The line which divides narrative from argument is tenuous and vaguely drawn, even when the account is of actions performed publicly and of matters of record attested by independent witnesses. Soldiers who have completed their campaigns or withdrawn from them and politicians who have put policies into effect or have seen them defeated have often set down some form of history in the conviction, expressed by Thucydides, that an exact knowledge of the past is an aid to the interpretation of the future.¹ The line is tenuous, however, because history is frequently transformed into fiction under the influence of arguments constructed to square actions with principles, and the arguments are twisted by the events into sophistry. Accounts of adventures among things of the spirit are still more esoteric than military and political myths. Incidents, dates, and even protagonists, are not easily determined by external witnesses to the evolution of ideas. The narrative therefore tends to reassemble the parts of an argument in the chronological sequence of their development, and the agents in the action tend to become ideas in dialectical opposition. Narratives of action reveal the interdependence of the careers and destinies of men; narratives of inquiry and speculation bring men together in common ideas encountered and in the common efforts to interpret them. In the treatment of intellectual and spiritual problems the individual mind is in contact with universal relations, and the grasp of a basic problem or the comprehension of a true idea is not an individual possession to be explained.

¹ Thucydides, i. 22.
adequately by personal traits or prior history. On the other hand, the order of experience takes on a significance, usually unsuspected until a problem is resolved, when the stages of the experience are rearranged as steps in the discovery or proof of what is later conceived to be valuable or true. In spiritual biographies the protagonist properly tends to lose his personal identity and his actions tend to be separated from the local conditions and temporal circumstances, for, as Spinoza proved, "insofar as men live under the guidance of reason, thus far only they always necessarily agree in nature."2

Habits of philosophic analysis and historical research, consequently, although they might seem useful instruments adapted to the effort of interpreting the memory of past problems with which one has worked and the sequence of the stages by which one has become aware of their implications and the requirements of their solution, in fact inhibit interpretation and reconstruction by suggesting prior questions. The account of one man's difficulties in speculation about principles, in deliberation about means, and in inquiry about consequences, is significant only if, on the one hand, the statement of his arguments has a bearing on ideas and aspirations as they are at once shared by other men of the time or tradition and involved in timeless principles or implications, and if, on the other hand, the account of the sequence of his efforts to clarify notions and achieve ideals contributes to the clarification of universal thoughts and common actions. Conversely, a slight knowledge of philosophy and historical method is enough to suggest suspicions concerning much that purports to be narrative accounts of thought or action: history is often made by equipping developments in theory or practice with subjective motivations which might justify but did not cause them, or by stringing events on significances later discerned but unexpressed and unknown at the time of occurrence.

The power and significance of autobiography and confession have their sources in these paradoxes, however much they may distress those who seek simple meanings of what is said and simple separations of the facts of narrative from the ideas of argument. The interdependence of actions and the interrelation of theory and fact tempt men to seek in the absolutes of independent empirical facts or eternal truths the significance of occurrences on which a life has touched and the developments which bind occurrences in a line of action or a growing insight. The actions of men are directed to satisfying like needs in like circumstances, and the thoughts of men encounter common matters and explore common patterns, yet the significance of the common and unchanged is rendered more intelligible by the circumstances and the changes that led to its expression in the particular manner of one person, one period, and one mingling of traditions. Doubtless motives may be manifest in any autobiographical account other than those recounted by the writer, and principles of selection operate in the determination of what occurrences should be chosen and emphasized, even in an account of speculation and inquiry other than the emergence of common problems and the clarification of universal ideas. The significance of the narrative can be sought in the delineation of a person and the circumstances of his times and culture, as well as in his approximations to ideas which influence many men and many times. Yet the reasons for writing about the circumstances which influenced one's thoughts and about the processes and events in which they were involved, can be only that the significance of thoughts, which is broader than the occurrences of one man's life, can be grasped concretely only in the particularities of expression and implication which are parts of biography, rather than of metaphysics or logic.

These considerations have determined the selection of autobiographical arguments which are presented in what follows. I have been concerned successively, for three rather long periods, with three problems which are problems of our times, or more nearly accurately, three approaches which our times have made to problems of universal scope and to truths of universal significance—problems of philosophic scholarship, of educational practice and administration, and of international and intercultural relations. Viewed in retrospect, these three problems seem so closely interrelated and interdependent that they may be described more nearly accurately as three approaches to the same problem. The same considerations, therefore, suggest that the narrative should run in the reverse of the chronological order, for the significances which I attach to events as I retell them were usually later additions, not recognized at the time. It is doubtless true that a man's characteristic attitudes are determined at an early age, long before the philosophic vocabulary which is later used to express them is available, but even if an autobiographer limited himself to such evidence as he could find concerning those first few years of his life and to the interpretations of his later life which his psychological or psychosomatic

2. Spinoza, Ethos, iv. 35.
vocabulary permitted, those principles by which he arranges his narrative are themselves late acquisitions, grounded in philosophic presuppositions, as well as in psychological facts. The adjustments of the human organism are doubtless explained by basic principles, but those principles are discovered and tested by the human organism: the principles and attitudes that might be found in any such theory in what I have said would serve to characterize me, but I have been impressed by the recurrent conviction that the significant part of what I know in relation to what I do, always has been acquired during the past year, and my narrative is therefore of the process and not of the fixities by which it may have been conditioned. The story would, moreover, be better told backwards, if that were possible, for the beginning of an argument is its principles, and the principles emerge later in the evolution, but as it is impossible to present the narrative as argument, I shall try at least to distinguish the occurrences and later significances attached to them from the vantage point of some turning at which the two may be put in perspective.

The First World War was such a vantage point. I returned to my studies at Columbia University in 1919. The interruption of the war had been slight, for I had been assigned in the Naval Reserves to the Student Army Training Corps established at Columbia during the last months of the war. But I had been a "preprofessional" student before the war, engaged first on a program of studies designed to prepare for the law and later on a pre-engineering program; my further training in the Navy had been for engineering. Like many other returning students, I found that my interests had shifted to humanistic studies, and for the next few years I read literature, history, philosophy, and the classics. In 1920, I wrote a thesis for the Master of Arts degree in which I studied Tolstoi, Croce, and Santayana, as expressions of three modern approaches to art and literature, and explored the relations and possible conciliation of esthetic phenomena conceived in terms of moral influences, esthetic experience, and scientific or psychological explanations. In retrospect I think the center of my interest was in the relation of esthetic values to science and to morality and in the methods appropriate to investigate in the art object the esthetic qualities of the object, the scientific foundations of the esthetic experience, and the moral and political implications of the creation of art and its influences. I was later to be impressed both by the need of new interpretations in art and morals because of developments in science and technology, and also by the danger of superficial and insubstantial analogies between the scientific method and the processes of moral deliberation and esthetic appreciation.

These purposes can be found in the thesis, but the recognition and statement of them is doubtless a later addition. The thesis also shows the marks of a more complete and systematic philosophy than I have been able to develop since 1920. The main outlines of the philosophy were determined (I thought), and it stood in need only of application to the varieties of problems of philosophy and related fields. The three chief ingredients of which it was composed were a scientific basis in behaviorism to account for how we think and how we act, a normative criterion in pragmatism to determine the meaningful problems of philosophy and the marks of truth and value by which to solve them, and a symbolic system by which to achieve precision in analysis and statement. It was a highly satisfactory philosophy, because it could be applied to a succession of subject matters and problems with little need of adjustment and with only a minimum of knowledge of the particular subject matter to which it was to be accommodated. I have never since been able to achieve comparable scope of system or convenience of method, but experience with later generations of students has kept me in contact with the later forms of that philosophy. In all its forms it combines a foundation borrowed from some science, a system of explanation couched in a technical vocabulary, and a ready applicability in the same form to all problems. Struggles with the simple distinctions of such philosophies usually raise doubts in their originators concerning the ideals to which they are directed. They led me by indirect ways to an interest in the vast diversity of problems which tends to be concealed in the simplifications, the unifications, and the analogies conceived in the name of philosophy and in the diversified adaptation of methods to materials and problems which tends to be forgotten in the hunt for formal precision and symbolic elegance.

The influence of science and of social and economic changes on philosophy and the determination of philosophic principles of scientific inquiry and social action seem in retrospect to have been the dominant interests during my graduate work in philosophy. The problems of scientific method and its metaphysical implications were prominent in the philosophic literature and in the philosophy courses of the early 1920s. These inquiries led me back to readings in the philosophers of
the seventeenth century who had engaged in highly elaborated and
diversified efforts to apply the scientific method to man and to human
actions and to interpret what is entailed in the scientific approach. I was
influenced in this exploration of present implications of science and
past speculations concerning it chiefly by Frederick J. E. Woodbridge
and John Dewey. Woodbridge helped and guided me in my study of
Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, and was quizzically tolerant of the enthusiasms I discovered for Descartes, Leibnitz, and Boyle. I learned from
Woodbridge to find philosophic problems, not in the massive opposi-
tions of systems and in the rival propositions certified by technical anal-
yses, but in the simple occurrences of everyday life from which the
dilemmas of philosophic disputation are derived. The operations of the
mind, so conceived, encounter the elements of order even in their most
arbitrary decisions, and the intelligible structure of the universe is en-
countered in the exploration of ideas derived from experience. Most of
all I learned from Woodbridge to respect the integrity of philosophic
thought and to hold tenaciously to the assumption that what philosoph-
ers said made sense, even when I had difficulty grasping it, and that
what philosophers meant might be comparable or even identical, de-
spite differences in their modes of expression. Dewey had just returned
from a long visit to the Far East and offered two courses in which he
related the diversities of philosophic systems and methods to his own
mode of philosophizing. From Dewey I learned to seek the significance
of philosophic positions in the problems they were constructed to solve,
to suspect distinctions and separations which remove the pro-
ces of thinking from the experience in which they originated, and
to relate the formulation of problems and the discovery of solutions
to the cultural influences which determined the manner of their occur-
rence.

My Ph. D. dissertation was a study of Spinoza which took its begin-
ing in Spinoza’s conception of scientific method in philosophy and of the
use of reason in the resolution of moral problems. The arguments
of Spinoza contained refutations of conceptions of the nature of sci-
ence, and the application of scientific knowledge to moral and political
problems which I had previously accepted without question. His anal-
ysis of scientific method is developed in a long correspondence in op-
posite to Boyle in which he argues against false empiricisms (as else-
where he demolishes verbal scholasticisms) contending that experience
alone can never refute a theory, because contrary evidence can lead
either to the abandonment or the modification of the theory, and ex-
perimentation alone can never give knowledge of the fundamental na-
ture of things or of basic scientific law. His use of method in moral
problems can be studied in the massive attempt of his Ethics to treat the
problems of action and passion in more geometrico and to provide pre-
cise mathematical proofs of moral theorems, but he argued that knowl-
edge has no direct effect in the control of the passions and the motiva-
tions to knowledge. Irrationality can be controlled and the operations
of nature can be understood, precisely because the universe is by nature
intelligible.

Yet even when I had come to some understanding of this view of
scientific method and its applications to morals, I was puzzled by its re-
lation to the other parts of Spinoza’s philosophic work. In his own
time Spinoza was criticized as an atheist; during the eighteenth century
Lessing, Jacobi, Herder, and Goethe found inspiration in his concep-
tion of God, nature, and human existence; in the nineteenth century,
the great physiologist and comparative anatomist, Johannes Peter
Mueller, thought it impossible to improve on Spinoza’s analysis of the
passions, and reprinted in his Elements of Physiology the aphorisms on
the passions in the third book of the Ethics. It is an accurate rough
description of the influence of Spinoza that its focus moved with the
centuries down the sequence of the books of the Ethics centering “On
God” in the seventeenth century, “On the Nature and Origin of the
Mind” in the eighteenth century, and on “The Origin and Nature of the
Emotions” in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century the
moral and political problems involved in “The Strength of the Emo-
tions” came to new attention in interpretations which are not always
consistent with the conception of God developed in the first book or
the conception of “The Power of the Intellect” expounded in the fifth
book of the Ethics.3 I realized only later that the problems I encoun-
tered in Spinoza were twentieth century problems and that the Spinoza
who influenced my thinking was neither the Spinoza criticized by Leibnitz
nor the Spinoza admired by Goethe or Mueller. The application of
scientific method to moral problems seemed to me to involve him in
two difficulties, the first in relating the knowledge of man and his pas-

sions to nature and its processes by means of God and His attributes, and the second in separating the methods and controls of politics from those of ethics. My dissertation explored the unity of Spinoza's thought both in the natural bases which permitted the application of the geometric method to nature and to man, and in the differentiation of the purposes and methods of religion and politics from those of scientific analysis and morals.

From 1922 to 1925 I studied in Paris, spending the summers traveling in Europe and working in the libraries which determined in part the itinerary of the cities I visited. Much of what I have said about the direction of my earlier graduate studies should doubtless be dated during these three years, for they gave perspective to what I had done, both because I was able to place the traditions in thought of which I had become aware in the United States in the context of the European traditions from which they were derived, and because I was able to push further back my examination of the historical origins of the ideas and problems with which I had been concerned. Sensed differences in attitudes, purposes, and ideas encountered in different times, places, and formulations, are easily converted into myths, which have the kind of truth that is recognized in jokes about national characteristics. The student of philosophy can hardly avoid being impressed by tantalizing similarities of idea, expression, and purpose, even in philosophic discussions distantly removed, in space or time, from those with which he is familiar; but even in those which are close in origin and influence, the similar purposes are differently achieved, the similar expressions have different meanings, and the similar ideas appear in different uses and contexts.

My studies in French philosophy were inseparable from my discovery of America. I had learned that Francis Bacon was the first modern philosopher and that he had first inquired into the organization of the new sciences and formulated the methods by which they were acquired; I now learned that René Descartes was the first modern philosopher and that his inquiry into method and into the foundations of the sciences were the beginnings of modern philosophy. The philosophic movements which engaged the attention of students in the United States at that time were forms of realism and pragmatism constructed in revolt against idealism; philosophers like Henri Bergson and Léon Brunschvicg were engaged on like problems in revolt against absolute idealism but I found, to my amazement, that they were idealists not-
rediscovery of alternative forgotten methods. But I also found much in their writings which was unintelligible and opaque without further historical study. I therefore worked with Brunschvicg on Spinoza and on the intellectual movements of which he was part. Brunschvicg had already published his study of the stages of development of mathematical philosophy, and he had begun to apply the same methods to the study of physical causality, moral conscience, and like concepts. I learned from Brunschvicg to use the historical development of concepts as part of the analysis of current problems in their interrelations in large departmens of philosophy. I studied Descartes, Malebranche, and medieval philosophy with Etienne Gilson. My explorations of the background of Spinoza's philosophy had already brought me into contact with currents of medieval thought. My three years in Paris gave me the opportunity to study medieval philosophers more systematically—and to become interested in particular in the twelfth century background of Abelard and the fourteenth century context of Ockham—and I learned from Gilson to trace the basic patterns and unity of philosophic thought through the diversity of philosophic systems and expressions. Even before my medieval studies it had become apparent that Western thought is unintelligible without its Greek foundations. I therefore worked with Leon Robin on Plato and Aristotle, and learned from him philological and philosophical methods of interpreting the text and the structure of philosophic arguments. My indebtedness to these great teachers and the many others whose lectures I attended can hardly be summed up in a few sentences, and I suspect that I am unable to disentangle what I learned from the uses to which I put it, or to separate the ideas I was conscious of from the subtle modifications which the whole changed context of life worked in them. The interrelations of cultures must affect increasingly the developments of thought and its effective application, but life in Paris in the early 1920s cannot be rendered adequately in purely practical or intellectual terms.

I returned to New York in 1925 and taught philosophy at Columbia University for the next ten years. After the normal apprenticeship of teaching numerous courses in logic and introduction to philosophy, my teaching was divided between the history of philosophy and philosophic analysis. My historical courses concentrated on the Philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and my analytic courses, which were offered under the titles, "Metaphysics and Science" and "Metaphysics and Method," were devoted to the examination of the basic presuppositions and philosophic principles of the natural sciences, of the moral and social sciences, and of art and criticism. As I discussed these problems with my students and as I wrote about those portions of them in which the pattern of relations was clearest, I was brought to the conclusion that the starting point of philosophic discussion in our times must be the consideration of the vast diversity of analyses that have been made, and that are still being made, of problems which have a recognizable continuity, despite changes, revolutions, and new discoveries. There is a tendency in American philosophy to seek basic principles in operations or in linguistic forms of expression rather than in the nature of things or in the categories of thought. But the analysis tends to be of operations abstractly conceived, rather than of actual operations which define ideas in the context of associated ideas in cultures or systems and in relation to the subject matter to which they apply; or alternately it is an analysis of the forms of hypothetical pure languages, rather than the actual languages developed by men associated in cultures and engaged in the solution of practical and theoretic problems. The treatment of ideas and systems as functions of cultures and of intellectual methods and the exploration of the patterns of their expression in a kind of historical intellectual semantics have, therefore, seemed to me important propaedeutic to the treatment of philosophic problems as such, and a defense against the shallow construction of patterns of culture which dispense with ideas, except as illustrative of cultural relations and of formal semantics which dispense with problems, except as consequent on the theory of language.

I have found that I returned often in these studies to the works of three philosophers whose speculations are explicit about the unity which they sought and about the distinctions which are important in the discovery of that unity. Aristotle found the basis of philosophy in experience, and sought to avoid the idealism of Plato and the materialism of Democritus; to that end he distinguished theoretic, practical, and productive sciences. Spinoza found the unity of knowledge and of things in Substance, God, or Nature, and sought to avoid the verbal explanations of Scholasticism (which he traced back to the tradition of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, as opposed to the tradition of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius) and the constructions of "emperics and recent philosophers"; to that end he distinguished ethics, religion, and politics. Dewey found the unity of inquiry in experience, not as an epistemological beginning, but as the common cultural source of phil-
might as easily be approached from other beginnings, for the traditions of philosophy come to life in the debate concerning basic principles to order the whole range of philosophic problems in which each position is based on the denial of previous distinctions. The discovery of truth and the establishment of meaning are both dependent historically on the doctrines which become false or meaningless in the orientation of the new doctrine, and despite the impatience of practical men and dogmatists, there is fortunately no way to halt the eternal philosophic dialogue about things, knowledge, and systems.

During the early 1930s I met Robert Maynard Hutchins and discussed education in America with him, touching on both the problems of general education in the colleges and of the higher learning in the graduate schools. Among other questions, we talked about the relation of history to philosophy—the applications of history to the development of knowledge in the history of ideas and the application of philosophy to historical processes in the philosophy of history. I went to The University of Chicago as Visiting Professor of History in 1934–1935, to give a course in the intellectual history of Western Europe and a seminar in the philosophy of history, and I stayed on as Dean of the Division of the Humanities and as Professor of Greek and Philosophy. During my twelve years as Dean, from 1935 to 1947, I was able to take part in the replanning of humanistic studies in general education in the College, as well as to cooperate with the departments in the reorganization of graduate work in the humanities.

The problem of the humanities in the present world is compounded of several dislocations which extend into many of the compartments of contemporary life—the readjustment of values to altered conditions and circumstances, the readjustment of methods of inquiry to the data and methods of science, and the readjustment of conceptions of the place of the humanities in education and life to changed philosophic presuppositions. During the period between the two World Wars there was widespread agreement concerning both the predicament of the humanities and the contribution which humanistic studies normally make to a well-rounded education in a mature civilization; but there was little agreement concerning what the humanities are, or concerning what should be done to improve their condition and to put them to the uses of which they are capable. Yet it seemed probable that the predicament of the humanities could be traced to a circle of interrelated causes—the failure to recognize the contribution of the humanities to civilization and the consequent construction of a civilization in which the place of humanistic values is attenuated; when accomplishment is marked by accumulation and value by place, humanistic studies offer less obvious attractions to young students than the precisions and effects of scientific studies or the utilities and problems of social studies; and, as consequence or in such circumstances, methods of teaching and inquiry vacillate between the irrelevant technicalities of tested traditional methods and the irrelevant innovations borrowed from fashionable sciences and technologies.

At The University of Chicago, graduate studies are organized in four divisions under the Physical Sciences, the Biological Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. This organization facilitates the assumption that the methods of the humanities are distinct from those of the natural and the social sciences in the treatment of subject matters and problems whose close interrelations are reflected in the affirmations and negations of philosophers concerning the separations and identities of the parts of our knowledge and behavior. During the early years of my work as Dean, members of the faculty of the Division of the Humanities met in committees, in small informal groups, and in divisional meetings to discuss the common disciplines which unite the various departments of languages, literatures, art, music, history, and philosophy in the Division. Out of those discussions there came an agreement that studies in the humanities should be conceived in relation to two bases—a material basis in the knowledge of a culture, a time, and a subject matter; and a disciplinary basis in the practice of methods of inquiry and criticism, and in the insights essential to their practice. The traditional separation of humanistic studies into departments such as English, Romance, Germanic, Oriental languages and literature, into Music, Art, History, Linguistics, and Philosophy, is token of the importance of command of the materials essential to humanistic studies in any given field of culture. The faculty decided that that organization was fundamentally sound, provided the methods and disciplinary approaches to the materials were broad and relevant to humanistic objec-
tives. In order to maintain what is important in such specialized knowledge and yet prevent the fragmentation of the humanistic enterprise, they set up four interdepartmental committees—to operate in much the way departments operate in preparing programs of study and presenting students for higher degrees—in the four disciplines practiced in varying ways in all the departments: in language, history, criticism, and philosophy. These four disciplines cross the departmental lines, and the organization of the committees permits a student in Language and Communication, in History of Culture, in Comparative Studies in Art and Literature, and in the Analysis of Ideas and the Study of Methods to take work which involves several languages and symbolic systems, or a variety of cultures and times, or a variety of critical systems and literatures, or the bearing of philosophic analyses on a variety of subjects. Moreover, the interdepartmental work of the committees was calculated to bring greater breadth into the departmental work, while the cooperation of the departments in the work of the committees would serve the purpose of avoiding the vague and tenuous generalities which so frequently remain as the only mark that comparative studies in literature, history, and philosophy retain from the universal ambitions which motivate them.

The close relation of the humanities to the social sciences and to the natural sciences, as well as the characteristic differences of the methods employed in humanistic studies on materials which may fall also under the scrutiny of the sciences, become less difficult to discern when they are considered in respect to the disciplines of the humanities. Literature and the arts have their uses as data in the social sciences, and in those uses they are sources of information concerning cultures and peoples. Literature and art are also expressions of truths about nature, man, and the cosmos, and the continuity of human knowledge is marked in the inspiration Copernicus found in Cicero and Freud in Sophocles, no less than in the stimulation Lucretius derived from Epicurus, Hume from Newton, and Dewey from Darwin. But literature and the arts may be studied for the values which they embody, as well as for the light they may throw on the manners and ideas of men. Times and cultural circumstances facilitate the recovery of meanings expressed by men in other traditions and places, but the discovery and appreciation of values in the creations and expressions of men present problems other than solely the recovery of what they meant. The same times produce good and bad art and the same intentions are well and badly expressed. The study of the arts for the world-view they embody, or for information about the circumstances in which they were produced, and the study of art as embodiments of esthetic values, are supplementary inquiries into related aspects of human activities.

In like fashion, the study of language may be approached by inquiry into the physical and physiological bases of speech, or into the history of the development of languages and their uses in the communities and civilizations of men, or into the effectiveness of their employment for particular ends of expression. Anthropological linguistics has developed a technique for recording the modes of expression in different tribes and peoples and in different circumstances; humanistic linguistics adapts its techniques to the examination of the employment of language in rhetoric, literature, science, and other modes of expression. The diversity of linguistic patterns revealed in the one approach and the normative standards discovered in the other are not rival hypotheses between which the linguist must choose, but supplementary considerations to be brought to bear on the problems of languages. History, likewise, presents dimensions in the succession of geological ages, the evolution of animals, the marks which astronomical and meteorological phenomena have left on the planets and the surface of the earth and in the theoretic relations of time and space, which are properly treated in the natural sciences. The reconstruction and interpretation of social, political, economic, and cultural conditions and changes require techniques and theories which are devised in the social sciences. The history of art, music, literature, philosophy and the development of ideas, theories and values reflect the evolutions of nature and the circumstances of man, but the reconstruction and interpretation of the history of thought and expression depend on knowledge of those forms and ideas, and that history is the context in which theories about nature and man are developed. Philosophy, finally, is one form of knowledge, profoundly affected by the development of the sciences and by their methods; it reflects the interests of times, peoples, and cultures in which it develops; its proper domain is the principles and the systematic relations of explanations of things and their processes, men and their communities, and values and their expressions.

Concern with the predicament of the humanities in the world today is both part and consequence of reflection on the humanistic aspects of culture. The appreciation of art, literature, history, religion, and philosophy is one of the characteristic marks of a great civilization, and in the
West the humanists have in various ages contributed to that appreciation by study of the tradition of art and learning. The humanists in Rome and in the Renaissance were able to adapt the knowledge of the past creatively to the formation of new cultures relative to new circumstances and new needs. The success of humanism depends on that double achievement—the perception of values as broad as humanity, and the expression of values in the living idiom of a people. Conversely, humanistic studies face two dangers in any period—the danger of debase when the cultivation of traditional values and learned disciplines is removed from relevance to present situations and problems.

The problems of the humanities in scholarship and in the higher learning are closely related to the problems of the humanities in general education in the colleges. The problem of general education is basically the problem of establishing a common basis of understanding and communication which is the particular need of a democratic community. The determination of the contents of courses in the humanities in collegiate education, is part of the problem of constructing—with a view to the ideal that the opportunity will one day be open to all young people to continue their studies beyond the high school—an education for individual development, for citizenship, and for the utilities and amenities of common life. The solution to that problem determines, in turn, the preparation which students will have if they choose to go on to further studies in the humanities, and consequently the form which higher studies and research will take. At the College of The University of Chicago, work was in progress to revise the content of education for the new four year degree of Bachelor of Arts, which had been constructed on the basis of a division of education into six years of elementary education, four years of secondary education, and four years of collegiate education, instead of the customary division into eight, four, and four years. In the new scheme a student normally receives the A.B. at the age of eighteen or nineteen, and the program of more specialized work in one of the departments for the degree of Master of Arts becomes a three year program, instead of the nominal one year allotted to such training under older schemes. Having participated in the Division of the Humanities in the planning for that enlarged M.A. training, I was glad to accept the invitation of the College to take an active part in planning and teaching in the new program of the College. The program for the A.B. was conceived as a common program for all students in the College, divided into courses according to the major divisions of subject matters and disciplines, and tested by objective comprehensive examinations based on the field rather than the peculiarities of courses or instructors. My own work on the program was in two courses, the general Humanities course and the Integration course.

The committee which planned the course of studies in the humanities approached its problem by discussing the general question of the place which humanistic studies should occupy in contemporary education. The functions and uses of the humanities, in turn, involved the committee in searching considerations of the nature of the humanities and the methods proper to study and teaching of the humanities. A one year general course in the humanities was required of all students of the College, as part of the “New Plan” which had been put into effect in the early 1930s. This was a pioneering course, and it is widely influential in American education—and indeed it is still frequently the basis of what is said, in criticism and in praise, about the Chicago course in the humanities, in spite of the radical changes of the 1940s. It was a good course, but it raised many problems, among which one had a recurrent and fundamental character. The course followed the historical sequence of artistic, cultural, and intellectual developments in the Western world, and the humanistic disciplines required for the appreciation and interpretation of arts, letters, and philosophy, tended to be lost in the story, while the story tended to be accepted uncritically. It could be argued that education should provide a training in the humanistic disciplines, as well as in the disciplines required for the understanding of the historical developments by which values and their environing circumstances evolved. The committee therefore recommended that two courses be planned—one in history and one in the humanities—and that a close relation be maintained between the history course and the general courses in the humanities, as well as the social sciences, and the natural sciences, by referring the materials and methods treated in those courses to their historical contexts and to the conditioning influences of historical times and movements. The problem of constructing a humanities course, when it is separated from questions of “covering” the history of art, literature, and philosophy, is the problem of determining the contribution which the humanities might make to contemporary
life, and, therefore, the problem of making available to students and to the times such benefits as might come from knowledge of men's great achievements.

It would be dubious history—even beyond the autobiographical license of reading theories later conceived into the development of earlier actions—to attribute to the group that discussed the plans for the humanities course any large consensus concerning the nature and the present purposes of the humanities. In the course of discussion I urged three objectives: the development in the student of taste and broad acquaintance with the arts, literature, history, and philosophy, sufficient to direct his interests and afford guidance into the rich satisfactions and improvements which exploration in these fields might afford; the formation of the abilities which are necessary to the recognition and appreciation of artistic, cultural, and intellectual values, as opposed to the random associated reflections which frequently accompany the attentive attitude and proper remarks that pass for appreciation; and, finally, the analytical abilities needed to integrate taste and interest, on the one hand, and critical judgment and discrimination, on the other hand, into the context of the principles—philosophic and social, theoretic and practical—which are particularized in the character and attitudes of a man, and universalized in the philosophies and cultural communities men share.

In my opinion those three purposes have served to signalize objectives that might be attributed to the parts of the three year course in the humanities which grew out of the planning started in that early committee. The first year of the course was devoted to bringing the student to a broad acquaintance with literature, music, and the visual arts, and with the basic problems involved in their interpretation. The second year concentrated on the problems of literature, in the broad sense in which it includes, not only belles-lettres but history, philosophy, rhetoric, and like forms of expression, and undertook to explore, not the historical sequences or the spirit of ages, peoples, or writers, but the questions which the critical reader should learn to ask concerning particular kinds of works or concerning particular aspects of all works: in respect to history, questions concerning the adequacy of the narrative, representation, or argument to particular facts; in respect to rhetoric, questions concerning the adjustment of forms of statement and argument to particular audiences, and their effectiveness, and value; in respect to philosophy, questions concerning the principles and the development of arguments; and in respect to appreciation and criticism, questions bearing on the forms of dramas, novels, lyric poems, the utilization and expression in them of the tensions and aspirations of men, and the communication they afford and effect to the spirit of men. These questions were raised in a succession of readings in works of history, rhetoric, philosophy, drama, novels, and lyric poetry, and the student was trained, not in reciting a dogmatic humanism or philosophy of culture, but in framing and considering the questions which are presented to a critical mind by the varieties of forms, contents, and proposed values. Once he had learned to consider historical questions relative to works of history, philosophic questions relative to works of philosophy, and esthetic questions relative to poetry, drama, and fiction, he was expected to venture also into the tangled intermingling of questions which constitutes much of the literature of criticism and appreciation, by treating philosophy as poetry or history, exploring poetry as metaphor, argument, or ritual, and transforming history into a metaphysics of cultures, an appendage to scientific theories borrowed from thermodynamics or evolution, or a dialectic with poetic, scientific, or religious overtones. During the third year the student returned to the study of musical and visual, as well as literary arts, to treat them in the light of critical principles as they apply to individual works, as they relate works to men and times, fashions and tastes, or enjoyments and uses, and as they integrate life, expression, and community in basic philosophic forms.

The program of general education in the College was developed in the various fields by planning and discussion similar to that which led to the formation of the three year course in the humanities, and the program consisted, therefore, of courses which the student would normally take in preparation for the comprehensive examinations, constructed to test whether he had the abilities and information which are the marks of the possession of a general education. The interrelations of the parts of such an education seemed to the faculty to deserve particular attention, and an "integration" course, to be taken in the last year of work, was therefore included in the plans of the program. I was a member of the committee which worked out the curriculum of this integration course. The objectives of the course are briefly adumbrated in the title "Observation, Interpretation, and Integration," which was attached to it in the early stages of faculty discussion. The committee began by considering the various ways in which the parts of knowledge
might be integrated: they might be fitted together in an inclusive and
neutral frame in an encyclopedic manner; their interrelations might be
found in the fashion in which they could be put to applications in life
in a practical manner; or their integration might take the form of the
development of a systematic view of the organic unity of experience
and the world in a philosophic manner. A general education, however,
does not depend on encyclopedic knowledge, but on a framework of
information and acquaintance with the uses and checks of available
sources of information. The practical applications of general education,
moreover, are not something separate from education, to be simulated
in classroom reconstruction of cases or in field tours of regions, and the
philosophy required for a general education should take the form of
insight into relations among the parts of experience and knowledge,
rather than of deductions from doctrines or dogmas. The committee
concluded that integration in a general education must come from criti-
cal awareness applied to what had been acquired as knowledge and
belief, and from the will and ability to explore the grounds and inter-
relations of what is known or thought to be known, to estimate intel-
lectual and practical consequences, and to judge the criteria used in
such inquiries. Such an integration would also provide the skills by
which to accomplish and test encyclopedic, practical, and philosophic
integrations.

The student comes to the end of his four years of collegiate educa-
tion—even in the new programs of colleges in which “general” courses
are constructed to facilitate his contact with large areas of experience
and knowledge—with a number of large subject matters and the variety
of methods related to them adjusted somewhat haphazardly in his ha-
bittual attitudes and modes of explanation. The adjustment of these
parts of knowledge, habit, and attitude is the problem of “interpreta-
tion” in the large sense in which personal attitudes and knowledge are
arranged, often unconsciously, according to fundamental preferences
and basic sciences and ultimately referred for explanation to precepts of
psychology, sociology, or economics, to theology, physics, folklore, or
literary taste. The student is made aware of the problems of interpreta-
tion and their ramifications by studying the ways in which such adjust-
ments have been made and have been justified in the “Organization of
the Sciences” in the first term of the course. The unity of the sciences,
the diversity of the sciences, the relations of theory and practice, the
metaphysical examination of the principles of sciences, the reduction of

Sciences to their physical elements, to their logical, psychological, and
epistemological forms, to their social and political conditions, the in-
fuence of the natural sciences on logic and ethics, of ethics on politics,
and of politics on logic and science, form part of the patterns in which
the sciences have fallen.

This formal interplay among the parts of knowledge and the varieties
of unity which have been found in the sciences or imposed on them, is
usually established or rejected by appeal to the facts. What is known
and what is believed are tested by experience and by the consequences
of action in accordance with the tenets of knowledge and belief. The
problems of “observation,” conceived in a large sense, turn on the rela-
tion of knowledge to facts, and on the variety of methods employed
to relate what passes for knowledge to what passes for facts, and to
achieve in statements of fact precision, generality, and relevance. The
student is brought to the problems of the discovery of facts and their
adjustments to theory, in the study of the “Methods of the Sciences” in
the second term of the course. The methods and data of mathematics,
physics, biology, the social sciences, and the humanities, are studied in
the formulation and resolution of problems proper to their respective
fields, as well as in the transfer of methods by which mathematics is
made a physical science, or the subject matter of physics becomes or-
ganic and that of biology, some form of physical forces, or chemical
processes, while the social sciences debate the validity of analogies to
the physical and biological sciences, and the humanities accept or resist
the methods of sociology, physiology, or linguistics. Finally, the con-
structions of our habits and knowledge, of their interrelations and their
references to facts and experience, are organized according to prin-
ciples, casual and unobserved in the processes of action, or precise and
tested in the demonstrations of the sciences. Principles are often sig-
nalized in the inquiries and discoveries of individual men; they are
often acknowledged in the common acceptance of an age or a people;
their impact or alteration is often the mark of revolutions in science and
society. The systematization of knowledge, values, and the relations of
men, is the problem of “integration,” in the broad sense in which prin-
ciples are found underlying the interrelations of habits and emotions,
of actions, knowledge, and communication, of individuals, groups, and
nations, which are in turn referred to the regularities and laws of nature
by principles which determine the interrelations and systems of the sci-
ences. The student encounters the problems of integration in the study
of “Principles in the Sciences” in the third term of the course, and he examines concepts like “pleasure,” which many moralists reject as an ethical principle, but which hedonists and utilitarians make the principle of all human actions, and “cause,” which was long the basis of all scientific explanation until philosophers and physicists questioned the meaning and the very existence of causes.

The exploration of the problems of the humanities in general education and in graduate studies was reflected in my program of teaching during these years. I taught sections in the Humanities and Observation, Interpretation and Integration courses in the college; I taught in the various interdepartmental committees and in the two departments in which I held my professorship, Greek and Philosophy. Departmental distinctions have led to the separation of the Plato and the Aristotle taught in Philosophy Departments from the Plato and the Aristotle taught in Departments of the Classics: the former frequently held doctrines which would be expressed with difficulty in Greek, while the latter wrote works full of philological problems but relatively free of philosophy. I adapted the methods I had learned from Robin to read Plato and Aristotle with mixed classes in which philosophers learned some Greek, and Greek students learned to discuss philosophy. I read Cicero and Aquinas with combined groups of philosophy and Latin students. I gave courses in which literary and art criticism was related to the discussion of philosophy and esthetics, courses in which scientific methods and the varieties of logical theories were related to their metaphysical assumptions, courses in which political and moral theories were examined in their bearing on the relations of cultures and on the political disputes of our times, courses in the philosophy of education, the philosophy of law, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of history. I came into contact in this curriculum of teaching with a more diversified group of students than could have afforded the adventure into philosophy in the older schemes of study. A generation of students is only a few years, and I can look back at several generations at The University of Chicago who have been able to move more widely in their studies than could their predecessors, both in the range of related interests and in the application of knowledge to present problems and things; who have conceived from the humanities a love for things human, for arts, letters, and sciences; who have learned to use languages, to apply methods of analysis and criticism, and to judge principles; who have acquired some sense of the histories and interrelations of peoples and cultures; and who can resort to reason without the suspicion that its cold light is destructive of humanistic values or irreconcilable with democratic processes. The educational practices which we established and the philosophic meanings which we explored, are already involved in the processes of change and misinterpretation, but the contacts with languages, with arts, with history, and with philosophy afford the student points of reference and support by which to judge their education and philosophy amid the changes; and the students who have made those skills and disciplines their own are a better expression of the ideals we set in education than any statement of our new plans or of the philosophies which animate them.

111. Planning for new forms of general education is grounded in present problems and in the relevance and efficacy of training in the major fields of human knowledge—in scientific method and knowledge of the results of scientific advance, in the background and problems of democratic life and man’s attachment to the guiding principles of freedom, and in appreciation of humanistic values and powers of communication and expression. Teaching and research in the humanities consists in the exploration of the great achievements of man in the study of their continuity in history and universality in values, at the point where tradition affects the present in the use of languages, the appreciation of art, the interpretation of history, and the construction of philosophies. In modern times general education and humanistic studies have both been influenced increasingly by the interrelations of cultures and the broadening of interest beyond the limits of the traditions of Western European and American culture. The coming of the Second World War accentuated that process and gave it a practical turn. During the early 1940s, planning for the effective use of educational institutions in contributing to the military success of the United States in the war took many forms, in respect both to research and to teaching. I participated in the planning of the Army Specialized Training Program, particularly the Area and Language Studies, and I became Director of the unit of that program established at The University of Chicago. The purpose of the Area and Language course was to give Army personnel a speaking ability in the language and a knowledge of the geography, and of the social, economic, political, and cultural conditions of the country in which they might serve liaison and similar functions. The University of Chicago unit undertook training in German, French, Ital-
ian, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese, and the planning of the course included the choice of methods of teaching language and the determination of what kind of knowledge of the region, the people, their ideas, values, and institutions would be most useful to enlisted men and officers in the discharge of their duties. There are impressive indications that the courses served a useful purpose in achieving the practical ends set for them during the war, and the influence of the experiences of the units set up at the various universities of the country, have continued in the postwar period, particularly in the methods of language teaching and in the planning of studies concerned with areas and peoples which had not been treated conspicuously in prewar education.

The teaching of languages in the Area and Language Courses profited by the intensive training which was possible and by the motivation which was supplied by the circumstances. The student was under Army discipline and his continuity in the course depended on his progress in acquiring fluency in the language he was studying. A large portion of his day was devoted to classroom training, guided study, and practice with language records and reproducing apparatus. Some of the schools made use of the methods of teaching language developed in the teaching of “non-literary” languages for which few “informants” or speakers, and no experienced teachers, could be found, and extended it also to languages with extensive literatures, well known grammars, and tested techniques of teaching. Publicity in popular magazines during the war was calculated to give the impression that it was a method used in all units sponsored by the Army, and that the techniques of language training had been revolutionized by a “scientific linguistics” which used the example of “informants” to induce proficiency in foreign languages as one had acquired one’s native language without the formalities of grammar. The linguists and language teachers at The University of Chicago concluded that the argument was based on a fallacy, for the analogy between acquisition of language in youth and in maturity neglected the devices which the mature mind might employ to facilitate learning, and on a misconception of the fashion in which grammar was used in recent language teaching. They found the linguistic method of language teaching wasteful: it dispersed the student’s efforts by requiring some acquaintance with the distinctions and terminology of a linguistic theory which was not particularly pertinent to his problems, as well as with the language he was learning, and the peculiar objectives to which the method was directed extended little beyond acquiring phonetic accuracy in the production of sounds. In languages possessed of literatures and related to cultures for which information is available other than that assembled by the question techniques of anthropology, richer and more efficient teaching resources are available. The teachers at Chicago were convinced that they could achieve phonetic accuracy more effectively by other devices perfected in recent experiments in language teaching and that they could also give proper attention to other related objectives, such as use of a larger vocabulary, fluency of idiomatic and grammatical speech, and development of ease and ingenuity in solving problems of expression in new subject matters. Tests were devised in which these various objectives were distinguished and the student’s ability was examined with respect to each. Any generalization concerning the effectiveness of methods of language teaching would depend on the systematic construction and administration of such tests, but more important than the decision among the rival methods which were tried during the war has been the continued development of methods and teaching materials along the directions indicated by those experiments. The importance of strong motivation and intensive training, however, is one of the undisputed lessons of wartime language training.

The problem of what to teach concerning the “area” in the short time available in the course, was more difficult than the problem of how to teach the language of the area, and the nature of the difficulty is indicated in the choice of the word, “area,” to indicate what was at least a geographical expanse in each case, and in addition, in varying degrees, a social, economic, political, cultural, and intellectual region, as well. The criteria of selection of what to teach were set in a general way by the basis of indisputable minima of geographic, economic, industrial, social, historical, and cultural information integrated by a variety of accidents and schemes. At The University of Chicago the emphasis tended to be more cultural and humanistic than at some other units, on the ground that the problems encountered in any assignment would be in part problems of information and in part problems of contacts with people; and whereas it would be difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate the details of information that might be required, familiarity with the culture and the values of the people would facilitate cooperation,
and in most cases provide the means of securing the needed information as well. Some knowledge of the literature, the philosophy, and the institutional, cultural, and intellectual history of the area was therefore woven into the information concerning rainfall, industry, transportation, and ethnic groups.

The area and language courses doubtless served a useful and urgent purpose in attacking a practical problem of liaison and contact during the war. That problem was the simpler form of complex problems of cultural contacts which were to have increasing attention in education and in political negotiations after the war. The history of the relations of the peoples of the world has been written in the past largely in terms of political, military, dynastic, and commercial contacts. Conquerors have swept across Asia Minor, Europe, and the Far East, frequently proclaiming the motive of “world dominion” to unite all mankind; explorers have skirted Africa and crossed the Atlantic from Europe in the interests of trade and as the precursors of settlers and missionaries; and it would seem, at first glance, that instruments, arts, and ideas traveled the pilgrim roads, the trade routes, and the paths of crusade and conquest, frequently unobserved in their immediate effects, following in the wake of these movements of power, profit, and salvation. The contacts of cultures are, however, older and more intricate than the tales of foreign lands which soldiers might bring back from their campaigns or sailors from their voyages: they are part of a texture woven into the folksongs which continued a living tradition after entering the Homeric epics; into the successive translation of Aristotelian and Galenic from Greek into Syrian, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin; into the influence of the Bible in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; into the spread of Buddhism, the migration of symbols, and the development of tools and technology. Since the war the contact of cultures has forced itself into prominence in the discovery that the economic, political, and social problems of the world are inextricably interrelated, and that knowledge and common values are indispensable instruments in the construction of a world community within which political institutions can operate on a worldwide basis.

The educational aspects of the problem of the relations of cultures had become apparent even before the outbreak of the Second World War. Education in the United States had been based largely on the tradition of “Western Europe,” or even on efforts to concentrate on the American experience and what was peculiar to it: large regions of the world—the Far East, India, Austronesia, the Near East, Russia, Africa, and even neighboring Latin America—were touched on only glancingly as they impinged on that local interest. Important advances had been made before the war in the improvement of Far Eastern and Russian studies on the graduate level, and it became increasingly clear as the war drew to a close that general education and the higher learning would have to reflect the broad scope of common problems revealed by the contacts of peoples which resulted from, and the common aspirations which were made practicable by, the advances of technology. The temptation to carry over the techniques of the area and language courses as a means to solve this problem was strong and widespread, and the regional “institutes” specializing in Russia, Latin America, the Far East, or Europe which have proliferated so rapidly since the war are often mere rearrangements of information and of traditional courses of study in new boxes, presented as novel results of the reexamination of problems and of the use of new methods for their solution.

The organization of knowledge and the planning of education are not simply questions of arranging collections of data and information in patterns of time, space, and culture; they depend on involved relations of the problems of times, the methods of sciences, and the aspirations of peoples. In our times they reflect common practical and material problems of war devastations, of food, disease, and security, and of the effects of technology on the lives and cultures of peoples on whom the impact of the advances of industry and science has been sudden and late; they are instruments in the attack on the political and social problems of vast numbers of people who have recently acquired the right to self-government, in the extension of fundamental education and human rights, and in the development of the interrelations of the nations of the world; and they are the structures which determine approaches to problems of comprehension and achievement of shared values and of understanding and advancement of common knowledge. In our discussions of these problems in their bearing on studies in the humanities at the University of Chicago it was decided to subordinate new regional arrangements of the program to new considerations of problems and methods for their treatment. In the Division of the Humanities the interdepartmental committees afford a frame for treating problems of cultural relations in terms of their reflection in problems of language and communication, of the cultural significances of art and
literature, of the broadened frame of cultural history, and of the prominent intrusion of ideas and methods into modern discussions and ideological conflicts.

The political aspects of the relations of cultures and of educational devices became apparent in the preparations for the peace. As early as 1942, the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) met to plan for the reconstruction of educational facilities and means of communication destroyed during the war. The Charter of the United Nations, signed in 1945, provides for the promotion of “international cultural and educational cooperation.” From these beginnings plans for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) grew, in the conviction, stated in the Preamble to UNESCO’s Constitution, that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments could not secure the lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world and that peace must therefore be founded upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind. UNESCO is an experiment in the relations of peoples; it is an effort to use educational, scientific, and cultural instruments for a political end, the achievement and safeguarding of peace.

I participated in some of the early meetings called in the United States to discuss the form which UNESCO’s Program and operation might take, and I was Adviser to the United States Delegations at the first three sessions of the General Conference of UNESCO, in Paris in 1946, in Mexico City in 1947, and in Beirut in 1948. I returned to Paris in 1947, after the establishment of UNESCO, to serve as the first Acting Counsellor on UNESCO affairs attached to the United States Embassy in Paris, and on my return to the United States I served as a member of the United States National Commission on UNESCO.

In September, 1947, a Committee of Experts was assembled in Paris to advise the Director General concerning the program of UNESCO in philosophy and the humanities. I attended the meeting as one of the United States experts, and as Rapporteur I drew up the basic document prepared at the meeting. The Committee differentiated three levels of activities in the field of philosophy and the humanities: the continuing service activities, such as the exchange of persons, information, bibliographical compilations and the like, in which philosophy and the humanities should share with the other disciplines; the activities related to its program which UNESCO would stimulate and encourage inter-national organizations in philosophy and the humanities to undertake; and, finally, projects bearing directly on the purposes of UNESCO to be carried out under UNESCO’s direct supervision. The Committee recommended two such projects, one in philosophy and one in the humanities. Both projects were conceived, not as scholarly enterprises undertaken in their respective fields, but as efforts to formulate the direct and immediate contribution which philosophy and the humanities might make to the peace of the world. The Committee decided that, if one asked what place philosophy has in the search for means to avoid conflict and to establish that dynamic order among the nations of the world which is the definition of peace, the answer must be found in the fact that philosophic issues were involved in the so-called “ideological conflict” which affects the discussion of diplomats, the reports and editorials of newspapers, and the ideas and formulations of men everywhere. The ideological conflict is basically an extension of philosophic problems to the discussion of problems of ordinary life, of national policy, and international relations, and a project was therefore planned to examine certain fundamental terms, such as human rights, democracy, freedom, law, and equality, as they enter into contemporary practical problems and statements about them. In like manner, if one were to ask how the humanities might contribute to mitigating the confusions and reducing the conflicts of our time, and how they might give emphasis to the elements of understanding and community which are beginning to emerge, the answer must be found in the study of humanistic aspects of cultures, in the communication which arts and letters establish, not in doctrines, but in basic values underlying differences of expression, tradition, and times, and in the community of traditions in their mutual influences and their common values. The Committee recommended, therefore, that a second project be set up to treat the hierarchies of values characteristic of cultures and expressed in artistic and intellectual productions as they bear on the relations of peoples and the problems which peoples face in common.

I continued work on both projects. The first form which the examination of ideological conflicts took was the study of human rights undertaken by UNESCO early in 1947, in cooperation with the Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council which had just started on the task of drawing up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. UNESCO was to examine the intellectual bases of the rights of man, first, in their historical development from the philo-
Sophistic principles on which they were formulated in the classical statements of human rights in the eighteenth century to the principles invoked in their definition and defense today, and second, in the present day opposition of principles which leads to diverse interpretations of human rights and in particular to the opposition of traditional political and civil rights to more recently asserted social and economic rights. The UNESCO Committee on Human Rights issued its report in July, 1947, and the collection of essays made in the course of its inquiry was published under the title, *Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations*, in 1949. The project was continued in an inquiry into the ambiguities which surround the word, “democracy,” in recent discussions and manifest themselves in opposed institutions and practices, as well as in propaganda maneuvers and accusations. A volume entitled, *Democracy in a World of Tensions*, appeared in 1951, published by The University of Chicago; the study of the diversities and shades of meaning attached to the term, “democracy,” is addressed both to clarifying differences of meaning and to exploring means of reducing differences of action.

The study of the humanistic aspects of cultures has meanwhile been directed to two related aspects of the relations of cultures—the study of the effects of new technologies on the customs and values of peoples who have been little affected by technological and scientific advances, and the structures of values in cultures that have adjusted themselves or are in process of adjustment to industrialization and political independence. The pattern of basic philosophic attitudes and values embodied in the institutions and in the ways of life of people or assumed in their statements about their institutions and actions, cannot be abstracted from the conditions or the relations of peoples; and with proper caution against ambiguity and conscious deception, the relations of peoples can be better understood by reference to that pattern of ideas and values. Even the political and economic relations of the various parts of the world are affected by what men believe and by what their beliefs mean, and the promulgation of a universal declaration of human rights will be translated by the peoples of the world into comparable actions in recognition of those rights only after the different meanings of “rights” and the different hierarchies of values which give effect to rights in different cultures have been transformed into motivations to comparable common ends.

The three problems which I have presented in the guise of an autobiographical account of my activities during the past thirty years—the philosophic, the educational, and the political problems of our times—have close interconnections both in the logical interrelations they would assume in any philosophy and in the historical interdependences they would reveal in any time. They have only an accidental relation in the career of any one man, and the irrationalities and paradoxes which he encounters are frequently the marks by which to reconstruct a version of the relations which they have in logic or in culture. The form according to which I have arranged this account makes the events it treats fall into the sequence of a consecutive search for a truth which is unified, and the sequence of the narrative is easily restated in an argument which proceeds in syllogistic from basic premises. It could as easily be recounted as a sequence in which I backed at each stage into the interests and basic convictions of the next, and it could then be restated in an argument that proceeds by paradoxes in which the contraries of each stage are reconciled into one of the contraries in the paradox of the next.

I backed into philosophy as a means of securing insight into the conflicts of theory and practice, of values and actions, which became increasingly prominent at the time of the First World War. I moved down the history of philosophy in my study of the antecedents of contemporary intellectual and moral attitudes, and I have backed into the broadening of my philosophic position in an effort to understand what would be implied in the positions denied by a series of philosophers. Dewey denied the distinction between art and science, practice and theory, and I found that the significance and power of what he taught depended on understanding the differences which separated the pairs of terms he collapsed. Spinoza denied the separation of the order and sequence of things from the order and sequence of ideas by scholastics engaged with words and by empirics engaged with manipulations of things, and I first appreciated the value and validity of his denials when I understood that proof might be distinguished wholly from process or be reduced to operations which can be controlled and repeated. Aristotle denied the idealism of Plato and the materialism of Democritus, and I began to have some insight into the peculiarities of his scientific and philosophic method and into his influence on the later history of thought, when I learned the opposed contributions of the ideas of Plato.
and the atoms of Democritus to the inquiry of men into the nature of things and of change. The denials seemed to me at first encounter so plausible that I found it difficult to understand how any one could ever have held the positions so readily and so persuasively refuted, but in each case a return in history or a reconstruction in theory made the refutation one more example of how men turn easily away from the theories they criticize but seldom because they have discovered error and destroyed its grounds. The importance and use of denying the distinction between art and science and between theory and practice are indeed directly proportional to the force and validity of the distinction and the length of time during which a tradition and a culture have acquiesced in it.

The relation of scholarship to teaching and of both to the social and political relations of our time, may be stated in terms of the same dialectical processes which are forced unobtrusively or reluctantly on scholarly inquiry. It is not merely that the pursuit of philosophy is itself both a process of education and a consequence of problems encountered in or induced by the educational process, but the education of a time and a people is a philosophy stated in genetic form and it serves to organize available knowledge and cogent beliefs in a kind of metaphysics of habitually accepted principles of action. When knowledge has been vastly increased, when the actions, productions, and relations of people have in consequence been altered, and when communications among men have been facilitated but obscured, then values that have been recognized to be common to all men are increasingly difficult of access to any man and the problem of reviewing and reorganizing education becomes in a fundamental sense philosophic. Yet philosophy, in our times, has become an academic pursuit and the philosopher backs from speculation to teaching as a career which permits leisure for scholarship and thought. Moreover, teaching has become a middle term, in our times as it has frequently before, to connect knowledge and scholarship to the status and operations of citizenship. Propaganda, communication, and education were seen to be powerful political instrumentalities during the war, and the political relevance of education and philosophy, which were doubtless apparent long before Plato constructed a perfect state by educating philosopher-kings, must continue to be recognized increasingly during the peace because of the dangers, as well as the opportunities, presented by new media of communication, new subjects of knowledge, and new recipients of education. The logical relations among these three problems must be inferred from the accidental relations in which they fall in the life of a man or the intercourse of a group. I have talked about myself, therefore, by recalling the ideas I have encountered in a manner which would be justified by Aristotle's argument that the mind which is actively thinking is the objects which it thinks, or by Spinoza's conclusion that men agree in nature and are united by the common possession of the true ideas which they share. Either account of their interrelations—the metaphysical account of their essential interdependences or the autobiographical account of the accidental sequence in which their intermingling is discovered—is an index to the nature of our times. We face a philosophic problem of formulating the organization and interrelations of our knowledge and our values, the interplay of our ideas and our ideals, the influence of our new sciences in providing means for the solution of old problems and in laying the beginnings of new problems, and the distortions and misapplications of what is called scientific method and of what is claimed as democratic practice. That philosophic problem is inseparable from the educational problem of equipping men with abilities and insights to face the new problems of our times and to use the new instrumentalities with wisdom and freedom. The philosophic and educational problems are both implicated in the political problem of achieving common understanding among the peoples of the world who might, if ideas continue to become opaque in the oppositions of interests, be divided into parties determined by classes, the wealthy and the dispossessed, rather than by ideas and purposes. Understanding of common ideas and common ideals is the one means to combat and discredit the assumption that values and ideas are simple reflections of class interests and ideologies, that philosophy, art, and education are simple badges of privilege or instruments of revolution, and that the differences which threaten to divide the world are imperious to methods devised for the peaceful resolution of differences and for agreement and cooperation on common courses of action, but can be resolved only by subterfuge, violence, and suppression.

The philosophic problem is not one for the speculation of the isolated scholar engaged in the construction of a personal doctrine. It depends for its statement and examination on participation by a broadly educated public and on testing of basic doctrines and values against the fundamental presuppositions of other philosophies, religions, systems of values, and modes of life. Philosophic universality is easy to achieve
by reducing all other views to the requirements and limits of one preferred creed and system, but it distorts the doctrines it refutes; and a similar easy and violent victory in imposing uniformity in political practices, with its consequences in suppression and hostility, is the only alternative to a political universality based on common understanding and on common values. True universality in intellectual, as well as in practical relations, depends on insight into the diversities of cultures, philosophies, and religions, and on acquaintance with the methods and consequences of science. The educational problem is not a simple choice between preserving the old and denominating anything new as good, but requires an integration of a new kind to be achieved both by applying new knowledge to values and by according new recognition to the claims of peoples and the values of cultures. International understanding, finally, will not be achieved either by programs of propaganda and information, or by setting forth the patterns of cultures and laboriously trying to think and feel as other people do. Values are based on the peculiarities of cultures, but they are understood and appreciated, even by those who share the culture in which they originated, because of their universality, and international understanding is based on the recognition of common values in the vast diversity of their forms and idioms. Understanding has a practical bearing both on action (because education and knowledge can build a foundation for international cooperation and world institutions) and on theory (because understanding and the preservation of peace are indispensable conditions for the progress of science, the construction of values, and the cultivation of the good life). These three—the understanding of order in nature, in the relations of men, and in knowledge, the education of men sensitive to the marks and uses of that order, and the appreciation of differences in the modes in which peoples express that order and seek their fulfillment in accordance with it—are the three related aspects of a problem which we all face in our individual lives, our communities, and in the world relations in which all communities have been placed.