished as they apply to human actions (prudence) or to things (art). Both intellectual virtues are particularized in application. Three kinds of particularity emerge as a result of making and doing: the products of the arts which are individual things; the moral virtues which are habits of individual men; and the economic and political institutions which are the ends of groups of men. These three, artistic constructions, moral virtues, and political actions, are not only closely related but interpenetrate and condition each other. The dialectical character of the analysis of their relations is apparent, however, not only in this overlapping, but in the shifts that can be made in the basis of classification. As Aristotle usually presents it, the apex of this triangular schema of the virtues, that is, the controlling science, is the intellectual virtue, wisdom, which is grounded in the nature of men and of things, and which is brought to bear on human actions and productions. The same triangle, however, is also considered in a second position in which politics is the architectonic science and determines in a state what are the appropriate and permissible developments of art and science. Finally, in a third position, art determines all forms of expression, even those given to the achievements of science and the acts exemplifying prudence.

The theoretic sciences have their most significant differences from the practical sciences in their respective relations to their subjects and to other sciences. The theoretic sciences are differentiated into kinds by means of the classes distinguished in natural things through scientific inquiry and definition; the particulars by which the practical sciences are differentiated, to wit, artificial things, habits, and ends, are not independent existent things nor are they susceptible of scientific definition. In the second place, the theoretic sciences, for Aristotle, are mutually exclusive, that is, physics is not, even in a secondary analogical sense, mathematics, nor is arithmetic to be confused with geometry; whereas in the practical sciences, as has been seen, ethics is in a sense politics, politics is an art, and art is moral.

Political philosophy is directed to action, not to knowledge or contemplation. Art, too, involves operations, but the result of such operations is apparent in an external object, not in conduct. It is impossible, consequently, to lay down generalized rules for artistic production comparable to the generalized precepts for moral action (for neither the matter nor the ends of art are as determinate as those of morals), but the intrusion of an external matter makes feasible a kind of inductive science of the arts based on their objects and consequences. A third schematism is therefore needed to supplement the schema of the theoretic and practical sciences. Our modes of expression may be classified in terms of the generality and specificity which make possible the discussion of practical or theoretic questions and the treatment of natural or artificial things, and actual, possible, or projected changes. A schematism which classifies methods, like the classification of actions in the practical sciences, must be dialectical, since it depends on choices and the conclusions of deliberation, not on fixed natures and relations. Wisdom, however, which is the highest and most universally applicable of the virtues, is here most fully realized in the most concrete
formulations, since in the modes of expression, generalities which are not generalities of fact are empty. The triangle should therefore be represented as descending from particularity to sophistry, not as applying general formulations to particulars.

In this schematism all the forms are universal in the sense of being applicable to all subject matters, but their manner of application is different. Rhetoric and dialectic have no proper subject, but in virtue of the generality of their arguments they can be applied indifferently to any subject. Histories, arts, and sciences are particularized to the subjects they treat and cover all subjects only by addition, histories completing histories, arts supplementing arts, sciences treating aspects of phenomena neglected in other sciences. Sophistic, finally, is more general than other modes of expression, since it is particularized neither by fixities of argument nor definitions of things.

Sophistic is a completely general technique in which the method of argumentation depends entirely on the manipulation of words and the accidents of association, unrestrained by concern to reproduce the opinions of men or to reflect the nature of things. Rhetoric and dialectic, while general in their application to all things and all subjects, base their arguments on the opinions of men. They differ from each other less in the details of the devices which they both use for persuasion than in the generality of the opinions to which they appeal: dialectic depends on opinions which are thought to be universal, or common, or expert, or preferable in some other sense, while rhetoric consults the peculiarities of the principles they use in treating things. The relation of science to history is expressed best in Aristotle's statement that the complete history of things of any given class should supply the principles for their scientific treatment; conversely, a correctly established scientific principle should apply to any instance or phenomenon disclosed by the history of such things. Art is midway between history and science, since, on the one hand, it is concerned, like history, with particulars, while, on the other hand, inasmuch as those particulars are artificial things, the laws of construction attain a universality comparable to the laws of science. If the triangle of these modes of expression is considered along that base - history, art, science - it touches on existent things in the three modes in which their characteristics can be stated, and these range from the particularity of things which are "better known to us" to the universality of things which are "better known to nature." The line connecting them, running as it does from particularity to generality, is the one which Aristotle traces in his frequent appeal to inductive processes.

The other two bases divide these two characteristics which are both essential to any method of treating things - universality and particularity. Science, dialectic, and sophistic attain to general principles in the three fashions which are differentiated in the last three books of the Organon, by discovery of universal traits in things, by appeal to general opinions, by manipulation
of manners and connotations of expressions. History, rhetoric, and sophistic, contrariwise, derive their cogency from particularity: history by treating particular circumstances, rhetoric by appealing to particular audiences, sophistic by relying on the apparent implications of particular statements. Of the six forms, therefore, three - science, dialectic, and sophistic - have been treated under logic; history has taken its place in Aristotle's treatment under two guises: the "natural history" which he uses and discusses in his scientific writings, and the "human history" which he uses in his treatment of the opinions of his predecessors and mentions only occasionally, usually in contrast to poetry; rhetoric and art require additional and special consideration.

Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic and is comparable to sophistic; it is an offshoot of ethics and often masquerades as politics. (Fn.3) It is an offshoot of ethics in the sense that the speaker is motivated by a moral purpose, that the character of the speaker may have persuasive effects, and that the emotions, prejudices, and convictions of the audience may dispose it to easy persuasion. Rhetoric, however, is not a part of political science, nor is it a practical science, because, notwithstanding its manipulation of moral materials to an end, it affords no means of discriminating among ends but may be used with equal effectiveness for any political end. Rhetoric makes use of a method comparable to that of scientific persuasion; and a scientific subject matter may be treated rhetorically, as when laymen are persuaded in popular expositions to accept the conclusions of science. Since it does not proceed from the proper principles of a subject matter, rhetoric is neither logic nor theoretic science. Unlike the sciences, but like dialectic, it has no specific subject matter and no single method or proper set of principles. It is not the science of a certain kind of things, but the faculty or power of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. (Fn.4) It is limited, since it has no proper subject, to questions on which difference of opinion is possible, since on such questions an audience might be persuaded to take either of two contrary positions. The fact that a case is just or true is insufficient in itself to inspire conviction, for the personalities of the speaker and the predispositions of the audience are intruded into problems of persuasion. The judges may fail to be convinced through the fault of the speaker, notwithstanding the natural tendency of the just and the true to prevail, and some audiences would not be convinced even if they were given the most exact knowledge: the art of persuasion must be cultivated to guard against that double danger. (Fn.5)

Rhetoric is defined in terms of its end or final cause, persuasion. In the physical sciences, the final cause is identical with the formal cause, and it is therefore used, when it can be isolated, conjoined with the other causes, efficient and material, in the development of the analysis. The peculiarity and complexity of the analysis which has been indicated in the statement that rhetoric has no subject matter, may be restated by observing that each of the three causes, material, efficient, and formal, would lead, not to a single subject matter as in physics, but to a different locus of analysis to explain how the end of rhetoric is to be accomplished. If you wish to consider the matter on which the orator works you must study the responses of audiences. If you wish to consider the devices or efficient causes by which to
stimulate such responses you must study the orator’s personal and intellectual influence. If you wish to study the form itself of the persuasion, expose its weaknesses, and learn the sources of its strength, you must study the argument. Aristotle criticizes contemporary arts of rhetoric for concentrating on one of these, namely, producing emotions in the hearer, without considering the arguments which are the form and essence of persuasion (Fn.6). There are, as Aristotle puts it, three modes of persuasion which a speaker can exercise: the persuasive power of his own character, the exciting of the right emotions in the audience, and, finally, proof or apparent proof. (Fn.7) The three books of the Rhetoric, therefore, take up successively the subject matters indicated by those three modes of persuasion, audience, speaker, and speech, seeking in them, first, the equivalent of a material cause, on which, second, an efficient cause operates, so that, third, the effect of both might be brought to bear on formal organization of the speech, which might otherwise seem in analysis (the evidence of the effect of the speech on its audience notwithstanding) to be empty and trivial. (Fn.8)

Although rhetoric has no proper subject matter but may be applied to almost any question, the consideration of kinds of audiences in Book I of the Rhetoric does permit a division of rhetoric into three kinds, as determined by the subjects appropriate to those audiences and the ends pursued in such subjects. (Fn.9) Political or deliberative oratory is directed to establishing the expediency or inexpediency of a course of action; it urges either that an action be done or not done; it is concerned with the future. Forensic or legal oratory is directed to establishing the justice or injustice of an action; it attacks or defends somebody; it is concerned with the past. Epideictic or display oratory is directed to proving a man worthy of an honor or the reverse; it praises or censures; it is concerned with the present. The division is purely formal in the sense that it is based on distinctions in the ends of the oratory, that is, the kinds of persuasion appropriate to different occasions. That very emphasis on kinds of ends makes possible the analysis of subject matter, for to achieve his various ends the orator must equip himself with propositions (Fn.10), and he can equip himself adequately by means of such shrewd summaries of common knowledge as Aristotle assembles in the greater portion of the first book of the Rhetoric.

The difficulty presented in such an assemblage of materials for use in rhetoric, however, may be seen on the one hand in the fact that such knowledge would seem proper to the sciences, and on the other in the fact that rhetoric has no subject matter, although the very essence of rhetoric is its arguments, to borrow the principles of the sciences would be at once ineffective and improper. Yet the treatment of arguments is possible, in the absence of elements and proper principles such as govern the discussion of scientific proofs, by means of broad dialectical distinctions. In one of the shrewdest and most influential of his distinctions, Aristotle points out that in dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms “common places” or “topoi” (or as the term is sometimes translated in the text published in this edition “lines of arguments”) supply the premisses of rhetorical arguments as principles supply the premisses of scientific syllogisms. (Fn.11) These “common places,” which are themselves the
result of a dialectical distinction between arguments "common" to several subjects and arguments "proper" to one, have in their present context several important characteristics. In the first place, they distinguish rhetoric from the sciences by the fact that the principles used by an orator are common to several sciences, such as ethics, physics, and politics. In the second place, since the orator may assert or deny a proposition, the equivalent of principles for him is adequately indicated by a pair of contrary terms, like "possible and impossible," or "more and less," or "good or bad," which may be joined in a proposition with any subject and so demarcate the "place" of a principle. Thus, one of the principles assumed in ethics might be "happiness is a good," and such a principle would then be applied only in the science of ethics; the rhetorician on the other hand would want, not a fixed principle, but knowledge of how to use "good" and its contrary in speeches in which he would argue that an action, or a natural occurrence, or a law was good (or bad). Finally, such a pair of principles or several such pairs would suffice to mark off the subject matter appropriate to each of the branches of oratory.

The subject matters of the three kinds of oratory are set forth, therefore, not by restating scientific information concerning the subjects of which they treat, but by expounding for the political orator the possible significances and oppositions of terms like good and bad, good and useful, and terms that mark degrees of goodness or utility, and by performing a like service for the forensic and display orators with terms related to virtue, law, pleasure, and justice. (Fn.12) It is, moreover, a sign of the dialectical formalism used in the analysis that the terms of orator, audience, and speech - which were basic in dividing persuasion into three modes, reappear in the kinds of propositions with which orators should provide themselves. Orators must prepare for one or more of the three kinds of speeches distinguished by consideration of kinds of audience; in political oratory the analysis yields kinds of principles which the orator can use; in display oratory it yields devices effective on the emotions of the audience; and in forensic oratory it yields propositions from which to construct the syllogisms of a speech. (Fn.13)

Such materials and such propositions depend for their effectiveness, and therefore for the form which they assume in a speech, on the use to which the orator puts them. Since the orator may use the materials for or against any proposition, the truth or falsity of the position being in itself inconclusive for persuasion, we must turn to the orator as cause of the effectiveness and form given to the materials; that is to say, the material cause drops out and the efficient cause is considered as it operates to the end of persuasion and in the organization of the argument. Once questions of objective truth are removed, the orator functions as an agent affecting decisions in two ways: he may use his own character and actions to cast a proper moral tone over the speech, and he may use his ingenuity in constructing the speech itself. (Fn.14) The second book of the Rhetoric, therefore, is devoted to two problems: an analysis of the means by which an orator may inspire the audience to confidence in his own character, extending through Chapters 1 to 17, and an analysis of the ways to invent and refute arguments, extending through Chapters 18 to 26.
The first of these analyses yields ways by which to induce an audience to believe a thing apart from proof of it. They reduce to three: conviction concerning the good sense, the good moral character, and the good will of the speaker. Two of these have been treated adequately under the consideration of political oratory, since the ways by which to establish one's own good sense or moral goodness are the same as those by which the goodness of others was seen to be established. The remaining question of means by which to establish good will is considered in an analysis of the emotions and the moral characters of men of different ages and fortunes. In this analysis the enumeration of the means by which emotions may be stimulated is no less objective, not to say cynical, than was Aristotle's earlier enumeration, in his analysis of the materials used in arguments, of the kinds of propositions which gain credence. Arousing the proper passions in the hearer is the final cause toward which the orator works, and therefore the emotions which are treated briefly in ethics as materials of the virtues are developed at length in rhetoric as the end of persuasion. Arguments, since they must now be treated without even the broadly understood materials of Book I, are schematized by means of three basic dialectical distinctions. Principles are again considered in terms of "places," which are again divided into common places and proper places, but whereas common places were common to several sciences and therefore to several classes of things when treated in terms of the materials the orator uses, common places are now common arguments used in all kinds of oratory, as contrasted to arguments proper to one particular branch. (Fn.15) The principles of rhetorical arguments are derived from common and proper places; the arguments themselves are distinguished into two kinds: the example, which corresponds to the induction of scientific logic, and the enthymeme, which corresponds to the syllogism. Finally, the third distinction is in the direction of the argument, for one may either demonstrate a proposition or refute it. The interplay of these three pairs of distinctions is sufficient to schematize the modes of argumentation of rhetoric in purely formal fashion from the traits of words and ideas without need of particularization to subject matter.

The differentiation of the kinds of subject matter from which persuasion is effected was derived from consideration of the devices of the orator, and subject matter dropped out of consideration; it remains to consider the parts and organization of the speech itself, and they can be derived from consideration of proof and apparent proof without further appeal either to the things audiences might consider or the emotions and ideas which the orator might use. Three questions enter into the making of a speech: (1) the invention and refutation of arguments, (2) style, and (3) arrangement. Since the invention of arguments is part of the constructive or efficient causality of the orator, consideration of the speech in itself includes only two main parts, style and arrangement, and to those two subjects the third book of the Rhetoric is devoted. (Fn.16) They are respectively the parts and the whole of the speech. The criteria to be applied to style are again determined by the three basic modes of persuasion: clearness being the proper virtue of language manifested in the conveying of plain meanings, and appropriateness being determined in two ways, that is, relative to emotion and
character relative to subject. Arrangement, on the other hand, is concerned with the distribution of parts of the speech in the statement and demonstration of the case presented. Arrangement, therefore, is one of the "forms" relevant to rhetoric, found now in the organization of the speech, as form had been found previously in the consequences of the orator's invention, and in the specifications and requirements of the subject matter treated. Aristotle is critical of undue complexity or subtlety of arrangement, and therefore he reduces the speech as a whole to two essential parts, statement and proof. This form reproduces in its manner, that is, in the arrangement of words, the form treated in the consideration of the orator and the audience. No greater fixity or more elaborate content should be sought, for rhetoric is an art or faculty defined in terms of an end, namely, persuasion, and the effectiveness of the modes of persuasion depends on a subject matter determined by the occasion and the audience, on the inventiveness and character of the orator, and on the formal organization of the speech. To seek form more determinately would be to transmute rhetoric into one of the sciences; yet to neglect form entirely, as rhetoricians had done before Aristotle, is to lose the substance and essence of rhetoric.

A poetic composition, no less than an oration, may be analyzed by considering it in turn as influencing its audience, as derivative from its author, and as the organization and statement of an argument; indeed more of the specific examples quoted in the Rhetoric are from the poets than from the orators. Yet, although poetry or any other art might be considered as an instrument of persuasion, or as one of the virtues, or as an incident in education, or as a kind of being, or as contributing to some utility, its nature is not exhausted nor even adumbrated in such incidental analysis. Poetry may also be considered as a kind of whole produced by art, and so considered, it is not a mode of persuasion, but a mode of imitation. (Fn.17) The analysis of the Poetics therefore makes use of much the same elements to isolate the tragedy as were used in the Rhetoric to isolate the relevant traits of the speech. This effort of Aristotle to treat art and to center his analysis on characteristics discernible in the object of art, however, makes use of quite different analytic devices to achieve an end which modern "esthetic" once sought to achieve (as the name of the inquiry indicates) through analysis of the perception by which those characteristics are discerned by the auditor or spectator, or (at further remove from perception) of judgment by which they are estimated. These recent analyses of art, therefore, resemble Aristotle's rhetoric more closely than his poetic, and indeed esthetic theory has borrowed many insights from his examination of modes of persuasion, (Fn.18) for qualities like beauty and sublimity, which are first discriminated in the perception of the audience, may later be ascribed to the object, or operations like those of creative imagination and genius, which are first discriminated in the artist, may later be made to account for traits otherwise unspecifiable in the object and thence for experiences inexpressible by the audience. Since the distinctive characteristics of the subject matter are emphasized by Aristotle in each science and branch of philosophy, the initial difficulty in the analysis of poetry, as in the analysis of rhetoric, lies in discriminating its subject matter. A poem is not a natural object,
and so not subject to scientific definition; it may appear in many human contexts and may be used to many ulterior ends. The poem, however, has a kind of independence and sufficiency which the speech, being calculated for specific occasions and to particular effects, does not have; whereas the speech is defined in the context of an audience and a speaker and whereas its method is compared and contrasted to the method of science, the poem is defined as a context of objects, natural and artificial, and its narrative is compared and contrasted to the actions of men, which it narrates. To achieve this isolation of the poem the causes applied in the Rhetoric are again used but in reverse order.

Rhetoric was defined by means of its final cause, persuasion; tragedy is defined by means of its formal cause, since it, like other arts, is a kind of imitation. The forms of poetry other than tragedy, however, are also modes of imitation, and therefore the analysis of the Poetics must particularize to the species of poetry as the Rhetoric had particularized to the forms of persuasion. This separation of tragedy from the other arts, and particularly from comedy and epic poetry (comparable to the distinction of political, forensic, and display oratory), is accomplished in the first five chapters of the Poetics. Whereas in the Rhetoric some treatment of materials for persuasion was possible by consideration of the kinds of audiences to be persuaded, and whereas the matter so considered was the propositions used by the orator, in the Poetics some treatment of the materials of poetry is possible, but by consideration of poets rather than audiences—that is, of efficient rather than final causes—and the materials of poetry are found in the elements which enter imitation. The propositions of rhetoric were contrasted to science and related to the kinds of audience to be persuaded. Since objects of art are not divided into kinds by the audiences to which they appeal (a tragedy either is perceived or not), the materials of which the artist disposes are found to be the three elements of his art of construction; the object, means, and manner of imitation, (Fn.19) and the evolution of poetry is traced from natural beginnings in human tendencies to the institution of a natural form or "nature" of the tragedy. (Fn.20) The natural matter which the poet uses as means in his imitation is contrasted to the natural matter he imitates, and is related to the forms of the arts, not to the minds of the audience. The tragedy is based on nature and is natural in ways not unlike those in which the state was seen to be natural; it is persuasive and pleasant in ways not unlike those of rhetoric.

From the materials of poetry, so assembled, the analysis turns to the form of poetry with the statement, abruptly, of the famous definition of tragedy. (Fn.21) It is not a scientific definition by genus and differentia, but rather a definition in four parts which supplement each other, each stating the form of tragedy, three in terms of matter, one in terms of its end. In rhetoric the form was sought successively in the requirements of the materials appropriate to audiences, in the operations of the orator, or in the organization of his speech. In poetry the form of tragedy is determined by a combination of specifications: by its object of imitation—it imitates an action which is serious and complete; by means of imitation—the language itself has pleasurable accessories brought in separately in each part of the work; by its manner of imitation—it is in dramatic
and not narrative form; and finally the form of the tragedy may be considered in terms of an end achieved by incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish the catharsis of such emotions. The form of a work of art, as opposed to the form of a natural thing, can be isolated only by considering these various determinants which impose a form on a matter, which, apart from the natural object imitated, the natural means used in imitation, the natural tendencies of artist and audience, would be indifferent to artistic form. Once isolated in that fashion, however, the ingredients which contribute to the form of tragedy may be considered in themselves.

Such analysis of the form of tragedy requires the consideration of it as a whole in relation to its parts, and the parts so discovered are six in number: plot, characters, and thought being derived from the objects of dramatic imitation; diction and melody from the means; and spectacle from the manner. In the formal analysis of the tragedy as such, which constitutes the second part of the Poetics, extending through Chapters 6 to 22, the three elements of imitation are shifted from the significance they had in the first part of the discussion, in which art was considered in the context of natural objects, agents, and percipients. Thus the subject represented is an action, and in the natural order of things, actions, as analyzed in ethics and psychology, are caused by thought and character; the action is represented in the tragedy by the plot, and the plot is the end and purpose, the life and soul of the tragedy. (Fn.23) Character and thought are now subordinate to plot, although in nature they are causes of actions and habits of the soul. The formal character of the treatment of the six parts of tragedy may be judged by comparison of the place of common elements in rhetoric and poetry. Thus, thought, which is subordinate in the tragedy to plot, is essential to the speech, for the argument is the very substance of persuasion; with the recognition of that difference of function, the treatment of thought can be passed over in the Poetics with a reference to the Rhetoric. (Fn.23) Diction, on the other hand, though it is the means of expressing and conveying thought in science, oratory and poetry is differently effective in each, and therefore is treated differently in logic, rhetoric and poetry, (Fn.24) despite some similarities in the means used and the effects sought. Language is analyzed in logic relative to the thought it expresses, and is decomposed into terms which are combined as subject and predicate in propositions which are in turn combined in syllogisms; language is analyzed in rhetoric relative to the persuasion of an orator on an audience, and is decomposed into nouns and verbs which are combined into periods appropriate to styles; language is analyzed in poetic relative to the construction of the poet, and is decomposed into letter which are combined into words to be combined in turn into figures of speech. Such traits of speech as rhythm and such uses as metaphors are common to rhetoric and poetic, while the methods of inference in logic – induction and deduction – have analogues in each of the other arts. Logic should achieve in language univocity and truth; perfection of diction in poetry consists in being clear and not mean; style in rhetoric must be clear and appropriate. Rhetoric and poetry approximate frequently in the ends to be achieved by language, but remain sharply different in their means, prose and verse.
Neither the consideration of the materials of poetry nor the shrewd and detailed analysis of the form of tragedy will supply criteria for the judgment of poetry. The plot is at once the form and the end of the poem, and therefore Aristotle pauses from time to time to consider what the poet should aim at and avoid in constructing his plots, that is, the relative values of tragedies which have different kinds of plots or use different devices in their plots. (Fn.25) For purposes of criticism the ends of poetry can be judged only inductively by comparison of one actual work of art with others in the respects in which they are comparable. The artist may consider ends in terms of the potentialities of his material, or in the expression or embodiment of his ideas, or in human reactions to stimuli, but the critic knows that ends are possible in art only from examination of what artists have accomplished. The Poetics therefore concludes, having treated art in terms of its materials and tragedy in terms of its form, with an examination of the ends of tragedy, accomplished by comparing it with epic poetry. Such a comparison would have little meaning in the treatment of art except as a device by which to sketch criteria for judgments of value in the infinite diversification of considerations that might be brought to bear on art. Tragedy and epic may be compared and contrasted in terms of their form and matter, that is, in the similarities of their construction of plots and the difference of their use of parts, and they are further comparable in the technical problems, which the critic may indicate and the poet must face, arising from the poet's operations as agent on his materials. Finally, however, the two may be compared, not in respect of any limited or external reference, but as forms of imitation and in respect of the ends pursued by art, and the differences and similarities are resolved in a judgment of value, that tragedy is superior in these respects to the epic. (Fn.26)

Of all the works of Aristotle, the Rhetoric and the Poetics have been most directly influential on modern thought, and the methods used in them have in recent centuries been extended to increasingly wide applications, even when it is difficult to trace the methods or their applications to the direct influence of Aristotle's statement and use. The devices of rhetoric, modified by Stoic and Epicurean rhetoricians, all but supplanted logic and dialectic in Roman philosophy during the early Empire, and when the writers in the Renaissance like Vives, Rudolph Agricola, and Ramus, revolted against what seemed to them the excessive and erroneous concern of the Middle Ages with logic and dialectic, they could be original and revolutionary by refurbishing dialectic with devices borrowed from ancient rhetorics, the Rhetoric of Aristotle among others. When the analysis of poetry and art in general was released similarly and about the same time from what seemed an excessive concern with the applications, the morals, and the doctrines of art, the movement stemmed from the renewed study of the Poetics and was advanced by doctrines borrowed from that work or developed in an effort to restate and complete those doctrines.

Yet even this direct influence is far from simple, for the changes introduced in the significances and applications of Aristotle's statements were numerous and confusing. They may be sketched by means of the relations which were seen between those
two arts and other techniques in Aristotle's philosophy. For Aristotle, rhetoric is a general method, the counterpart of dialectic, in which speeches are considered relative to speaker and audience, and in which arguments are based on opinions, not on the nature of things. The chief change which was worked on that conception by Roman philosophers appears in the increase of the importance of opinions, for among philosophers and scientists the Skeptics emphasized the fact that even knowledge of things is a kind of opinion and held that it falls short of certainty, and among practical men, educators, and statesmen, the numerous rhetoricians made the ability to influence opinions man's most important power. During the Middle Ages, however, another grouping of the sciences brought rhetoric into the "trivium," together with grammar and dialectic, as a science of words, and when men like Agricola and Francis Bacon labored against the sciences of words, variously misinterpreted, they substituted for them a more objective method which consists of the topics and common places applied, not merely to ideas or verbal forms, but to things, while men like Hobbes found hints in Aristotle's rhetoric which made it a prototype of modern political theory. The techniques of rhetoric have gone thus modified into scientific method and politics, where their effects can still be detected, while rhetoric itself, having become an art of words, has languished and all but died in the curricula of our schools and has in very recent years affected logic, which, by the strangest of ironies, has taken on a new life by becoming an art of symbols. The Poetics on the other hand has been used successively as a handbook for the writing of tragedy (and so gave apparent sanction to rigid rules of composition), as inspiration for a philosophy of the perception and judgment of art (and so came to serve many transcendental masters), and as a guide to men's characters (and so first furnished together with the Rhetoric the types for a branch of literature to which philosophers, like Theophrastus and Shaftesbury, literary men, like La Bruyère, and psychologists, like Adler, have contributed, and later suggested the vocabulary for a kind of psychotherapy). These mixed influences may be summed up in the observation that Aristotle sought to analyze rhetoric by treating the means by which to achieve its end, and therefore considered the rhetorical composition in relation to author and audience; he sought to analyze poetry by treating the interrelations of parts by which its form is achieved, and therefore considered the poetic composition in relation to natural and artificial objects. In modern times rhetoric has been treated as Aristotle treated poetry, and poetry has been treated as he treated rhetoric, but the significant and substantial influences of the two treatises must be sought in the works of men who were neither rhetoricians nor critics of art.

Footnotes to Part 9:

1 Nicomachean Ethics ii. 1, 1103a26: "Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them,
we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts." Ibid. 1103b7: "Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building; well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft "(cf. ibid. 2. 1104a27). For other points of similarity between the virtues and art cf. ibid. 3. 1105a10; 6. 1106b8.

2 Art is usually contrasted to nature, chance, and fortune as possible modes of production; cf. ibid. 4. 1105a21; vi. 4. 1140a18; Metaphysics xii. 3. 1070a8. Physics ii. 8. 193a11: "Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so. Thus is a house, e.g. had been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in the same way as it is now by art; and if things made by nature were made also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature. Each step then in the series is for the sake of the next; and generally art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates her." Cf. ibid. 2. 194a21; Meteorology iv. 3. 381b8.

3 Rhetoric i. 1. 1354a1: "Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others." Ibid. 2. 1356a25: "It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts — sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset." Cf. ibid. 1. 1355b14, and Politics 3. 9. 1181a13.

4 Rhetoric i. 3. 1355b26. Cf. ibid. 32: "But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects," and ibid. 4. 1359b9: "The truth is, as indeed we have said already, that rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like sophistical reasoning. But the more we try to make either dialectic or rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be re-fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning. Even here, however, we will mention those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their fuller treatment falling naturally to political science."
Cf. ibid. 1. 1355b8 and Posterior Analytics i. 1. 71b9. Topics i. 3, 101b5: "We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed (so, in dialectic) when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine and faculties of that kind; this means the doing of that which we choose with the materials that are available. For it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade, or the doctor to heal: still, if he omits none of the available means, we shall say that his grasp of the science is adequate."

5 Rhetoric i. 1. 1355a21 - 1355b7. The proper moral limitations on the use of rhetoric and its similarities so restricted to logic and science are particularly emphasized; cf. ibid. a29: "Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in."

8 Ibid. 2. 1356a14; "Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts." Cf. ibid. 1. 1354a11: "Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case."

7 Ibid. 2. 1356a1: "Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself."

3 If this interpretation of the organization of the Rhetoric is correct even in part, it would follow that in the effort to round out a complete analysis of the art of rhetoric, its problems are approached successively from several sides. That fact is sufficient to explain the discovery by scholars of passages in the different books which are not literal repetitions of the same doctrine and which seem to be contradictory; it does not however justify their conclusion derived from that discovery that the work is a pastiche of pieces taken from several books on rhetoric composed by Aristotle at different times and based on different conceptions of the art.

9 Ibid. 3. 1358b36: "Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For
of the three elements in speech-making - speaker, subject, and person addressed - it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. The hearer must be either a judge with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about future events, a jurymen about past events; while those who merely decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory - (1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display."

10 Ibid. 1359a6 ff. The consistent concern of Book I of the Rhetoric with subject matter is further indicated by the fashion in which the analysis of means of persuasion in terms of their matter finally slip wholly out of rhetoric to the consideration of a technical means of persuasion (that is, means of persuasion not proper to the art of rhetoric) in the final chapter of that book.

11 Ibid. 2. 1358a1: "We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to be demonstrative. There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody - one that also subsists between the syllogisms treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to those we have not yet acquired. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular subject the further they are getting away from pure rhetoric or dialectic. This statement will be clearer if expressed more fully. I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of argument (sc. common places or topics) are concerned. That is to say those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics and many other things that have nothing to do with one another. Take, for instance, the line of argument concerned with 'the more or less.'"

12 The treatment of political oratory opens with a statement of the purpose of the discussion, ibid. 4. 1359a30: "First, then we must ascertain what are the kinds of things, good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For he does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place." The summary of accomplishment at the end of the treatment of political oratory lays similar emphasis on subject matter, differentiating the treatment from the scientific consideration of the same subject; ibid. 8. 1366a16: "We have now considered the objects immediate or distant, at which we to aim when urging any proposal, and the grounds on which we are to base our arguments in favour of its utility. We have also briefly considered the means and methods by which we shall gain a good knowledge of the moral qualities and institutions peculiar to the various forms of government - only, however, to the extent demanded by the present occasion; a detailed account of the subject has been given in the Politics." Cf. ibid. 4. 1359b17. Similar statement is made of the nature and purpose of the analysis of the other two modes of persuasion. Cf. ibid. 9. 1366a23:

"We have now to consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base,
Since these are the objects of praise and blame," and *ibid.* 1368a35: "We have seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in making such speeches, and the materials out of which encomiums and censures are made." Cf. also *ibid.* 13, 1373b1: "It will be well to make a complete classification of just and unjust actions. We may begin by observing that they have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, I mean particular law and universal law. It is characteristic of the influence of Aristotle that in many instances the dialectical distinctions which he makes for the use of the orator have been made the basis, despite his repeated disavowal of scientific intention or precision, for the scientific discussion of the subject matter in question; his distinction between written and natural law in Chapter 13 thus has had a long and distinguished history as a basic distinction in what has been called the "philosophy of law."

13 Aristotle is explicit in these distinctions. Cf. *ibid.* 4. 1360a35: "These, then, are the most important kinds of information which the political speaker must possess. Let us now go back and state the premisses from which he will have to argue in favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding these and other matters." For display of oratory, *ibid.* 9. 1368a23: "We have now to consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, since these are the objects of praise and blame. In doing so, we shall at the same time be finding out how to make our hearers take the required view of our own characters — our second method of persuasion." For forensic oratory, *ibid.* 10. 1368a7: "We have next to treat of Accusation and Defence, and to enumerate and describe the ingredients of the syllogisms used therein. There are three things we must ascertain — first, the nature and number of the incentives to wrongdoing; second, the state of mind of wrongdoers; third, the kind of persons who are wronged, and their condition." These differences are further emphasized by the quotations and examples used in each case: the discussion of political oratory is reinforced by citation of distinctions made in the *Politics* and by quotations from Homer, Simonides, Pindar, and the orators; display oratory by citation of distinctions discussed in the *Nicomachean ethics* and by quotations from Plato, Alcaeus, Sappho, Simonides; forensic oratory by distinctions similar to those made in the *Poetics* and by citations from the dramatic poets and Homer.

14 *Ibid.* ii. 1. 1377a15: "We have now considered the materials to be used in supporting or opposing a political measure, in pronouncing encomiums or censures, and for prosecution and defence in the law courts. We have considered the received opinions on which we may best base our arguments so as to convince our hearers — those opinions with which our enthymemes deal, and out of which they are built, in each of the three kinds of oratory, according to what may be called the special needs of each. But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions — the hearers decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a decision — the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind."

15 The transition from the devices by which to invest a speech with moral character to the consideration of arguments is made, in Book II, by means of common places or common arguments;
cf. ibid. ii. 13. 1391\textsuperscript{b}23: "Each of the main divisions of oratory has, we have seen, its own distinct purpose. With regard to each division, we have noted the accepted views and propositions upon which we base our arguments - for political, for ceremonial, and for forensic speaking. We have further determined completely by what means speeches may be invested with the required moral character. We are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory."

16 ibid. ii. 26. 1403\textsuperscript{a}34: "Three points must be studied in making a speech; and we have now completed the account of (1) Examples, Maxims, Enthymemes, and in general the thought-element - the way to invent and refute arguments. We have next to discuss (2) Style, and (3) Arrangement." Cf. ibid. iii. 1. 1403\textsuperscript{b}6.

17 Poetics 1. 1447\textsuperscript{a}13: "Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kinds in their means, or by differences in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations." The author and audience are present in the analysis as natural sources of poetry, nature being further removed from the objects constructed by art than from the habits consequent on moral action; cf. ibid. 4. 1448\textsuperscript{b}4: "It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to two causes, each of them part of human nature. Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation, and it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation."

18 The rhetorician thus would recognize that all voluntary actions are or seem to be good or pleasant (cf. Rhetoric 1. 10. 1369\textsuperscript{b}19). The arts and sciences may be considered under these guises. Emphasis on the good and the useful would place the analysis of the arts in its moral and political setting. Or they may all, the arts, the sciences, and even the good, be considered in terms of the emotional responses of men, and analysis may be conducted wholly as a calculation of pleasures and an identification of emotions. Cf. ibid. 11. 1371\textsuperscript{b}4: "Again, since learning and wonder are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant - for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry - and every product of skillful imitation; this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant; for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences ('That is a so-and-so') and thus learns something fresh." For reasons that will be obvious in the analysis of that work, this distinction is relevant to the first part of the Poetics (4. 1448\textsuperscript{b}5-18).

19 Ibid. 1-3. 1447\textsuperscript{c}38 - 1448\textsuperscript{b}3.

20 Ibid. 4. 1448\textsuperscript{b}4 ff. Cf. 1449\textsuperscript{a}14: "It was in fact only after a long series of changes that the movement of Tragedy stopped on its attaining to its natural form," and 23: "As soon, however, as a spoken part came in, nature herself found the appropriate metre. The iambic, we know, is the most speakable of metres, as is shown by the fact that we very often fall into it in conversation, whereas we rarely talk hexameters, and only when we depart from the speaking tone of voice." The passages are badly distorted if they are interpreted as intruding naturalistic criteria in
poetry instead of indicating the natural materials and evolution of
the poet.

21 Ibid. 6. 1445b21 ff.
22 Ibid. 6. 1445b36, cf. 1450a32: "So that it is the action
in it, i.e. its Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of the
tragedy; and the end is everywhere the chief thing." Cf. also 38:
"We maintain, therefore, that the first essential, the life and
soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is the Plot...."
23 Ibid. 19. 1456a33. Thought as it is used by the dramatist
is the power of saying whatever can be said or what is appropriate
to the occasion, and the determination of what that consists in is
the common function of politics and rhetoric; cf. Ibid. 6. 1450b6:
"This is what, in the speeches in Tragedy, falls under the arts of
Politics and Rhetoric; for the older poets make their personages
discourse like statesmen, and the moderns like rhetoricians."
24 Rhetoric iii. 1. 1404a35; Poetics 19. 1456b8. Questions
of delivery are separate from these considerations and common to
oratory and poetry: cf. Rhetoric iii. 1. 1403b20.
Similar comparisons as they bear on character and discovery are
introduced in Chapters 15 and 16.
26 These four comparisons, suggested by the four causes, are
taken up in sequence in the last four chapters of the Poetics.

10. THE INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE

The difficulties which arise in the discussion and interpreta-
tion of another man's philosophy from the paradoxes in which the
enterprise itself is involved are more formidable than any schol-
arily difficulties such as might be encountered in the materials
of the problem. They are paradoxes which were seen, in the fourth
section of this Introduction, exemplified in Aristotle's inter-
pretation of his predecessors, and they have been prominent in the
interpretations which have in turn been made of Aristotle's philo-
sophy almost to the same degree that the restatement has had
philosophic significance and influence, for the result from the
fact that two philosophies enter the process of interpretation,
the philosophy expounded and the philosophic purposes which led
the expositor to his task. It would be a historical impertinence
to suppose that they have been avoided in this exposition of the
philosophy of Aristotle, for these paradoxes are present even when
adequate provision is made to neutralize them. The expositor
serves a function only in so far as and in the respect that he
departs from what the philosopher he expounds has said, and yet,
in so far as he finds it necessary or desirable to alter the origi-
ral form and manner of expression, he faces the question whether
it is the same philosophy which has been expounded or some sub-
stitute which has been fitted with references to works whose
first significances have been distorted. Or, if the paradox
is stated in terms of the subject-matter of the two, the philo-
sopher and his expositor, the latter must either choose as
his subject another man's philosophy (in which case his subject
is quite different from that of the philosopher, for whereas
the philosopher treated kinds of things, the expositor treats
what the philosopher said about kinds of things), or else he must make the philosopher's subject his own (in which case, short of repeating the philosopher's words, he sets himself in rivalry and competition, with no possible assurance that his statements cover what the philosopher treated or that their subjects are really the same). These are no idle or subtle intrusions of wordy distinctions into the simple problem of paraphrasing difficult statements in easier words or of equipping unprepared readers for the understanding of an esoteric discussion. They are, rather, the practical questions which should suggest themselves to the cautious reader, however unprepared, who is asked to accept one statement as the equivalent of another or to take it as a simpler expression of some of the implications of a doctrine, and they are comparable to the caution he would exercise before accepting any other currency at an estimated value. The brief references that have been made above to the history of Aristotle's influence are sufficient to indicate that there is no obvious or sure answer to such questions, but at most any newer statement of an old doctrine can be tested by inquiring into its purpose, context, and materials.

Considered in the light of such cautious skepticism, the distinguishing trait of this Introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle would seem to be that it treats most briefly precisely what was of greatest concern to Aristotle, that is, the specific subject matter and problems of his philosophy (on the assumption that the reader will pass from the Introduction to the works themselves, and that the exposition of what Aristotle says would under the circumstances be entirely gratuitous) and that it concentrates on his method of inquiry, proof, and demonstration (on the supposition that if the reader has been told how and why Aristotle says what he says, he will have been assisted in understanding what Aristotle is talking about and what he says about it). It would be a great mistake, however, to suppose that the subject matter of this Introduction reproduces the subject matter treated in Aristotle's philosophy, or that Aristotle is concerned primarily with method, or that the schematism of causes is more than incidental and instrumental in his treatises to the discovery and identification of causal relations and influences. Some provision was made in the statement of the method against such erroneous suppositions, for Aristotle was shown to have constructed his method, step by step, precisely because he was convinced that philosophers cannot substitute for method width of experience or investigation of things, and that method was shown to be not merely the manipulation of symbols or the use of ideas, but rather the application of these instruments to the analysis and interpretation of things. Aristotle does not reduce philosophy to logic; nor does he refer all problems for solution to epistemological criteria; nor, finally, does he bring simple metaphysical decisions to bear on all branches and problems of philosophy. An exposition cannot be justified in any such simple substitutions and equivalences of what the expositor says for the statements in the text of the author. In the present case, since the philosophy of Aristotle has been expounded by means of his method, the exposition might properly be explained
in turn by means of the technique attributed to Aristotle. The philosophy of Aristotle was designed to extend, in the vast number of fields and phenomena he covers, over artificial as well as natural things. That philosophy, however, is itself an artificial thing, constructed by the genius and labor of one man. In the analysis of artificial things, one important point which such works as the Poetics and the Rhetoric have in common, is their indirect treatment of the essential aspect of their subjects: rhetoric is defined in terms of its end, but is analyzed by means of its final, efficient, and formal causes; poetry is defined in terms of its form, but it is analyzed by means of its efficient, material, and final causes. The peculiar value that may be claimed for the exposition of Aristotle's philosophy in terms of his method is precisely that it leaves untouched the essential aspect of his philosophy, for that can be stated only by Aristotle. The critic may treat the end of philosophy by consideration of the processes, formulations, and materials that contribute to the pursuit of philosophic truth; but the reader must go to the philosopher, not to the critic, to engage in that pursuit, and at most the critic can abstain from the intrusion of distracting lesser truths which Aristotle might have, or should not have, or could be supposed to have, sought.

Whether or not the propriety of such a purpose in exposition be granted, three questions may be raised concerning any mode of restatement: the accuracy of its report, the importance of the items selected for report, and the purpose envisaged in that selection. With respect to the first, although the method of philosophy is not the subject matter or primary concern of Aristotle, his interest in method was so great that a formal, and often elaborate, statement of method can be found for every important branch of philosophy as he conceived it, and the evidences of his peculiar use of method are conspicuous in almost every statement of his conclusions. Those statements of method are assembled in the Introduction, and an effort is made to fit them together as they apply to the related portions of Aristotle's philosophy and to indicate the manner of their operations in the actual development and statement of that philosophy. The interpretation of the statement of method so abstracted would stand in need of more detailed exposition and defense before it could be supposed that that method is indeed the method of Aristotle, but since it is used here as a guide to the reading of the works of Aristotle, the reader can test it, and so accept or reject it, by its success as a guide, so obviating the need of such further and elaborate defense as would be appropriate if it were stated as a scholarly thesis. With respect to the second question, that of importance, the exposition of the method goes beyond a statement of the form of propositions and premises used in the composition of Aristotle's treatises, or even the methods of observation and control which determined the conclusions embodied in that form. The method is here conceived and stated in terms which depend on the Aristotelian analysis of causes, and the causes in turn form the central theme of his metaphysics, extending thence into every field of inquiry and activity. Dependent on the accuracy of the interpretation of Aristotle's
metaphysical doctrine, the method has its foundation in an interpretation of the nature of things and of reality. The reader may therefore supplement the first criterion of his reading with the second: the consideration of method should not only serve to elucidate any given portion of Aristotle's works, but since it bears on metaphysics and since metaphysics is a science of first principles, it should bring out a consistency and compendency of treatment running through the problems of the various parts of the philosophy. Finally, with respect to the third question, that of purpose, since philosophies may be interpreted in a vast number of ways and to a vast variety of ends, the emphasis on method would find its best justification if it should set the analysis moving in a direction and to an end such as Aristotle might have envisaged in the construction of his philosophy, and so, without prejudice to other possible interests, turn attention relevantly to the nature and pursuit of truth.

The selection of the works published in this edition, no less than the apparatus for their interpretation provided in this Introduction, was determined by the concern with such ends. Some notion can be recovered of Aristotle's contribution to philosophy and to the tradition of culture only by faithful adherence to his text, and such adherence involves in exposition and edition a three-fold purpose, which may be differentiated as objectivity, utility, and intelligibility. In the interest of objectivity, the texts of Aristotle's works have been preserved intact so far as limitations of space have made practicable and, where omissions have been imperative, the fact of the omission and the character of the omitted portions has been indicated as clearly as possible. To select and rearrange small fragments of a philosopher's works is to recompose them and often to alter the doctrines they express. Therefore instead of a piecing together of parcels and snatches selected with an eye to what seems more likely to catch the interest of the reader, the entire texts of the more important books are included, and even when omissions have been made from a work, entire books or entire chapters have been retained. The most recent complete translation of Aristotle has been used - the Oxford translation - which is in itself a kind of culmination to the philological research of a hundred years, embodying in one form the results of the effort of philologists since the time of the great modern edition of Aristotle's works, published by the Berlin Academy between 1831 and 1870, to determine and render the significance of what Aristotle says. As has been customary since that time, the pagination of Bekker's edition of the Greek works which is published in the first two of the five volumes of the Berlin edition has been retained in the margins of the present edition. The retention of that pagination makes reference to passages in Aristotle possible without the annoying necessity of specifying the changing pages of each new and improved edition: thus the reference in the footnotes above to, say, Metaphysics xiii. 4, 1078b27 is to Chapter 4 of Book 13 (or Book M) of the Metaphysics, line 27 of the second column of page 1078 of the Berlin edition. Since the two volumes are paginated continuously, no special designation of volumes is needed; since the line references are to the
Greek text, they are of course only approximate, but closely approximate, in the English translation. After the clearly inauthentic works have been excluded, it is possible to reduce the eleven volumes of the Oxford edition to a single volume without too serious loss of parts that bear on problems of general philosophic interest.

The second consideration, of utility, bore on the determination of the contents of the edition and the direction of the introduction. Since the biological works present the double difficulty involved in a technical subject matter and in a manner of treatment of the subject which is not easily translated to equivalent modern procedures, most of the omissions are from those treaties. For similar reasons, and to a lesser extent, omissions were made in the physical writings, and in logic, and rhetoric. For the most part, however, except for questions of particular and technical interest, the more important works are here and are published intact. After some measure of objectivity has been achieved by setting before the reader as much as possible of the works of Aristotle in the best form that scholarship has been able to give them, and in the order which has long been traditional, it is important that the reader be equipped to approach that massive array in a fashion which will recover something of the scope, interest, and applicability of the doctrines developed. Since Aristotle is neither an easy nor a popular writer, it would be poor service to the uninitiated reader to provide him, in an excess of editorial honesty, with a complete text and no indication of how to move about in it. The Introduction was intended, therefore, to map out the extent and the divisions of the Aristotelian philosophy, and to supplement the general scheme by indicating, in brief statements of its continued influence in later times, the points at which the reader might wish to seek out the exposition of the doctrine relevant to problems of particular interest to him. Such indications have been made brief, since they are used best if they are made the means by which to free the reader of the need or desire to use them. It is true of Aristotle, even more than of most philosophers, that he cannot be read, but must be reread, since each part of his philosophy contributes to the understanding of other parts. He is a philosopher on whom it is difficult to start, but once a start has been made he provides adequate interrelations and extensions.

Even the complete text and a sage awareness of the simple or useful or interesting doctrines of Aristotle, however, would be inadequate for the recovery or appreciation of Aristotle's philosophy. The third consideration, the concern for the intelligibility of the doctrine, carries beyond the erudition of the philologist and the cultured appreciation of the connoisseur seeking what had been great and significant in our intellectual past. The works of Aristotle are devoted to the expression of a philosophy and of an organized group of sciences. Appreciation of what he has accomplished is possible only if their intellectual contents and structure are apparent and intelligible.

Two questions should be raised by anyone who contemplates the task of reading a voluminous and difficult writer: why one should read him and how one might most profitably read him. Concern
with objectivity, utility, and intelligibility are aside from the point if those questions are not answered, except as they indicate some of the motives which have dominated the study of Aristotle in the past. The works of Aristotle may be read to uncover the career of a man and the evolution of a doctrine; they may be read to assemble statements and reflection for useful application or edifying meditation; they may be read for insight into one phase of the long enterprise of philosophic inquiry. While these are all relevant to an answer to the question, why read Aristotle, they hardly bear on the full or philosophic answer, for in terms of the analysis which Aristotle's example suggests, an answer to the question "why" would require a purpose or final cause, and these three answers owe their partial relevance to the fact that they are applications of the other three causes.

We are men like Aristotle and have a natural interest in the activities of men, and, among other activities, in those by which they, as efficient causes, construct great intellectual systems. The materials which Aristotle used are materials which we in turn might use in our business of living, appreciating, and thinking. The form which he gave to his thought is one which might be contemplated with aesthetic, moral, or intellectual enthusiasm. Yet none of these achievements, however laudable they may be, is the end of philosophy. Aristotle suggested that end in many ways, none of which is more striking than his observation that all men by nature desire to know, and even without the authority of Aristotle one would be drawn to the conclusion that in the degree that the reading of Aristotle does not contribute to knowledge, Aristotle or the reader has failed in pursuit of the one end worthy of a philosophic enterprise.

The brief history of Aristotle's influence on later thought which has been sketched in the concluding paragraphs of some of the sections of this Introduction may be taken as illustrative of the two totally different fashions in which Aristotle has been influential as a force in intellectual history. His work has become deeply imbedded in our intellectual tradition, and there are few branches of thought in which even casual inquiry will not disclose terms, theories, inquiries, and insights that can be traced back to his influence. The analyses which tradition has continued from Aristotle, however, even when they still bear his name, as the "Aristotelian logic" or the "three Aristotelian dramatic unities," rarely continue the significance which their originals had, even when germs of those doctrines can be discovered in them. It is part of the tradition that what is most important in Aristotle is not what has been perpetuated in the Aristotelian tradition, and by a like token, if his works are read today for material information, directly comparable to what would be found in modern treatises on the same subjects, his accomplishments are dated and thin. Formulations and reformulations of his doctrine are important for cultural history, but what is important about them is not their truth or their falsity, but their influence, their extension, and their dates. Nevertheless, the history of culture is not exclusively the record of revolts against Aristotle or even of recurrence of distortions of Aristotle; and when his influence has been an inspiration to scientific and philosophic inquiry, the stimulation derived from the inform-
tion he amassed has been less important than the extension of the method he supplied to work beyond the limits that mark off even his great achievement. Aristotle can still be read, not only to determine what one great philosopher thought philosophy to be, but to discover from his insight the delineations of philosophic ends and criteria, unconfined by the restrictions of the expression Aristotle gave them. Aristotle, the man, can be appreciated only in a careful and sympathetic reading, and that reading will disclose profit and grace where they were unsuspected before the depth and power of his philosophic analysis was discovered. And philosophic insight is not irrelevant to utility, since it reveals the shallowness of criteria of utility and truth which might have been employed if that insight had not been achieved. Even more important, however, the treatment of the philosophy of Aristotle involves, in addition to sensitive awareness of what he says, an appreciation of why he says it, and therefore entails awareness of the manner of control which truth exercises on philosophic statement and investigation.

Such considerations, however, suggest an opposite answer to the question how to read Aristotle. We are the heirs of a tradition which has preserved many traces of Aristotle's philosophic inquiries. What he has done and what he has said is therefore more readily intelligible to us in the modified form in which it still constitutes part of our thought and convictions. It is wise to read Aristotle for the first time in the reverse order to that in which his works have traditionally been arranged and with emphasis on his conclusions and his analyses rather than on his principles. What Aristotle says concerning poetry and rhetoric, although it is more complex in manner of analysis and more difficult in systematic construction, approximates more nearly to what modern writers might say on those and related subjects, and is in that sense simpler than what he says concerning physics and metaphysics. His moral and political theory, for like reason, leads him in its development to many distinctions and statements which a modern reader would be disposed to accept or reject, without too lengthy preliminary translation of the mode of expression. The reader is therefore advised to begin his reading of Aristotle with one of those subjects, preferably one concerned with a subject matter in which he is already interested, the Poetics if he is interested in literary criticism, the Rhetoric if he is interested in the modes of persuading men, the Politics or the Nicomachean Ethics if he is interested in social institutions or moral habits. He would be unwise, unless he has special training in the subjects which they treat, to begin with the Organon, the Physics, On the soul, or the Metaphysics. He should remember, however, as he picks his way through the discussion of the tragedy or of the moral virtues, that full appreciation of the distinctions which are made and the arguments which are used would require the background supplied by Aristotle's other works, and any tentative mental catalogue he may make of what is true and false, good and bad in Aristotle's analysis should be checked in the light of possible insights to be derived from later consultation of such masterpieces of philosophic analysis as the Metaphysics and On the soul. Those works, though later in the order of his reading, since their matter is more difficult
than that involved in the intricate but familiar questions of conduct and art, are nonetheless simpler in analysis, once the manner of that analysis is appreciated from instances of the more complex treatises, and so they may in turn shed a light back on the works first studied. The reader who can make the transition from familiar problems to first principles is well prepared to reverse the order of his study and to follow the lines of Aristotle's method through the treatises without need of further guidance, for if it is true that men by nature desire to know, it is no less true that man recognizes the marks of truth when he begins to approach it, however frequently he may previously have been mistaken. There is no better answer to the question why one should read Aristotle than the consideration of how men who have been influenced by him have tended to read him, for once the reversal has been effected and his conclusions are approached in the light of his principles, he can be appreciated not only for his expression of a philosophy but as a guide to philosophy and as an aid in the pursuit of truth, to which he thought men dedicated and to which his philosophy is a monumental contribution.

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