The relation between man and his environment, between the individual and society, is not a reciprocal action between two determinate entities or fixed natures. What man does depends on what he is, and what he is depends on what he has done. The success and frustration of his actions, which affect what he is, depend on the circumstances in which he finds himself as well as on his impulses and powers. He adapts himself to his environment, and he modifies it to his liking. He is a constituent part of associations and communities which take their characteristics and functions from the interests and occupations of their members and in turn mold the characters, skills, and aspirations they possess and exercise. Even the line between physical environment and associative society is not sharply drawn, for the cosmos has been treated as a commonwealth of ruling powers and dominions, and societies and states have been conceived as power structures within which the interplay of actions and reactions can be calculated from the parallelograms of forces.

The relation between individual and society, which has been the subject of interpretation and speculation since the beginnings of literature, religion, and philosophy, suggests, on the one hand, analogies between the virtues, purposes, and conditions of individuals and of society and, on the other hand, causal relations between parts and wholes which are literally distinct and different. The two models of statement relating individual and society formed by basic expressions adapted to the analogies between individual and society and by basic expressions adapted to distinguishing individuals from groups of which they are members become oppositions in their theoretic formulations. In the analogical dialectical tradition, Plato found analogies between the faculties of a man and the classes of a state and argued that man and state share the same virtues and that states are wise, temperate, and courageous as well as just; Augustine sought peace in the harmony of parts in individuals and in societies; and, since on this model the analogy between virtue, peace, and health is close, societies as well as individuals may be said to be healthy or ill. Mankind is then a large man or all men, or a large family, or a world community, or a transnational state. In the literal causal tradition, the analysis of the individual is separated from the analysis of society; Aristotle and John Locke began their political treatises by arguing that political relations are distinct from the relations of family, household, or dominion, and they examine individual and society in causal interaction; virtues and habits operate in the actions of men, while institutions and laws operate in the actions of states; and, since on this model specific differences are differences of kind, both individual men and human states can be generically just in their actions, but only individuals can be healthy or ill, and only
states can be oligarchical, despotic, or democratic. Mankind is then a form of associative human action, and men function differently as individuals, or as members of a family, a community, or a state, than as members of the community of mankind.

The history of the discussion of individual and society—philosophical, literary, practical, and scientific—has been rent by controversy between the analogical and the causal mode of analysis and statement. One of the effects of awareness of the concept of mankind should be the devising of ways to avoid this endless and fruitless controversy, for in the context of mankind it is easily apparent, formally, that the analogies and the interactions are both valid formulations, and no less apparent, substantively, that men will continue to hold both positions in the communication that constitutes the community of mankind. In the discussion of mankind which follows, analogical likeness between individuals and societies will be used to set up the idea of mankind as an extension of more familiar and less extensive ideas and to use distinctions appropriate to one to open up questions concerning the other. Literal distinctions will be used to separate individuals and societies. In particular, the ideas of mental health and of mental illness will be applied only to individuals; mankind will be differentiated from individual men and from all other associations of men; and the relation between individuals and mankind will be sought not in the juxtaposition of static natures but in the dynamic interrelations of functions. Mankind is a cause of both health and disorder in individuals because it provides new or reinforces old uncertainties productive of new uneasinesses and new expectations, and it provides new or extends old opportunities productive of new confidences and new fears. In this respect, mankind is no different from other communities or associations of communities. The concept of mankind is of particular importance to the problems of mental health because it provides means which may be used to reconcile forces of permanence and change by turning both to applications which produce the harmonious co-ordinations of health rather than the chaotic disorders of disease.

Mental health in the individual is a balance or harmony of impulse, passion, understanding, and habit, that is, of spirited, emotional, intellectual, and moral faculties. This balance or harmony of functions is manifested and strengthened, or disorganized and weakened, by actions, passions, thoughts, and precepts operative or accepted in the communities in which man is a part. In this analytic context, viewing the relation of individual and society from the standpoint of the individual, the analogies between the individual and mankind are apparent, but mankind is more than the totality of all men, or the common human nature which they share, or the interdependencies which they experience, or the shared aspirations which they develop. Mankind is a form of association or community which has been in existence in partial or attenuated forms for a long time but which has increased in importance and efficacy so rapidly since the end of World War II as to constitute a distinct factor in mental health and illness. In this analytic context, viewing the relation of individual and society from the standpoint of society, the distinction between individuals, communities, and mankind are appar-
ent, and mankind is more than a political, economic, cultural, or social association; it is an organic association which may provide the basis for any of these associations or functions, but its specific function is their balance or harmony in peace and security. Mankind is a form of society with generic likenesses to other societies and with specific differences discoverable in its effects on human capacities for action and dispositions to action. Problems of mental health and illness are problems of the individual. Mankind is related to mental health by the effects of mankind on the faculties of man which are balanced in health. In order to bring out the relevance of the concept of mankind to mental health, mankind is treated in its bearing on action under four headings in what follows: "Action and Aspiration"; "Action and Thought"; "Action and Passion"; and "Action and Morality."

I. ACTION AND ASPIRATION. HOW DOES MANKIND STIMULATE IMPULSES?

Mankind is a society of all men and of all societies. The nation is also an association of associations as well as of men, and in the nation both associations and men may be treated as legal "persons." Pluralism was recognized and extended slowly in the political state, however, and the members of mankind have only recently passed from the use of moral, religious, and legal aphorisms to the tentative use of devices of treaty, constitution, and consent. This evolution is seen in accelerated form in the influence of mankind on the formation of the numerous new nations which have come into existence since 1945. New nations were formed because the influence of mankind has also altered the orientations and objectives of old nations and of non-governmental associations, local or global, within nations. The concept of mankind facilitated the formation of new nations. An altered conception of the associations of peoples permitted the new nations to join the society of nations and, in doing so, both to realize aspirations which had previously been frustrated and also to recognize new frustrations and to conceive new aspirations. The formation of new nations stimulated new aspirations in the citizens of those nations and set up inhibitions to old aspirations sanctioned by the tradition of earlier associations. Four aspirations have been intricately interrelated in the operation of mankind on groups and on groups and on men, which has had as one effect the formation of new nations, and those aspirations differentiate and relate four aspects of association in societies and in mankind.

A. POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

Men aspire to achieve self-determination—for themselves and for those with whom they are associated—in basic decisions affecting their own welfare and pursuits. The forms of political independence and sovereignty provide a ready, schematic answer to this aspiration. But the ambiguities of political sovereignty appear both within and without—in the relations of the nation with its citizens and in the relations of the nation with other nations. When a nation makes its own decisions, who makes the decision—the people or some group of power elite—and how are people and leaders educated to assume their new responsibilities? When a nation makes its own decisions, how does it take into account effects of its actions which might diminish the independence
of other nations or advance its interests at the expense of the common good, and how does it protect its independence from the consequences of the decisions of others or yield some portion of its sovereignty? If the question were simply political, the relations among nations would continue in the traditional ambiguities of political pronouncements which have settled so conspicuously in recent years about terms like “democracy,” “freedom,” “equality,” “peace-loving,” “aggression,” and “tolerance.”

B. ECONOMIC SUFFICIENCY

Men aspire to secure the satisfaction of their needs and wants, to raise their standards of living, and to achieve security of expectation. The establishment of new nations has raised expectations in their members that notable economic changes will be set under way: industrialization, retraining of workers, new distribution of resources, and new divisions of labor to solve the problems of living and to make feasible the ideal of living well. The new nations have come into being with the expectation that they will receive assistance in catching up, and the old nations have had a variety of motives to accede, in part and under circumstances, to some aspects of that expectation of material assistance, technical assistance, and training assistance. Despite ambitious plans and vast expenditures, the expectation has in the main been frustrated in the concrete forms it takes in the lives of individual men. The aspirations to self-determination and to assistance may be mutually consistent, but more frequently they are, or seem to be, antithetical.

C. SOCIAL EQUALITY

Men aspire to justice, not in the legal sense of rendering unto each his due according to some traditional code of law, nor in the moral or religious sense of doing unto others as you would have them do unto you according to an aphorism universally acknowledged but seldom seen in concrete application, but in the sense of not being confronted by a necessity to lay the foundation of your aims and actions in distinctions between those discriminated against as such and those favored from the start. Within the new nations, members are accorded freedom and equality, rights and obligations, by which they are free to use their powers and act as they wish and by which they are constrained to conform to law, custom, and common opinion. In the context of mankind, nations are free and equal in the society of nations. Programs of self-determination and assistance become programs of co-operation, with the ambiguities within which self-determination, assistance, and co-operation may be mutually supplementary or mutually contradictory.

D. CULTURAL PROGRESS

Men aspire to satisfy the sense that they are getting somewhere. But they can get somewhere only in their own terms. The new nations must benefit by the advances in the sciences and the arts, and they must preserve their own cultural identities. Within nations, members must be better educated, and they must be made aware of the values of their cultural traditions. In the context of mankind, the values of the achievements of all the cultures of mankind must be used as a basis and guide to the establishment of a common culture which finds a suggestive model in the communication which great art establishes with all men and the communication which science achieves across cultural traditions. Self-determination, assistance, and co-operation are ad-
vanced or frustrated by the criteria of judgment.

The influence of mankind on nations and associations of men extends to the aspirations of individual men. Men everywhere, whether or not they are aware of international relations, economic interdependences, the images peoples form of each other and the injustices they feel, and the relations of cultures, are aware of impulses, passions, ideas, and moral judgments which have taken on a new vitality in their thoughts of themselves and what they can do. The interrelations of these aspirations provide the impetus which might develop into frustrations conducive to mental illness and the possibilities of harmonious interrelations which might serve as a new foundation for vigorous and dynamic mental health.

II. ACTION AND THOUGHT. HOW IS MANKIND ENCOUNTERED IN EXPERIENCE?

If mankind could be defined simply in terms of the forms of association in which all men are brought together in action and feeling, the problems of mankind might be stated simply in the abstract terms of "independence," "assistance," "co-operation," and "judgment." Almost all the discussion of world problems takes place in this abstract form, but even without departing from abstraction it is apparent that any one of the four factors may be made basic and that the change transforms the conception of problems and of possible modes of operation relevant to them. All problems of community can be reduced to political problems to be resolved by political debate, consent, and action; or all problems and all historical developments including political, social, cultural, and intellectual history, have a material or economic interpretation, which discloses the basic forces at work and the course of action that will transform modes and relations of production; or all problems will be solved by use of the methods of science; or all activities and all men will be adjusted to each other when we understand the structures of values of cultures and of world culture. Each of these formulations is plausible, and each has been promulgated widely as a message of hope; but they have also entered into vigorous controversy which has left consequences of frustration and of skepticism. Yet it should be apparent from the first that the concept of mankind will not be embodied uniquely in any one social structure, political constitution, economic system, or ideological doctrine.

If the manifest effects of the concept of mankind are the aspirations stimulated in men by recognition of their common humanity, the concept of mankind is encountered in experience in all the means employed by men and associations of men to understand and satisfy these aspirations. Mankind is encountered not only in associations, but in ideas, facts, and symbols; not only in deliberations, but in judgments, actions, and passions. The thought employed in action is not limited to abstract thought capable of systematic statement and proof; it is found in the schemes, habits, and automatisms of action without explicit statement; it is found in rationales in which facts are experienced, noticed, and arranged; it is in the structure, significance, and emotion which constitute symbols. These dimensions of thought are so related that one cannot be used without the others, and each may be made the surrogate for all the others or the impediment blocking the operation of any of the others.
A. HUMAN INSTITUTIONS

Problems are discussed by means of formulations which are set in opposition in the issues presented by particular problems and which are judged in the formulation of a resolution of the issue. A formulation is a statement the meaning of which has been indicated and the application of which has been specified. Rules are formulations for the treatment of recurring problems, and institutions are frameworks of distributed powers constructed with rationales and applications designed for the formation, application, and enforcement of rules. Both formulations and institutions have "consequences" in discourse and operation. The consequences of the rules which men acknowledge and of the institutions by which they live are sometimes consistent and mutually reinforcing, but they are sometimes antithetical and mutually destructive. Political negotiations and actions are efforts to resolve contrarieties in the consequences in what men think they should do and what they are induced, persuaded, or forced to do. The aspirations stimulated by the concept of mankind sometimes require the establishment of new institutions and sometimes indicate a need to preserve and renovate existing institutions.

B. HUMAN NATURE

The formulations of agreements and the policies of associations are sometimes found to be inoperative because they do not accord with the facts. The facts encountered by formulations and institutions include facts about man, human nature, as well as facts about things, the nature of the world. Encountered or experienced facts are composites of the impulses of men and the stimulations of things, and any allegation of fact is therefore a composite of facts signifying (attention) and facts signified (stimulus). The facts alleged in the treatment of any problem are, as a consequence, sometimes in harmony and sometimes in contradiction. The common human nature of men and the common world which they inhabit determine the facts of their common needs and wants and the means to satisfy wants and realize impulses, but efforts to further the aspirations of mankind by satisfying more needs or needs of more people sometimes encounter the difficulty that the satisfaction of some wants is inconsistent with the satisfaction of others and that ministering to the needs of all diminishes the possibility of supplying the demands of some.

C. HUMAN POWER

Statements and institutions may sometimes be in accord with the facts and yet not be in accord with the operation of the power structure. The operation of existing institutions is a power structure. Revolutionary action is the operation of some constituent part of that structure to change the structure or to change those who administer power in the structure. Revolutions occur in mankind as well as in smaller communities, and they often occur without change in the words of the statements of the accepted rules or in the forms of the institutions of the customary or legal actions. The revolution consists in a change of meaning of statements or a change of symbolic significance of groups or institutions. Either change of meaning, of the rule or of the institution, may entail a transformation of the use of power. Rules and institutions are subject to different interpretations, and human power may both be used to impose an interpreta-
tion and also be created or modified by an interpretation imposed. The concept of mankind may be distorted by a universal extension of one power and one ideology, or it may emerge as a new unified structure of power which establishes a maximum harmonious interrelation of many powers and many modes of thought.

D. HUMAN VALUES

Institutions, facts, and symbols are encountered in experience only as what they are thought to be. Apart from beliefs and convictions concerning what they really are, they have no experienced existence behind, above, or below phenomena. They exist in the significance explored in thoughts and opinions. Structures and hierarchies which are constructed among those significances may be in agreement or in opposition. If it is true that communities and cultures have structures of values, it is also true that there are disagreements concerning what those structures are, not only in political and social programs proposed for the communities and the cultures, but also in the technical descriptions they receive in different disciplines and by different experts in the same discipline. The concept of mankind may be used as a propaganda label for any structure of values presented for universal acceptance, certified as tested by long experience as creed, polity, economy, or cult, or recommended as a new departure by sect, party, class, or school; or it may be understood as a flexible interrelation of values appreciated and judged after education which resists the rigidities of indoctrination to develop awareness, art, prudence, and wisdom.

III. ACTION AND EMOTIONS. HOW IS MANKIND MANIFESTED IN ACTION?

Mankind is encountered in the operations and processes conditioned by human institutions, human nature, human powers, and human values. It is manifested in human actions ordered, unconsciously or by deliberate design, in purposive pursuit of objectives. The manifestation of mankind objectives in such purposive activity is a calculation of opportunities and frustrations in which either of opposed courses of action may be presented plausibly as the proper means to achieve the objective. In general, questions of decision and policy must choose between alternatives, either of which may be defended as continuations of tradition or as initiations of change, as founded on permanence or on innovation, as conservative or as revolutionary; and when this ambivalence is extended to mankind, the same course of action may be attacked as divisive or be defended as unifying.

A. OBJECTIVES INSTITUTIONALIZED IN GENERAL

A structure of functions may be designed to perpetuate one manner of solving problems and to establish one form of authority for their solution, or it may be designed to provide means for considering and resolving problems which have not occurred before and to establish a balance of functions and offices to work out their interpretation and solution. The development of constitutional government and the trend toward "democracy" since the eighteenth century has faced the double problem of preserving the established constitution and of putting the constitution, at last, into effect. The pursuit of this double purpose has been facilitated and complicated by the use of
two instrumentalities — interpretation and amendment. Any given article of a constitution, written or unwritten, is subject to interpretation which is determined ambiguously by the intention of the framers and by the changed circumstances to which it must be applied. The responsible citizen is formed to awareness of the provisions of the basic law as interpreted and to sensitivity to needs of amendment when changing circumstances reveal omissions, ambiguities, or desirable extensions of its provisions. At each stage these possibilities may be presented as oppositions of permanence and change in the distribution and use of powers, in which the powers or prerogatives of the government or the community and the powers or rights of the individual no less than the powers of the departments of government and of the organs of opinion are in conflict; or they may be conjoined to provide for a maximum realization of the objectives of individuals by the maximization of common objectives.

B. OBJECTIVES FIXED BY CIRCUMSTANCES

A structure of functions may be conceived to be simply the product of the interplay or of the oppositions of powers. The use of power is to secure what one wants and what is possible under the circumstances, material and social, that is, to secure one’s own objectives by applying and controlling natural powers and by utilizing, influencing, or opposing the power of others. Objectives are wants satisfied or extended to new wants that might be satisfied. The satisfaction of one’s own wants may be consistent or at variance with the satisfaction of the wants of others. Power may be used to frustrate the purposive activity of others or to provide what they want, or it may be used to modify their wants in conformity to one’s own or to assist them to acquire the power to satisfy their own wants. Criteria for permanence may be found by appeal to basic human nature common to all men which determines the basic needs to be satisfied. Criteria for change may be guided by considerations of therapy to return from induced complexes to wants determined by operation according to the laws of one’s own nature or by considerations of progress to extend one’s natural wants by new accessions of power.

C. OBJECTIVES SET BY REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

A structure of functions may suggest objectives by opposition when pressure groups or rebels seek to achieve what they conceive to be the objectives of the community by seizing power or seek other objectives which they conceive to be better adapted to the community. Emotions are guided neither by rule nor by power. Instead, emotions form rules and unleash powers, and the emotional enunciation of rules and use of power for the status quo become as revolutionary as the manifestations directed to the opposed objectives. A successful revolution for change becomes a bulwark of permanence resisting revolution which becomes in the new structure counterrevolutionary, and a successful counterrevolution which fore-stalls change tends to institute changes in a counterreformation.

D. ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES OR ABSOLUTE ENDS

A structure of functions, when it has achieved flexibility and stability in operation, division, and concentration in powers, responsiveness and confidence in emotions, may turn to the realization of its potentialities with a minimum confusion of faction, strife, and contro-
versy. Ultimate ends are not objectives set in advance by the promulgation of an ideology but the objectives which become conceivable and desirable, as well as possible, by education which realizes the potentialities of men and communities. It builds on the permanence of the great achievements of men in all forms of activity in the past and by means of them, as in past "renaissances," opens up innovations. It is based on, and is intelligible by, particular cultures and disciplines, but it liberates for new values and humanizes for new achievements. Its objectives are those of mankind when it teaches men to use the values of their particular cultures and those of others to face new problems that are common and to work toward new values which will also be common.

IV. ACTION AND MORALITY. HOW DOES MANKIND AFFECT ACTIONS?

Either permanence or change may promote health or illness in the organization of the functions of men. Any partial discussion of an encompassing whole beyond existing associations and communities tends to produce enthusiastic expectations and tense oppositions.

If permanence is a perpetuation of known evils and experienced injustices, it produces tension, and change produces hope. If permanence is a perpetuation of institutions, impulses, powers, and values against the threat of destructive and disruptive forces, it produces confidence, and change produces anxiety. Mankind, in functional operation through facts, emotions, ideas, institutions, provides the only cure for partial concepts of the associations of men which further divisive ends. Mankind is a dynamic combination of permanence and change, of stable structure and progressive action. The contemplation of permanence alone or change alone promotes confidence or anxiety, indifferently. The ambivalence of response is a consummatory cause of disorder; and, therefore, societies, including world community, viewed as states of stagnation or chaos, are among the prime causes of mental illness. Awareness of mankind opens insight into the processes of an organic whole operating with continuity and adaptation to applicable universality and reflective self-reorientation.

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