The arts of poetry and the arts of criticism are uncovered and studied in their products, in poems and in judgments. Poetry and criticism, however, the making and judging of poems, are processes. The study of literature as a product—existing poems and existing interpretations and appreciations of poetry—develops a body of knowledge which is sometimes called "poetic sciences." The recognition and use of poetic and critical processes—producing and judging poems which did not previously exist, and uncovering and analyzing aspects of existing poems which were not previously discerned or appreciated—develop things and values by use of arts which are sometimes called "heuristic arts." Knowledge or science is used in processes of deliberate or artful making; art or criticism is used in production of things or knowledge of things, natural or artificial. Knowledge is a product of inquiry; criticism is a process of judgment; the two are joined—knowledge of things and use of knowledge—in critical inquiries or critiques of judgment.

Practice of the arts and knowledge of the arts develop in reciprocal relation to each other to produce changes in literature and in taste, which in turn produce paradoxes in practice and in theory. Paradoxes arise, in the first place, from the fact that poetry and criticism are processes and also products, and therefore, in a variety of ways exploited by schools of poetry and schools of criticism, process is product and product is process. Closely connected with these are paradoxes which arise, in the second place, from the relation of knowledge to process and product: knowledge guides the process of artful making and leaves identifiable marks of art in the product; inquiry is used to produce knowledge of the process or of the product, and therefore, in a variety of ways, poetry is criticism and criticism is poetry. As a consequence, in the third place, since the process of poetry moves from a maker or poieites...
through a making or *poiesis* to a thing made or *poëma*, there have been
disputes among poets and critics concerning whether the process of
poetry should be studied in the powers of the poet or in the rules of the
art or in the structure of the poem. But this paradox is compounded by
the fact that criticism, which is the same as or different from poetry, is a
process which moves from the judge or *krites* through a judging or *kritike*
to a judgment or *krisis*, and the judgment of poetry and of criticism has
been influenced by differences concerning whether criticism is known by
studying the behavior of critics, the injunctions of the critical art, or the
judgments of works.

Further paradoxes arise from the relation of poetic to critique,
whether they are the same or whether one is preparation for, or pro-
paedeutic to, the other. Further paradoxes arise from the nature of the
process, whether it is a making or a generation, a formation or a cre-
at ion, for the interpretation of poetry, if it is interpreted as a thing made
or poetic, will take into account the potentialities of the matter of which
the poem is formed, whereas the organic unity and transcendental per-
fection of a poem, if it is interpreted as a thing founded, like a lineage or
a colony, or a thing created *ex nihilo*, like a man or a universe, must be
derived from a source beyond human understanding and expression.

Creation is a process which moves from a creator or *ktistes* through a
creating or *ktisis* to a creation or *ktisma*. The founding of a colony or the
creation of a universe is the establishment anew of an organic whole
which determines the functions and interrelations of its constituent
parts. Moreover what is created is had or possessed by its creator; a
creation or *ktisma* is a habit or *hexis* (as art likewise is a habit or virtue) or a
property or *ktima*. Considered as a product, further paradoxes arise, for
the product of a process is a "thing," and a thing produced may be an
object, or a thought, or an expression, or an action—a subject matter, a
science, a discourse, or an art—and indeed if it is one of these things it is
all the others, for things that are made and judged are existent-things,
known-things, said-things, and made- or done-things. Moreover the
scope of poetry and criticism enlarges and contracts: the cosmos and
each of its ordered parts is a poem, and a poem is a cosmos, a communi-
ty, a communication, a discourse, a poetic discourse.

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The function of critical inquiry is not to resolve such paradoxes but rather to construct places in which the varieties of poetry and of criticism may be developed as statements of common unstated experiences and of common encountered problems of poetry and of criticism, which are named differently and are put in different contexts in different modes of making and of knowing. Everybody knows what poetry is and is able to test what is presented as poetry or as characteristic marks of poetry against touchstones of identifiable common experience, but there is no consensus concerning how it can be identified and talked about or concerning the scope and diversity of its possible manifestations. The identification of the product is obscured and the use of the process is obstructed by the ambiguity of words, the confusion of ideas, the chaos of things, and the conflict of arts. The problems of poetry and criticism can be and have been stated and examined by clearing and traveling all these paths. Consideration of the arts, or the technical approach to poetry and criticism, has the advantage of viewing the problems of poetry and criticism as arts, and of using the verbal, epistemic, or metaphysical approaches to poetry and criticism as supporting arts not as authoritative grounds for alleging facts or validating doctrines. The poetic and critical arts may be examined in their use of verbal and inventive arts, epistemic and interpretive arts, and metaphysical and systematic arts. As processes or faculties or powers or structures, the arts are concerned not with the nature of words, actions, thoughts, or things, but with their places in the arts of making and judging. Arts of places have been developed to improve and organize making and judging in the arts. Arts of Memory and Arts of Invention were originated, according to history and fable, by poets and rhetoricians, but they have extended as arts from poetry and rhetoric to the other arts. Arts of Places have been distinguished from Sciences of Things sometimes because they are empty and verbal and therefore obstructions to and distractions from the cultivation of arts and sciences, and sometimes because they are instruments of innovation, organization, and validation and therefore essential for the instauration and advancement of arts and sciences. Histories of literature and of criticism as products of making and of thinking—as works of art and objects of inquiry—are themselves products fashioned from experience and reflection, from data and facta. The selection of instances of poetry and criticism to be recorded and studied as products of poetry and criticism in such histories depends on definitions and postulations of what poetry and poetic experience are, which determine how they are recognized, judged, and known. Histories of poetic and critical works are histories of things that have been and that are known. Histories of literature and of criticism as processes of making and of presenting the making and its products as poetic and as proper subjects of critical evaluation and judgment are themselves processes by which ambiguous terms are defined, unspecified facts are al-
leged, and unassumed positions are posited for the purpose of identifying, characterizing, and making poetry and criticism. They are histories of places of things that no longer exist or that do not yet exist, in which forgotten things may be remembered and unthought of things invented. The products made take their characteristics from the processes of making, and the paradoxes which join histories of makings and histories of things-made extend also to histories of makings and histories of knowings and bind histories of arts to histories of sciences. Arts may be identified with sciences or distinguished from them, and there may be sciences as well as arts of places and arts as well as sciences of things.

Histories of literature and of the arts pick their ways falteringly among meanings given to ambiguous terms and references found for them, reaffirming and reconsidering identifications and characterizations, comparisons and differentiations, assimilations and discriminations, amplifications and delimitations. A history of arts as products uses defined terms and classifications as instrumentalities for the investigation of artificial things. A history of arts as processes produces a plurality of definitions and classifications which may be interpreted as antithetical, alternative, or supplementary. Since the analysis of a process differentiates beginnings, ends, and points between, the ambiguities of the network of terms used in poetry and criticism may be examined from many vantage points. One such vantage point is found in the statements of authors who laid down definitions of important terms and placed them in fixed structures which have been used in later formulations and analyses. In histories of literature and criticism as products, their positions are interpreted in unambiguous meanings—platonic or aristotelian, classical or romantic—and they take their places in histories of controversy, influence, refutation, and revival. In histories of literature and criticism as processes, they are interpreted ambiguously, by proponents and opponents, and are used with altered meanings and applications in the history of poetry and criticism. The structures of things presented as poetic in any finite span of history, such as the fourth century B.C. or the seventeenth century A.D., are subject to an indefinitely large number of interpretations, but they can be, and have been, reduced to recognizable interrelations by structures of places and by arts of places. What results is not an unambiguous history of positions concerning poetry and criticism as products, but a productively ambiguous history of the processes by which the history of literature has been remembered and by which innovations in poetry and criticism have been invented.

The vocabulary and topography of places and of arts of places are derived from two authors, Cicero and Aristotle. The history of places exhibits instructively the peculiarities which separate histories of places from histories of things. Cicero wrote a book called Topica which he presents to a friend as an exposition of Aristotle's Topics. The labors of generations of historians and scholars have produced no plausible or
enlightening explanation of the relation to each other of the places enumerated, expounded, and used in the two works. Cicero wrote a book called *On Invention* in which, like Aristotle, he differentiates rhetorical from dialectical invention and uses places for both kinds of invention, but the relation between the rhetorical places of Aristotle and those of Cicero is not unambiguously disclosed by philological or historical research. The *Ad Herennium* was long reputed to be the work of Cicero, and the conception of rhetoric expounded in it is so closely related to that of the *On Invention* that the two works were referred to in the Middle Ages as Cicero's First Rhetoric and his Second Rhetoric. The *Ad Herennium* was the progenitor of the long line of Arts of Memory. The *On Invention* was the textbook from which medieval students learned the liberal and human arts. It was also the classic from which Renaissance humanists learned arts of discourse by which to undermine the technical language and the verbal arts of scholasticism. The literary and scientific arts of invention and discovery emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries amidst battles about places and times and things—about placed things and universal things, timed things and eternal things. There is little agreement among historians or scholars concerning how later authors continued or modified Ciceronian or Aristotelian places in the history of the arts of memory or the arts of renovation. The glimpses of processes and the intimations of places even in inert reified histories of products and approbations, however, suggest the possibility that the nature of places and their use might be rediscovered, that is, remembered and invented, by using the arts of places and the history of processes, rather than the arts of known things and the history of products, to reconstruct what poets and critics meant by places from new forms of literature and new forms of critical insight, analysis, and evaluation which poets and critics produced from them.

When Quintilian undertook to trace the origins of the art of oratory in the third book of his *Institutio oratoria*, he wrote a history of the art as processes in which the invention of places and the invention of ways of talking about them are distinguished and related. The use of places and the usefulness of places depend both on what they are and on what they are thought and said to be. Quintilian finds the materials for that history in an infinite diversity of authors who share a common purpose, to exhibit and explain excellence in discourse, but construct different ways, *viae*, to achieve and display excellence: the speeches reported by poets, the rhetorical analysis of Empedocles, the treatises of the early writers of textbooks, the writings of Gorgias who was a pupil of Empedocles and a fellow countryman of Corax and Tisias, and the numerous Sophists who were contemporaries of Empedocles during the 109 years of his life. Of these, Quintilian reports, Protagoras and Gorgias were the first to treat commonplaces, and Prodicus, Hippias, Protagoras, and Gorgias were the first to treat emotions (*Institutio oratoria* iii. 1. 1–12).

The language, the structure, and the characters of this history are
derived from Cicero, frequently with acknowledgment of the source, but
Cicero uses different places to trace a different way in his history. The
history of Greek rhetoric which Cicero recounts in his Brutus (i. 25–52)
is, indeed, two histories which cover the same period and, in the main,
the same orators. There is no reason for this duplication except that the
two histories use different commonplaces and identify and characterize
orators and oratory differently. The first history (i. 25–38) takes its be-
ginning in the testimony of a historian, Thucydides, and finds the se-
quence of its history in the commonplaces of oral-and-written speech,
speech-and-what-is-signified, and eloquence-and-philosophy. The other
arts were discovered and brought to perfection in Greece before
rhetoric was elaborated as a faculty and language of speaking (dicendi vis
atque copia, i. 26). The first written records of oratory are found in
Pericles and Thucydides, although it is believed that Solon, Pisistratus,
and Clisthenes, who lived long before them, were effective speakers.
The style (genus dicendi) of other orators of the time may be learned
from the writings of Thucydides: they were sublime in words, abundant
in thoughts (sententia), brief by compression of things, and therefore
sometimes obscure (i. 27–29). Thereafter a host of teachers of eloquence
appeared—Gorgias, Thrasy-machus, Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias
—and were opposed by Socrates who refuted their words (verbum) with a
subtlety of disputation. The richness of Socrates' words (sermo) inspired
learned followers who turned from the older philosophy of nature and
invented a philosophy of life and society. Cicero postpones treating the
history of philosophers to present the history of orators. The steps of
that history are marked by the characteristics of a sequence of great or
perfect orators ranging from Isocrates, who was a great orator and a
perfect teacher, through Lysias, who might be called a perfect orator,
and Demosthenes, who was an absolutely perfect orator, to Demetrius of
Phaleron, who emerged not from a military tent but from the shady
retreat of the philosopher Theophrastus and entertained rather than
stirred his countrymen.

The second history (i. 39–52) takes its beginning in the testimony of a
poet, Homer, and finds the sequence of its history in the commonplaces
of war-and-peace, force-and-charm, and internal-and-external. The
praise which Homer lavished on the speech (dicendum) of Ulysses and
Nestor—the speech of Ulysses had force, that of Nestor had charm—is
evidence of the honor accorded eloquence even in Trojan times, and it
was because of that esteem of eloquence that the poet himself was so
excellent in speaking and so clearly an orator (i. 40). The deliberate
cultivation of the art and its greater influence is seen in Pisistratus.
Themistocles succeeded him when Greece was at the height of its power.
His fortune was not unlike that of his contemporary, Coriolanus: both
went into exile from positions of power in their own states and com-
mitted suicide. The authority of Thucydides, which was followed in the first
history of oratory, is against the death in exile of Themistocles, but Cicero is permitted his version, "because the privilege is conceded to rhetoricians to distort history" (i. 42). Pericles was the first orator to be influenced by theory (doctrina). There was no theory of speaking, but Pericles had studied with Anaxagoras, the physicist, and he found it easy to transfer that mental exercise (exercitatio mentis) from recondite and obscure things to forensic and popular causes (i. 44). The all but perfect orator was produced in that age in Athens, for the ambition to speak well does not arise in men who are establishing a government or conducting a war, but eloquence is the companion of peace, the ally of order, and the offspring of a well-constituted state. Aristotle is quoted in support of this position, and commonplaces are mentioned for the first time in this history of rhetoric. After the expulsion of the tyrants from Sicily when legal means for the restitution of private property were sought, Corax and Tisias first set down precepts and an art, for although men had spoken accurately and in orderly arrangements before, no one followed a way or an art. Aristotle is quoted further: "Protagoras wrote out and prepared disputations of illustrious things, which are now called commonplaces, and Gorgias did the same thing when he wrote praises and vituperations of singular things, since he judged it to be in the highest degree the proper function of the orator to augment a thing by praising it and again to diminish it by vituperating it" (xii. 45–47). This history, attributed to Aristotle, goes on in a balance—or place—of the practice and the teaching of the art. Antiphon, like Protagoras and Gorgias, wrote speeches. Lysias, observing that Theodorus was more subtle in art than in orations, abandoned teaching the art to write speeches for others. Isocrates first denied that there was an art of speaking but wrote speeches for others, then gave up writing speeches and devoted himself wholly to composing arts. The account closes with an examination of the influence of circumstances on oratory. Oratory flourished in Athens, but there were no orators in Argos, Corinth, or Thebes except possibly Epaminondas. There are none today in Sparta, and even Homer refers to Menelaus as an agreeable speaker but a man of few words. Eloquence was degraded when it spread to the islands and to Asia, passing through stages of variation or place, from Attic to Asian styles, with Rhodes somewhat saner and more Attic.

The ability or art of speaking is presented and developed, in the Ciceronian tradition, in the framework of two sets of places, one to relate natural powers and acquired abilities in the art, the other to relate the component arts of speaking to each other and to other arts. As an ability, speaking well is a product of nature, or of practice, or of art. As an art, eloquence is one art which is a concourse of five great arts— invention, arrangement, diction, action, and memory (xi. 25). The art of history is closer than any other art to the art of rhetoric (De legibus i. 2. 5). Herodotus and Thucydides first gave distinction to Greek history by
eloquence, though neither was trained in forensic oratory, and history emerged full formed when the rhetoricians Theopompus and Ephorus, at the instance of their master, Isocrates, turned to history (De oratore ii. 13. 55–57). It is the function of the orator to speak on all things, on definite causes of litigation, deliberation, and panegyric, and on universal questions unrelated to particular times or persons (ii. 15. 65–66). History as what happened is familiar to everyone, but it must be set forth in things and in words, for which purpose rhetoric orders a structure of things (rerum ratio) and a structure of words (verborum ratio) (ii. 15. 62–64).

History observes different laws than poetry: in history everything is referred to truth, in poetry to pleasure (De legibus i. 1. 5). The art of memory, in which places are used to identify and recall things and words, was formed in the interaction of poetry and rhetoric. The art of invention, in which places are used to relate things and words in sequences and arguments, was formed in the interaction of philosophy and rhetoric. The places of the two arts are sources of order, one derived from the order of places, the other from the order of things and processes, ideas and arguments in places. The places of the arts of memory are ordered places which serve for the identification and characterization of things and for the definition and application of words by means of “images.” The places of the arts of invention are structured places which serve for the development of connections and consequences in things and in discourse by means of “positions” and “oppositions.” In the Ciceronian tradition, arts are sciences; things known are things made, and processes of knowing are processes of making and doing. Things recalled and things invented constitute all the things that are.

Cicero credits the poet Simonides with the invention of the art of memory (De oratore ii. 74. 299; 86. 351–54). After the collapse of a banquet hall, Simonides identified the unrecognizable remains of the victims by remembering the order of their places around the table. He observed that memory is aided by order, and that an art of memory might be formed by placing mental images in selected places so that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things and the images of the things will recall the things themselves. Images will bear the same relation to places as letters to a wax tablet on which they are written. Quintilian repeats the story and argues that the art, like many other arts, is based on experiment. Places, impressed (signata) in the mind and used as seats of images, build the art on the experience that, when we return to a place after a time, we not only recognize the place but also recollect the persons we met there, and even the unuttered thoughts that occurred to us (Institutio oratoria xi. 2. 17). The memory arts of Simonides, Hippias, and Theodectes are used by Aelian as contrasts in his study of the natural memories of animals (On Animals vi. 10). The prodigious memories attributed to orators by ancient writers are sometimes praised
as natural, sometimes as acquired by practice or by art; and the artificial memories (mnemonikon), or technical memories, or arts of memory, include both the abilities or habits of remembering which orators (and their audiences) acquired by practice and also the precepts and arts of recollecting which rhetoricians expounded in treatises. They were clearly not limited to the Simonidean art, used in many memory books, in which the art is presented with illustrations of visual places—colonnades, palaces, theaters—in which to order visual images to call to mind visible things—or things perceived by other senses, or things imagined, or words, or thoughts—symbolized by the visual images. We find no records on which to reconstruct the memory arts of Hippias, Theodectes, or Crineas, and we are puzzled by reports of Pythagorean and Democritean memory books since they cannot be reduced to picture books. Yet if the art of places is used on the study of places, it encounters extensions of visual places and visible images to other places and images, to the regions of other sensibilia, to imaginary places and phantasms, to dimensions and signs, to measurements and characters. Such places are recognized and discovered when the art of memory, formed in the contact of rhetoric with poetry, is related to other arts, like the art of invention and the art of judgment (or criticism) in the contact of rhetoric with philosophy. The discovery of new places and new images marks stages in the identification or creation of new aspects of literature and of new ways of criticism by which to uncover, know, and judge them.

The art of invention is fundamental among the five great arts of rhetoric, for the arts of arrangement, diction, action, and memory are all employed on invented things. It is also fundamental to all other arts of discourse. Cicero says that every consistent rational analysis of discourse (omnis ratio diligens disserendi) has two parts, an art of discovering and an art of judging. Aristotle was the originator or the master (princeps shares the ambiguity of all “principle” words ranging from “beginning” to “control”) of both, whereas the Stoics cultivated only the art of judgment, which they called dialectic, and neglected the art of invention, which is called topic. It is easy to find hidden things if their places are pointed out and marked, and, in like fashion, if we wish to track down an argument we should know places. Aristotle called the seats from which arguments are drawn places, and Cicero therefore defined a place as a seat of argument, and an argument as a reasoning (ratio) which establishes conviction about a doubtful thing (Topica ii. 6–8). The invention of commonplaces was credited to Protagoras and Gorgias and was associated with Protagoras’ antilogiae and his conviction that in every experience there are two arguments in opposition to each other (which he apparently applied in his lost work on antilogisms to all major problems, the Gods, Being, the Laws and Politics, and the Arts) and with Gorgias’ analysis of all arguments in all fields as deceptions. Cicero professes to derive his topics from Aristotle, and he enumerates a relatively short list of topics,
or seats from which arguments may be drawn, such as definitions of wholes, enumerations of parts, meanings of words, conjuncts, genera, species, likenesses, differences, adjuncts, antecedents, consequences, contradictions, causes, effects, comparisons (Topica ii. 8–iv. 24; De oratore ii. 36. 153–40. 173).

The arts of memory and the arts of invention which developed in the Ciceronian tradition were “ways” of using places to recall and invent, to identify and characterize things and the relations of things. The ways were ways of making and of knowing. The places were places of things and of arguments, and the ways in which they were used were at once ways of art and of sciences. Aristotle distinguished between arts and sciences. Place is a heuristic device in his arts of invention. It is part of the subject matter of his physical sciences, and knowledge of the nature and function of places in psychological processes provides a basis for the use of places in artificial recollection, which is distinct from natural memory and natural recollection, and from artificial invention, which is distinct from natural quick wit. The places of science are places of things and motions; the places of art are places of presentations and arguments. Aristotle distinguished between the “methods” (methodos) of the sciences and the “ways” (hodos) of the arts. Methods are adapted to the particular subject matters under investigation and are as numerous as the sciences and the parts of sciences. Ways are universal and adapted to the presentation and organization of all subjects, real or imaginary, and all arguments, objective or subjective. Cicero, who transformed Latin to make it capable of carrying the meanings of Greek philosophical terms, used the one word “way” (via) to translate both terms. The medieval liberal arts are ways. After the term methodus was Latinized from methodos in the translations of the works of Aristotle in the thirteenth century, the places of the arts and sciences were sought in the concrete ways of words and things, the trivium in literature and oratory, the quadrivium in mathematics and physics; and the places to relate arguments and discourse to things and thoughts about things were sought in treatises on method rather than in distinctions among kinds of principles of arguments borrowed from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Topics, and On Sophistical Refutations. Bacon's Novum organum and Descartes' Discourse on Method gave a modern turn to this search for methods by which to reform or invent arts and sciences which was the source of rediscovery of tradition and discovery of novelty in modern literature and science and in modern speculations on literary criticism and scientific method.

Aristotle borrowed the word “place” from common speech to make it a scientific term in his physical sciences and a technical term in his arts of invention. It took its place among words like “cause,” “principle,” “element,” “property,” “function,” “process,” “motion,” “action,” “faculty,” “power,” “understanding,” “reason,” “method,” “place” (topos), “mode” (tropos), “imagination” (phantasia), “image” (eikon), “phantasm” or “men-
tal image" (phantasma), "figure" or "schema" (schema) which continued to be basic words in later philosophy, usually with meanings and references other than he gave them.

Aristotle gave "place" a scientific meaning in his natural sciences as the outer limit or container of a natural thing. Since nature is an internal principle of motion, he distinguished the proper place of a body in which it moves itself from the common place in which bodies move one another. Like matter, place is an unchanging substrate in the changes and motions of things. Matter, however, is internal to the thing, while place is an external container. The similarity of their invariance in motion led Plato, according to Aristotle, to confuse them and to give space or room (chora rather than topos, place or container) the characteristics of matter when he analyzes it as the receptacle or mother of motion. Psychology, which is one of the natural sciences, investigates the motions and things of the soul—sensation, imagination, and thought, perceptibles, imaginables, and intelligibles. In the De anima Aristotle examines the motions of the soul as an ordered sequence of unified motions. In the Parva naturalia he distinguishes the physical, physiological, and psychological motions, internal and external, by which they move and are moved. The arts of invention have their scientific bases in the De anima, the arts of memory in the Parva naturalia.

In the five senses, sense and sensibilia, as well as the medium which each proper sense requires, are both active and passive. Sight is a single motion in which the eye becomes vision as a result of the action of colors, and colors become visibilia as a result of the action of sight, while the diaphanous becomes a medium for seeing as a result of the action of light. Vision, visible, and medium of visibility are all both active and passive. The motions of imagination are midway between the motions of sensation and the motions of thought. The phantasms or mental images of imagination are derived from the sensibilia of sensation. Phantasms persist in the absence of perceived bodies, and the imagination operates on them without a bodily organ, although common sense does have a bodily organ. Thought cannot take place without phantasms, and in thinking the phantasms of imagination are transformed or universalized into the intelligibles of understanding. Imagination is the motion by which a phantasm or image is presented to us (De anima iii. 3. 428a 2–4). It is a motion which originates in active sense, and since sight is the primary or first sensation, the name imagination (phantasia) is derived from light (phaos), for without light it is impossible to see (iii. 3. 429a 2–5). Intelligibles are abstracted from phantasmata, and thinking is a motion which relates mind (nous) to intelligibles (noeton) as the motion of sensing relates senses to sensibilia and the motion of imagining relates imagination to imaginabilia. The senses judge (krinein) concrete sensibles; the mind judges universal intelligibles abstracted from them. The faculties of the mind are separable from their matter as are their objects (iii. 4.
Aristotle remarks that it has been well said (presumably by Plato according to scholarly tradition and speculation) that the soul is the place (topos) of forms, taking the soul in its noetic function, not in all its functions, and taking form as potential not as actual (429b 27–30). The mind is active and is acted on. The possible intellect is rendered actual by actual intelligibles; potential intelligibles are made actual by the activity of the agent intellect. Mind actualizes the forms of thought which are potentially existent. The mind and objects of thought are potentially the same, but they are not actually the same until the mind thinks, much as a wax tablet is potentially all the things that may be written upon it (429b 23–430a 9). The production of science occurs between two places, for inquiry proceeds from the sensible places of natural things and motions to the intelligible places of mental images and intelligent motions.

Phantasms are formed and used not only in thought but also in sensation, memory, dreams, and hallucinations. The motions of the soul are not only from the places of sensed things to the places of formed knowledge but also to the formation and perception of phantasms which depend on places to account for their divergence from sense experience and rational science. Sensation is a motion of sense and sensible in which the senses “have” and “undergo” sensibles. It is a habit and a passion as well as a motion. Awareness of the process and the products, of sensings and of sensibles which are had and undergone, is a motion of common sense, a first sensitive faculty, which has and undergoes images (eikon) and mental images (phantasma) of sensings and sensibles (On Memory and Recollection 1. 449b 24–450a 22). Memory is neither sensation nor supposition. It is a habit (or having) or an undergoing (or passion), after a lapse of time from the act of sensing or supposing, of something sensed or supposed. Memory, imagination, and thought depend on phantasms derived from sensibles. Phantasms are perceptions of common sense. Imagining is a motion of imagination (phantasia) and images (phantasma) ordering images and producing imaginations. Memory is a habit and passion of phantasms of past sensations, past imaginations, and past thoughts. Recollection is a motion which follows a way ordered by similarity, contrariety, and connection of phantasms experienced in the past (2. 451b 10–23). Things and motions may be related in an order of succession. Recollections occur, deliberately or without conscious effort, when one motion occurs in connection with and after another (2. 451b 23–452a 2). The mode (tropos) of seeking it deliberately is to begin with or choose a starting point, and some men use places (topos) for the purpose of recollection. Aristotle’s example of places of recollection moves from the association of milk to white, of white to air, of air to damp, from damp to autumn: the perception of milk may thus lead to the recollection of autumn (ii. 252a 12–16). He adds that generally the middle of all the related phantasms is the beginning, because it is possi-
ble to move from it in any direction. Dreams are not sensations, and they are concerned with phantasms rather than with sensibles, but they involve more than phantasms; and a person of trained memory (mnemonikon), that is, a person who has an art of memory as a virtue or habit, remembers his dream not only as phantasms but as a process of putting phantasms in places (On Dreams i. 458b 17–25). The mere mention of a place causes a person who has a trained memory to remember the things themselves. Recollection occurs when one motion succeeds another naturally. It is different from learning. One is able somehow to move by one’s own effort from a chosen beginning point in seeking to recollect, whereas one can only proceed through something else, things or teachers, to learn something one had not known and for which, therefore, one could have no memory. Aristotle argues that Plato was mistaken in identifying thought and knowledge with recollection.

The places of memory are places of science; the places of invention are places of art. The places of memory are places of motions and of things, of sensibles and imaginables. The places of invention are places of arguments and of words, demonstrative and refutative, emotive and persuasive, deceptive and misleading. Arguments have their psychological foundations in the motions of things and ideas, but the places of discursive presentation and judgment are different from the places of natural motions and their consequences. The arts use ways to produce plausible and effective arguments and discourses and to judge them in different topical applications and thematic developments; the sciences use methods to investigate the conditions and causes of things and motions and to determine their characteristics and consequences. The psychological process of rational thinking proceeds from the places of perceived physical motions to the places of constructive intellectual thought, that is, places of teaching and learning, of inquiring and validating. The universal analytic art of demonstrative inquiry and proof which Aristotle sets forth in the Posterior Analytics has no need of places since it is the art of constructing valid arguments, real definitions, and causes from terms. The transition from sensibles to intelligibles, from corporeal perceptions to mental conceptions, is made by phantasms. The places of phantasms make possible the scientific investigation of an inner sense by which outer senses are perceived to sense or not to sense (it is because of that inner sense that we turn our eyes to see something we do not see) and of a common sense by which sensibles perceived by two senses, like shape and size, are perceived as a common sensible (it is by that common sense that shapes seen and felt are judged). The outer proper senses perceive sensibles; the inner common senses perceive images or phantasms of perceptibles; the imagination abstracts phantasms from the common content of many sensibles. Memory is the having or habit of phantasms of past perceptions of sensibles or of phantasms; recollection is the motion, deliberate or without conscious initiation,
from present perceptions to past. Inner senses, common sense, and memory are faculties. The powers of imagination and recollection may be improved by practice, but the arts of imagination and recollection are habits acquired or passions undergone, subject to scientific laws of initiation and association rather than to precepts and arguments of art.

The motion from sensibles to phantasms and to intelligibles in rational thought is dependent on the condition of the body and the mind. Hallucinations and dreams are produced by phantasms in unsound bodies, perturbed minds, or in sleep. The places of phantasms are required to explain and guard against illusory perceptions and to remember and interpret dreams, but they do not provide bases to eliminate or improve them. Universal arts of invention, as contrasted to arts acquired as habits or undergone as passions by individuals, occur in communication, that is, in the places between individuals. Aristotle elaborated four such universal arts. The universal art of scientific inquiry and proof has no need of places of argument in addition to places of things and of thoughts, for it provides means by which to investigate differences of things unaffected by differences of men. The art of dialectic uses common places to establish agreement among men of different opinions concerning propositions and problems. The art of dialectic is universal to all men. The art of rhetoric uses common places and particular places to persuade—that is, to move convictions, opinions, and passions—of individual men and groups of men. The art of rhetoric is adapted to particular audiences, circumstances, and speakers. The art of detecting and refuting erroneous arguments, formulated by design or unintentionally, uses common places to characterize and order fallacies of thought and of speech. In all three, places are sources of arguments and conclusions.

Aristotle's dialectic of places is derived from Plato's dialectic of spaces of ideas and is the source of Cicero's rhetoric of places of arguments. Plato's dialectic is a universal method to relate all varieties of change and opinion to their bases in unchanging being and knowledge. Aristotle's dialectic is a universal way of producing common opinion distinct from the methods of discovery and proof used to produce knowledge or science. For Plato thought is recollection, and recollection of ideas is creative thinking, invention, or discovery. In the Topics Aristotle uses a vast number of common places to establish or undermine the interpretation of sentences advanced as statements of accidents, properties, genera, or definitions of things under discussion. They are places used in the search to produce by argument common assent concerning propositions. At the end of the Topics he turns to the practice and organization of the art of dialectic, which include assembling collections of familiar, commonly held, and ready-made arguments, or common opinions and accepted propositions on which such arguments are based. A supply of general propositions is a source of arguments in the art of dialectic, much as mention of the places (topos) of things arouses memory of the
things themselves in arts of memory (mnemonikon). Cicero's topics are sources of argument in an art of discourse. They are used as seats of argument both in the general questions of dialectic and the particular cases of rhetoric. Cicero's canonical list of a dozen or so topics serves the function of Aristotle's formed propositions or even, in the case of definition and genus, of his predicables. Aristotle's dialectical topics are seats of propositions derived from arguments; Cicero's topics, which combine Aristotle's dialectical and rhetorical topics, are seats of arguments derived from propositions.

Aristotle's rhetoric of places is designed to produce persuasive arguments (pistis), which had been omitted in previous arts of rhetoric. He differentiates common places, like the possible or impossible, the more or less, the great or small, or amplification and diminution, which are applicable to all subjects, and proper places applicable to particular subjects (Rhetoric i. 2. 1358a 10-35; ii. 18. 1391b 20-19. 1393a 20). The places are treated in relation to the subjects appropriate to different audiences in the first book of the Rhetoric and in relation to the character of speakers and the opinions and passions of audiences in the second book. When the Sophists are credited with the invention of commonplaces, they were not places for the establishment of propositions or for the discovery of arguments but ready-made speeches to be memorized. The Sophists confused the art and its product as if a person seeking to impart knowledge to obviate pains in the feet, instead of teaching the art of shoemaking, offered finished shoes of various sorts (De sophisticis elenchis 34. 183b 36-184a 8). In the use of such commonplaces they also confused the art of rhetoric with other arts, particularly the arts of politics and of ethics.

Aristotle's places for the refutation of sophistical arguments are characterizations and classifications of fallacies of thought and diction designed to produce arguments of clarification and refutation. Since the art of sophistical arguments opposed propositions concerning any subject and on any question, sophisms (sophismata) came to be distinguished by later logicians from sophistical arguments, and their places could be treated as sources of truth since the pursuit of the antithetical lines of inquiry may contribute in their interplay to the advancement of knowledge and the uncovering of a new problem for further investigation.

Since various criteria are available to test the emptiness of "places" for purposes of memory or invention, and since the "images" and "arguments" placed in them can be given an indefinitely large number of meanings, the arts of memory and the arts of invention went through lines of development which resist examination and statement in accordance with fixed presumptions about the arts and their processes and products. The resulting interplays of recollection and invention in the places of tradition and of revolution affected the continuity and the changes encountered and interpreted in the history of literature and criticism. Places may be dimensions in which things are set and mea-
sured, containers proper to things and common to their motions, rooms or spaces in which things come to be and to be known according to transcendental principles, or vacua in which things impinge on and modify one another according to the motions of underlying matter. Literature may be understood in its dimensions by consideration of symbolic distances, ratios, proportions, and figures. Its room or space is the cosmos in which literature expresses grandeur and sublimity and explores rational structures and divine values and aspirations. It is a motion of bldies in vacua and voids in which its causes and consequences conform to laws of action and reaction and reflect the underlying nature of man and of the universe in which he moves. The places or containers of literature are genres of artificial objects composed of form and matter in imitation of human action.

Each of these circumscribing circumstances gives a different character to the literature that is placed in it and a different critical vocabulary adapted to formulate judgments about it. Dimensions and extensions are adapted to discourse, and criticism measures ambiguities, figures of speech, styles. Rooms and spaces are adapted to elevations by contemplation and aspiration, to the expression of huge thoughts and the inspiration of lofty loves; and criticism evokes intimations of thought, and echoes of expression, of things that exceed human speculation and discourse. Vacua and voids are conditions of the motion of bodies and of the impressions and passions generated in those motions; and criticism explores the circumstances and consequences of induced expectations and caused feelings. Places reproduce the forms of things they contain, the forms of actions adapted to characters and developed as consequences and causes of thoughts; and criticism seeks the unity which combines the surprise of discovery with the inevitability of consequences. Indeed each of the words of criticism changes meanings as it moves from one variety of places to another. Images may be figures of speech, likenesses of ideas, artificial constructs, motions and reflections of bodies. Poets may imitate poets, or becoming may imitate being, or art may imitate nature, or impressions of sense and sensibility may imitate their physiological and social causes. Discourse may be expressions relative to poets, expositions relative to thoughts and ideals, arguments or narrations relative to actions and characters in history or literature, or descriptions relative to things and motions. Any given work may be subjected in turn to evaluation as expression or presentation, as exposition or inspiration, as narrative or argument, and as description or exhibition in different modes of criticism.

The arts of memory and the arts of invention function creatively in interrelation. The arts of memory reconstruct the history of literature from which new works of literature and criticism emerge, but the history is not monolithic and fixed, and the innovation is not arbitrary and ungrounded. Every age and every author reviews and reforms the his-
tory of literature, and every author and every critic continues a tradition of the past. The history and development are fixed in each perspective, and the rebirth and revolution are directed in each projection. In view of this balance of controversial fixities and oppositions of literary views encountering pluralistic possibilities and combinations of literary making and creation, this analysis and history of places has not traced the development of a concept of places to establish a definition of places but has exhibited them in their multiplicity and interaction revivifying the past and preparing a novel future. What has been set forth is not subject to test as true or false. The criteria relevant to an analysis and history of processes will be satisfied if it opens up unnoticed aspects of past literature and criticism and helps remove present choices from the battle of exclusive selection to the discrete uncommitted consideration of their respective processes of production and consideration.