The influence of ideas and ideals is not found in patterns of actions rigidly determined, and the sensed continuity of cultures is never formulated unambiguously. What is effective on men's minds and feelings and what persists in their thought and imagination are only partially and temporarily expressed in bodies of doctrines found in one age and transmitted from age to age. The story of ideal influence and cultural continuity cannot be told definitely or finally. Doctrines and beliefs are modified as they are repeated and reinforced in traditions, and the history of the common past must be re-examined and reformulated by each age and by each community to account for the emergence of new circumstances that give ages and communities their peculiar character and spirit. Old and new, tradition and change, permanence and relativity are not simple opposites, nor are they simply discovered in the facts of human action and expression. They are encountered in the theories and histories by which the facts are explained and in which new succeeds old, old supplants new, and theory and history become themselves parts of a process in which continuity and change are mingled in the prosecution of a common inquiry and unending dialogue.

In the inquiry that has associated men in progressively larger and more interdependent groups, men have turned from investigating immediate practical problems to making and enjoying things of beauty or to speculating on eternal mysteries and enigmas—sometimes combining practical, aesthetic, and theoretic; sometimes separating the accumulations of knowledge, not only from the errors discarded and the ignorance superseded, but also from other human accomplishments classified for that purpose as emotional, imaginative, or mystic; sometimes using past acquisitions of knowledge or information as instruments for further inquiry; sometimes
returning to hypotheses prematurely discarded, or refurbishing accepted doctrines to adjust them to newer data, or abandoning the old and constructing radically new theories and amassing data which were inaccessible until the concepts that marked them off were discovered or formed. In the dialogue which began before the beginning of history, interlocutors have participated for a time and then have disappeared, while others, more recently arrived, have continued the themes their predecessors had discussed and the words they had used—sometimes forgetful of the original problem or ingenious in discovering unsuspected aspects, and often insensitive to the meanings in which the words were used when they picked up the thread of discussion or inattentive to the nuances of distinctions the words once carried; sometimes introducing new problems which bent the altered words to still newer meanings and associations and which altered the old arts and techniques of statement and proof; sometimes adapting newly devised instruments to transform old problems.

The common inquiry and adventure, the continuing dialogue and co-operation are, like everything else, subject matter for theory and science. Human nature and human community have been set forth and ordered according to theological, anthropological, biological, philosophical, metaphysical, psychological, sociological, geographic, cosmological, or economic principles. Histories recount the successions or patterns of action and thought with the aid of one or another of these doctrines and in substantiation of its assumptions. But the relations of the sciences and the successions of the histories are, in turn, steps in the inquiry and phases in the dialogue. Participants in the inquiry and speakers in the dialogue proceed as if they were engaged uniquely in promoting acceptance of true doctrines and sound proofs in a context of accepted facts and established sciences; and our analyses of states of affairs, actual and past, are frequently framed as if doctrine, belief, and action fall into place by conforming to unique patterns or sequences historically determined and disputable only by the ignorant, the biased, or the malicious. Yet the ambiguity of concepts in theoretic disputations and the multiplicity of interpretations of historical facts may also suggest, not that we ought to eliminate ambiguity from our statements or that we shall ever be able to do so, if that were desirable, nor that we ought to agree on the facts of our situation, but rather that our efforts to use knowledge and history to guide actions are involved in problems similar to those of scientists faced by opposed hypotheses and to those historians faced by mutually inconsistent interpretations.

It is difficult to apply knowledge to action, not only because the motives that lead men to act are not basically, or even largely, rational, but also because what is advanced as relevant knowledge in any problematic situation is not a single consistent body of doctrine and does not indicate a unique course of action. We have almost ceased to notice, to cite one striking example, the differences and oppositions between the diagnosis of the problems of our times which traces the persistent crises of a scientific and technological age to the fact that our moral and spiritual development has not kept pace with our scientific and technological advance and the diagnosis of our troubles as due to the fact that the social sciences have lagged behind the natural sciences and that our power to control nature exceeds our power to control man. It is difficult to learn from history, not only because the past is never wholly repeated and what is relevant in analogies from the past is not easily determined, but also because what is advanced as history reflects the circumstances and convictions among which the history was conceived as well as the conditions and actions it sets forth. Historians in the West have in recent decades constructed accounts of the characteristics of civilizations, their development, decay, and death, to balance Marxist inquiries into history as part of the science of the history of society according to which society moves inevitably through fixed stages determined by relations and means of production to an ideal classless society; not only are the histories contradictory in the data selected, in the interpretations put on common data, and in the relations found to connect data, but also it is not immediately apparent how men may learn from either account to advance or prevent processes which are inevitable or, at least, to
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which no exceptions have been recorded. The problems which arise in applying science or history to action are not scientific or historical: in their theoretic form they are metaphysical problems of first principles; in their practical form they are rhetorical problems of persuasion.

The problems of a culture and of the relations among cultures, which are stated in theory and narrated in history, are encountered and resolved in the clash of theories and the oppositions of traditions. A community or a civilization is a product of antecedent circumstances; it is also an expression of a set of beliefs concerning the nature of things and an evaluation of what is worth while. Within the community or the culture, the antecedent conditions are interpreted in a variety of histories, and the common beliefs concerning reality and values are interpreted in a variety of theories. Commitments and convictions concerning what is true and what is important are mingled in the operation of historical processes, and those processes, in turn, are expounded in histories committed to principles which result in variant historical interpretations of the consequences of convictions. They have their grounds in reality and processes, but those grounds are formulated in philosophies and sciences which are constructed to take account, in the sphere of human and social actions, of the differences among philosophies and among the organizations of sciences. Tradition has been the channel as well as the obstacle of change. Revolutions have sought the new by a return to the old, and, when they have sought to avoid the old, they have rediscovered old ways and values, old predicaments and problems at the peak of their revolutionary success. Philosophers and scientists have organized symbols in demonstrative systems, have sought the verification of systems in facts and experience, and have promoted doctrines and methods in an effort to secure acceptance for them by a consensus of all men, or of the experts or the educated or the elite, or, at least, of a school or a sect or a party, but they have also recognized that their systems of symbols, their empirical verifications, and their proofs depend on the formation of concepts which

face out on the unexplored and determine the alterations or revolutions of their systems.

In the processes of objective history (which include among historical phenomena the construction of histories by historians) and in the processes of objective nature (which include among empirical social facts the formation of theories by scientists and philosophers) continuity and change are found in themes and concepts, arts and techniques, data and purposes. A civilization which has a common past and a common set of values is bound together by symbols which are the source of common action and mutual confidence and understanding. So long as the symbols are viable, the civilization is vital, and the symbols are a source only of concepts for inquiry and themes for discussion. The symbols of a civilization by which men live and act are elaborated in myth and history, in belief and knowledge. A crisis of civilization is a failure of symbols as a bond binding men in the community they previously recognized and as an inspiration leading them to common action for common purposes. New histories are then composed and new efforts are made to convert all men or an elite or a sect to one of the doctrines which interpret reality and values. Such efforts succeed sometimes, but they never secure more than partial and temporary consensus, and their success in the past has usually been due less to the values or the truths they celebrate than to some species of force—the influence of material and economic circumstance, social pressure, political control, or military power. Even when they are successful, moreover, the form and content of doctrine and belief are modified by the same processes that lead to the resolution of differences of belief and doctrine by conviction and force, by influence and resistance—the success of peaceful and violent social change is due to the efficacy of the themes and the concepts, the arts and the techniques, which are the sources of the interpretations we give to the nature of things and to their operation and development.

The four themes which are treated in the essays brought together in this volume—love, truth, freedom, and imitation—are
themes which were first given a prominent place in the inquiry and
the dialogue of Western civilization by Greek poets, statesmen, and
philosophers. They have continued since antiquity to be concepts
about which men have organized inquiry into, and discussion of, our
common lives and purposes. The history of the influence of the
Greeks has been retold in every age from Alexandria and Rome to
present-day formulations of an emerging world community, but the
different judgments of the adequacy of their ideals and conceptions
have themselves been parts of the discussion of common themes.
The influence of the Greeks has been exalted and disputed for qual-
ities attributed to them and for reasons alleged to account for or to
diminish their accomplishments. The miracle of Greece was that
one small community of men—not indeed of all Greeks but of
Greeks resident in Athens during a few generations—developed so
many themes and perfected so many techniques that have con-
tinued to occupy men in their individual lives, their arts, their as-
association, and their pursuit of knowledge, wisdom, and spiritual
values.

Love, truth, freedom, and imitation have been defined, de-
veloped, and applied in theories which depart from Greek concep-
tions; and the histories which recount the development of those
themes find Greek practices and doctrines deficient in many res-
pects. The Greek doctrine of love, despite the lofty reaches and
subtle elaborations of the Platonic theory, was supplemented by the
Christian conception of divine love and charity. Yet St. Augustin
found the themes and the dialectic for the systematic formulation of
Christian charity in the doctrines of Plotinus.

Greek mathematicians, astronomers, physicians, and philoso-
phers, despite the progress they made in formalizing, systematizin-
g, and advancing knowledge in astronomy, mathematics, physics,
meteorology, and biology, and despite their monumental construc-
tion of logical devices and techniques and their profound explora-
tions of the nature and requirements of truth, did not succeed in
elaborating the instruments, in defining the concepts, or in making
the measurements required for the establishment of empirical and
experimental sciences. Yet at each stage of the development of
modern science the themes and the problems on which the Greeks
exercised their ingenuity reappear, sometimes in explicit reference,
sometimes in distant echo, sometimes in distorted refutation: Co-
pernicus quotes Greek astronomical theories which he learned
about from Cicero; Galileo developed his mechanics in the contest
of the disputes of Aristotelians and Averroists in Padua; Descartes
invented his geometry to solve problems posed by Greek mathe-
maticians and Fermat laid the foundations of number theory to
translate their insights into new symbolic forms; Cuvier and Dar-
win expressed admiration for the observations and theories of
Aristotle; Whitehead borrowed inspiration and terminology from
Plato to express the organic interrelations of his philosophy of sci-
ence; and modern scientists frequently clarify the basic assump-
tions of their theories by quarreling with concepts they attribute to
Aristotle.

Greek society and polity had their economic foundation in slav-
ery; the love of freedom which Pericles celebrated in his Funera
Oration did not extend to all residents of Athens, and the Athenian
democracy was an oligarchy; Plato, Aristotle, and other political
theorists in Athens did not number “democracy” among the “per-
fect” forms of government. Yet Western man learned to talk about
freedom and justice, order and the rule of law from Greek poets,
thinkers, and men of action; and eighteenth-century philosophers
and revolutionists justified democracy by means of distinctions,
arguments, and principles that had their origins in Greek theory
and practice.

The concept of imitation occupied a fundamental place in Greek
theories of science, morals, art, and rhetoric; it was displaced from
that central position and found inadequate in later critical, phe-
omenological, and pragmatic theories of truth and in creative and
expressive theories of art and beauty. Yet the influence of the
various doctrines of imitation is apparent, not only negatively in the
doctrines set up to supplant them, but positively in the exemplary
uses to which history was put by precepts applied in practical ac-

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in the dialectical and operational criteria by which the truth of
deductions was tested by application in natural processes, and in
the techniques which were adapted to different objects of imitation
in academic, impressionistic, imagistic, expressionistic, surrealistic,
and futurist art.

A theme or a concept is an instrument in the development, de-
defense, and refutation of doctrines and theories. The history of
themes is longer in extent and broader in scope than the history of
the doctrines that specify the theme in any field or in any form of
action, since the development of themes includes the significances
and implications which relate disparate doctrines, connect the his-
tories of separated theories and sciences, and explain heterogeneous
applications of developed doctrines in other fields than those in
which they originally appeared. Some themes which were first
elaborated by the Greeks have influenced later developments of
doctrine by the pattern of interrelations they suggested or laid bare.

It would be absurd to argue that Greek philosophers, poets, or
rhetoricians anticipated the Christian doctrine of charity, or the
psychiatric doctrine of sexual urges, or the doctrines of courtly love
or of romantic love. They did explore ingeniously and imaginac-
tively the loves that relate man to man, to woman, to ideas, ideals,
and God and that bind men in families, friendships, and communi-
ties; and the names of Oedipus, Helen, Aphrodite, Antigone, Hippolytus,
Damon and Pythias, Orpheus, Alcestis, Achilles, Orestes, and Socrates have
continued to evoke in the minds of later men the vast complexity of human loves. Later discussions of the themes of
love as subconscious drive, individual desire, community bond, or
transcendent attraction, not only extended early concepts to new
meanings and applications using Greek examples or borrowing
Greek names to form technical terms, but played on the inter-
dependences of forms of love, making one form or another funda-
mental to the rest.

Other themes that bear the marks of Greek origin have influ-
enced later developments of doctrines by basic distinctions and data,
and further development has consisted in sharpening of the distinc-
tions in doctrines, correcting and adjusting theories, and supple-
menting hypothesis by hypothesis as new data have been accumu-
lated in the successive applications of more refined theories. Ari-
totle discussed motion in terms of time, space, matter, infinity, and
causation, but his distinction between upward and downward motion
prevented him from giving importance to the idea of inertia, and his
distinction between violent and natural motion, between alteration,
increase, and local motion stood in the way of his forming a concept
of force. He examined the kinds, structures, functions, and parts of
animals, basing his distinctions in many cases on extraordinarily
acute empirical observations, and he concentrated attention on
problems of nutrition, growth, modes of locomotion, reproduction,
heredity, struggle for existence, survival, disease, and death; but at
best he prepared for the later concepts of classification, function,
and evolution on which biological inquiry has proceeded since the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The character of the themes
which have guided the progress of science is obscured by the im-
portance of the data on which concepts are employed and to which
they are adjusted; and the suggestive power of the interrelations
which they conceal in their ambiguities, which are as frequently
liberating as obstructive, appears only occasionally in the insights
explored in new discoveries.

Still other themes explored by the Greeks have influenced later
developments of doctrines by the enlarging scope of application which
they acquired with changing circumstances, beliefs, and institu-
tions. Cynics and Stoics conceived the equality and brotherhood of
man; Christians related the brotherhood of man and the heavenly
city to the Judeo-Christian conception of God; but only in recent
times have economic and political changes permitted the extension
by which the concept of freedom is applied to all men and the en-
largement by which it includes economic, social, and cultural as
well as political and civil rights. Modern man has rediscovered in
his efforts to comprehend and encompass the four freedoms some of
the perplexities of Antigone's appeal to an unwritten law which
underlies, and comes into conflict with, the laws of states.
Finally, some themes of the Greeks have influenced later developments of doctrines by moving from field to field, losing significant application in one to acquire new applications in another, often without attracting attention to the relations between the fields. Plato and Aristotle discussed art as an imitation of nature; aesthetics and criticism made little sympathetic use of imitation during some periods, including the nineteenth century, yet the theme has had a long continuing career: Hellenistic and Roman rhetoricians and poets advised poets, historians, and philosophers to imitate the great models in their art; Christian writers moved the concept into morals and theology and advocated the imitation of Christ; imitation returned to a central importance in the doctrines of the Renaissance, and among other applications political philosophers based their doctrines on the imitation of the past or the imitation of nature; and the models which scientists constructed and the operations they employed and described had a relation to nature and its processes which the Greeks could have named imitation.

The discussion and application of themes which can be traced back to the Greeks have been carried on for centuries by arts and techniques which the Greeks invented to develop and variegate the themes in which they were employed. They still retain the names given to them by Greek thinkers—logic and dialectic, mathematics, rhetoric, grammar, poetic, history, logistic, sophistic, eristic, criticism, philosophy. Just as the themes of inquiry and discussion tend to assume a fixity and rigidity in doctrines, conclusions, and beliefs, so too the techniques of inquiry and discussion tend to lose their character as arts and to become methods, instruments, and organs of verification and proof by which postulates, hypotheses, and beliefs are attached to bodies of data and by which inquiry and inference are transformed into formalized sciences. The processes employed in these methods are in turn combined and transformed by similar methods—those which in the past led to the construction of metaphysics, theologies, critical philosophies, philosophical anthropologies, and epistemologies, or to the elaboration of the ideals of the communion of saints, the republic of letters, and the consensus of experts, or, more recently, to the promulgation of the unity of sciences, the homogeneity of cultures or ages or the patterns and successions of cultures, societies, and epochs, and the integration of the whole man. On the other hand, just as themes are fertile sources of diverse and even contradictory doctrines, so too techniques are moved from field to field in heterogeneous application to subjects for which they were not designed in their previous uses: the devices of rhetoric are applied to things as well as to words, to the construction of methods of discovery in science as well as to the formation of arguments for persuasion in practical problems or to the invention of forms and figures in poetry; treatises on the grammar of science or the grammar of politics follow more than a figure of speech in their search for least parts and simple connections; dialectic, whether it finds its foundation in spirit or in matter, supplies a method for all problems; theologians and poets have professed sometimes to express truths beyond the scope of reason or science, sometimes to give form to insights accessible to common sense, philosophy, and science in the language of everyday life; philosophy is reduced to logic or to historiography or to art.

There is no way to participate in the inquiry or the dialogue, in which themes are developed and techniques are employed, except by taking a stand on a doctrine which is one expression of a theme and by using a method which is one development of a technique or an art. The history of the processes which lead to that doctrine—that belief or philosophy or science—and to the method by which it is established, extended, and defended, relates what went before to the assumptions and convictions that form the last stage of the evolution. Yet actual processes transcend the fixities of doctrines and the oppositions of historical accounts of their evolution. The themes that connect the successive doctrines are ambiguous from the point of view of the precisions attained in systematic formulation; and the techniques which move, usually undetected, from one application to another are haphazard from the point of view of rigorous method. Yet the very ambiguity of the themes and the freedom of the techniques from commitment to principle or subject
matter give them a double value—a heuristic value as instruments of discovery of doctrines and principles, which may then be verified and applied in determinate and definite form, and an expressive value as grounds of common purposes providing a means of communication and mutual understanding to proponents of different forms of expression, different contents of value, and different systems of proof. The invention and discovery of new hypotheses and principles, when they are not purely fortuitous, arise out of new variants of themes and new applications of techniques; and communication, when it is more than the elaboration of the shared beliefs and postulates that unite communities, sects, and schools, depends on the discovery of the common themes to which particular doctrines give different concretion, the common values to which different communities give different expression, and the common techniques to which different methods give different principles, employments, and systems.

Four themes—love, truth, freedom, and imitation—and four arts or techniques—philosophy, history, rhetoric, and poetry—are presented in this volume in four aspects of their operation in the processes of discovery and communication, of concealment and deception, which elude single definition and simple reduction to the rules of methods. By the criteria of clear, distinct, and adequate ideas, the themes are equivocal, yet they are the thesaurus out of which univocal and analogical definitions evolve and achieve precision of significance and application. Philosophers criticize the presuppositions and refute the conclusions of other philosophers according to the requirements of their own definitions and theories, yet the relations which give relevance and significance to their exchange of compliments arise from the themes by which they are joined rather than from the definitions by which they are separated. By the criteria of methods whose presumptions are stated in advance and whose operations are reduced to rules conforming to requirements and criteria, the techniques are indeterminate, inasmuch as their starting points are undefined, enigmatic, and mysterious, and their operations inventive, creative, and unpredictable. Yet the techniques provide not only the connections between the stages by which grammar, rhetoric, logic, dialectic, and poetic have evolved in practice and in the application of normative rules to practice, but also the connections between the arts which make heterogeneous applications possible—poetic has afforded the devices to make philosophy an art, dialectic has determined successions of history and patterns of cultures, logic has supplied categories for metaphysics, rhetoric has constructed the “proper places” of inductive method on the analogies of the “common places” of discourse, and grammar has suggested the “syntax” of modern logic.

The theme treated in the first essay is love; the technique by which it is developed is philosophy, but in the course of the treatment and in its manner it is apparent that this is properly a theme for poetry. The interrelations of the treatment of one theme by two techniques, however, run counter to the interrelations of things discovered in the development of themes and the use of techniques. We have tended in recent decades, in spite of our devotion to philosophies of events, relations, wholes, and organisms, and in spite of our avoidance of misplaced concreteness, substances, separations, and abstractions, to separate the disciplines we practice and the purposes for which they are employed. Science, and philosophy in so far as it is made scientific, treat truth and probability and are cognitive; history sets forth the interrelations and successions of concrete events; ethics has recently borrowed an orientation from rhetoric, as politics has in the past, to become ejaculatory or persuasive; while poetry arouses emotions. These four methods, nonetheless, are not distinct in the context or in the techniques from which they arise, and according to many philosophies—which we easily forget when we seek our unities and wholes in the unity of science, or of culture, or of man—to separate them is to be guilty of unwarranted dichotomies and abstractions.

The essay on “Love and Philosophical Analysis” takes its beginning, therefore, in interrelations and interdependences of loves and methods explored in Greek philosophy. The techniques of poetry and rhetoric lie, as it were, midway between—or in some
other manner beyond the reaches of—both the factual determinations of history and the theoretic precisions of philosophy. To bring out the character of techniques that involve more than opinion but less than proof, the problems of knowledge and motivation, of objective fact and transcendent insight are focused in this essay, not on the large themes of experience or intuition, which might be used to provide the matrix in which contemplation and action are joined, but on the theme of love, which is the stimulus to the pursuit of knowledge, the prosecution of action, and the creation or appreciation of art.

Plato argued that there is a single method by which truth is achieved in philosophy, science, practical action, and common discussion; that that method, dialectic, is a method of discovery, of proof, of communication, of teaching, and of expression; that the use of dialectic simultaneously defines terms, clarifies ideas, prepares and persuades minds, and analyzes the objective situation. It follows, therefore, that practical problems are solved best by dialectic employed by philosopher-kings or, failing that ideal solution, by right opinion applied by statesmen and enforced by the persuasion and penalties of laws; that poets should properly be banished from the state and that dialecticians and lawgivers should be recognized to be sounder and better poets or, if the dialogues be taken seriously as examples of dialectic, that Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar should be rectified, interpreted, and applied by dialecticians; that history is a myth which either applies the truths of dialectic in likely stories or uses the truths of what actually happened to interpret dialectical proof as a likely story. These are complexities of interrelations and mysteries of transformation which few "Platonists" have preserved in their use of the dialectical method or in their translation of Platonic themes into Neoplatonic doctrines. They have frozen the dialectic of Plato to make it an instrument by which to ascend the ladder of loves, the chain of inspirations, or the parts of the divided line, which in turn have been ontologized into sharply divided stages of being and becoming, knowledge and opinion, reality and process; or they have made the equivalence of the processes of reality and the processes of thought into an identity of historical evolution and intellectual demonstration. Only the constant and recurrent influence of Plato himself has saved Platonists from the consequences of scientific or religious dogmatisms and practical skepticism by reproducing in the varieties of doctrines inspired by the dialogues the richness of the themes they explore.

The fact that Plato applied the term "Ideas" to the realities, which are imitated by things and by thoughts, has led many of his interpreters and admirers to conceive his philosophy in purely, or in fundamentally, intellectual terms. This is the more surprising, since few philosophers, not even Augustine and Ambrose, or Rousseau and Kierkegaard, whose arguments reflect Plato's dialectic and whose inquiries echo Socrates' ironic questions, have devoted more thought than Plato to nonrational springs of human action and to nonintellectual insights into transcendent values—to love, poetry, intoxication, and the mystical perceptions of intuition and religion. The theme of love, rather than the Idea of the Good, or the One, or the Beautiful, is suited to focus in human action on motivation and inspiration instead of on the rational analysis of means and ends; and the techniques of poetry, religion, rhetoric, and drinking, which find their perfection in dialectic and philosophy, are appropriate to focus attention on the persuasion of men to action instead of on the analysis of truths by which love operates and in which it finds its ultimate justification. The theme of love carries the analysis, not simply through varying doctrines of love, but through varying methods, circumstances, and subject matters made relevant to those doctrines in ancient, medieval, and modern discussions. That exploration of the theme permits the statement of modern problems which arise from lacunae in modern doctrines of love and which indicate desiderata in methods of developing and understanding it: the rich varieties of conceptions of love developed in past discussions of the theme have tended to be reduced in modern times to a basic sexual concept, and it has become difficult to treat effectively the loves which bind men in communities, attach man to ideals, or draw him into mysteries which exceed self-interest or subconscious
self-assertion; the techniques by which men engage in inquiry about love and attempt to effect communication have tended to be reduced to methods of objective verification of erotic aberrations or social frustrations, insecurities, and tensions, or, when they have resisted such reduction in the techniques of poetry and politics, to be treated as void of cognitive content. It has become difficult to state the problems that are involved in establishing purposes, plans, measures, policies, or cultural values as genuine and grounded propositions in relevant sciences, for problems of action and mutual understanding depend not only on persuading people who are frequently separated by doctrines and beliefs but also on the adequacy of purposes and statements, on the one hand, to common values that underlie differences and on their fidelity, on the other hand, to an objective situation whatever the differences of the views by which it is approached.

The theme treated in the second essay is truth; the technique by which it is developed is history, for although truth is properly a theme for philosophy it is treated historically more frequently than philosophically, and even the accounts philosophers give of the doctrines of other men as stages or as elements in the development of their own positions are histories of doctrines that have been presented as true rather than demonstrations designed to exhibit their truth. History is not concerned only with facts and with the interpretation of what men have done and said, after the manner of Thucydides and of most writers classified in libraries as "historians"; it is also concerned with the doctrines, communities, and fantasies men have constructed and with the methods they have employed in those constructions. The ideas men have used to interpret and to alter facts become themselves facts in history. The ideas of historians, poets, prophets, scientists, and philosophers, no less than the ideas of statesmen and the ideas attributed to peoples, are data for history. History and rhetoric, viewed as techniques, have a double relation in the treatment of facts and the planning of action: the past facts of history are a guide to future action, and the present attitudes of times and of peoples determine the interpreta-

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Ideas are transformed when they are stated as historical events in a historical context. The significance and the truth of a doctrine depend on its proof and verification; when ideas are viewed in the circumstances of their occurrence and the influences that contributed to their formation, they are facts and events to which truth or falsity are relevant only indirectly and accidentally. Yet we usually treat ideas "historically" rather than intellectually, and we seldom note the transformation we work on them. Only rarely do we restate the presuppositions on which a doctrine other than our own is based or examine the evidence that is advanced to support it and the data to which it is applied. Our usual procedure is to state other men's theories and doctrines in the context and on the presuppositions of our own, to show the irrelevance of their arguments to our principles, the inadequacy of their conclusions to our data, and then to account for the peculiarities of the doctrine by the circumstances, interests, or prejudices of its author, or his times, his nation, people, or class. The influence of philosophies on history, conversely, determines the relevant data and the taxonomy or causal relations which are sought among data. When histories depend on dialectical presuppositions, they tend to be epochal and to trace the spirit, climate, or character of times and peoples in the manner of Herodotus, Augustine, Hegel, Marx, Spengler, or Toynbee. When histories depend on the causes treated in some particular science or branch of knowledge—such as politics, economics, sociology, or the military art—they tend to trace a causal line of progress or decline that cuts across distinctions of periods and ages in the manner of Polybius, Gibbon, Buckle, or Henry Adams. When histories concentrate on the actions of outstanding men or peoples, they tend to be exemplary narratives presented for imitation or avoidance in the
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manner of Plutarch, Machiavelli, or Carlyle. Finally, when histories are concerned with problems and with the doctrines which men evolved in the solution of problems, they tend to be disciplinary in the manner of Diogenes Laertius, Prantl, and Ueberweg, in the history of philosophy and logic, or of like historians of the sciences, the arts, and literature.

The techniques of philosophy and history are focused, in the essay on “Truth and the History of Ideas,” not on the large themes of fact or event or reality, which might be used to explore the data or irreducible materials on which history, science, action, and art are employed, but rather on the theme of truth, in which men justify in varying ways what they say in varying situations by reference to what they conceive to be the relevant and compelling facts. Plato treated the history of his predecessors dialectically and concentrated therefore on what has been taken to be the spirit and the significance of their philosophies; Aristotle treated the history of his predecessors problematically and concentrated on the details of the doctrines they developed to resolve particular problems. Plato and Aristotle both treated history in the interest of philosophy, and there is good reason to doubt the accuracy of their presentation of either the spirit or the doctrines as they were developed and without reference to Plato’s or Aristotle’s philosophy. Yet later historians, working as historians rather than as philosophers, have been dependent largely on their testimony and have composed the history of Greek philosophy prior to them by mingling the two in proportions and according to criteria supplied by the philosophies of successive historians. Plato and Aristotle choose, in accordance with their respective philosophies, the facts they report concerning earlier philosophy: they concentrate attention on different philosophers, on different ideas of the same philosophers, and on different interpretations of the same ideas; the relations they reveal among the ideas of any one philosopher or any group of philosophers are different; and they differ even on the question of the beginning of philosophy, Plato finding it in Greek thought, Aristotle extending his inquiries to the barbarians. But if their philosophical assump-

Introduction

tions determine the facts available to later historians, their philosophies likewise become facts in a context of other facts and with scant remnants of proof or verification, when the history of philosophy is extended to include them and to pass beyond them to their successors.

The theme treated in the third essay is freedom; the technique by which it is developed is rhetoric, but the rhetoric is that of speeches used in a history to reconstruct the conditions and intentions that moved men to action. As the subject of the first essay is the theme of love presented philosophically for poetic purposes, and as the subject of the second essay is the theme of truth presented historically for philosophic purposes, so the theme of freedom is presented in the third essay in the rhetorical development of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, and of the opposed speeches by which it is framed, for the historical purpose of setting what men thought against the background of the causes that led them into conflict. The problems involved in the resulting juxtapositions are not problems of the theoretic interrelations of themes and techniques in an organic philosophy in which all things may be thought to be interdependent, all sciences unified, and all methods one, if being is distinguished from becoming, and knowledge from opinion; they are problems of the practical interrelations of knowledge applied to particulars and knowledge used in action, if knowledge is applied to the conditions of men and used to influence their motives. Thucydides had a theory by which he combined history and rhetoric in order to relate, in the treatment of practical problems, knowledge applied to particulars historically and knowledge used in action rhetorically. His history is an effort to present both the immediate causes and the real issues of the war. The immediate causes are what men thought and said, and they are expressed rhetorically in the speeches which Thucydides reproduces and reconstructs, while the real issues emerge in the circumstances and relations of the opposed powers which become inseparably mingled with what men think the issues to be. But if rhetoric is employed to construct the particular knowledge which constitutes history, the purpose of the history is to contribute to the
practical knowledge employed in plans for action which is set forth by rhetoric. Thucydides hoped that, if he succeeded in exposing the real cause of the war, exact knowledge of the past might facilitate the interpretation of the future and the discussion of possible courses of action.

These two interrelated problems—the historical determination of what happened and why and the practical determination of what should be done and how—have led to the use of many other methods, some similar, others in radical opposition, to those developed by Thucydides. To bring out the character of the techniques of rhetoric and history that underlie those opposed methods, the problems of historical knowledge and practical action are focused in the essay on “Freedom and Disputation,” not on the large themes of human behavior or society, which might be used to bring fact and belief, motivation and persuasion to bear on one another, but on the theme of freedom, which men of different persuasions have long conceived to be the condition and the end of human action. The historical development of doctrines expressing the theme of freedom runs a course almost directly contrary to the historical development of doctrines of love. All the varieties of love and all their applications are intelligible today, but apart from the conception of love developed and applied in psychology and psychiatry they have little effective application in the analysis and planning of our individual or social actions, and the term is not used without hesitation in most of its meanings. The doctrines of freedom—the definitions and applications which the theme has received in historical evolution after the Greek phase—have undergone almost total transformation in their actual and possible applications; but, whereas a modern speaker or writer would feel embarrassment in repeating the theme of any except the satiric speeches of Plato’s Symposium, he can and does repeat the theme of Pericles’ Funeral Oration in almost unaltered form and details of expression. In their historical development as themes, freedom and truth have come frequently into contact with each other; and, in the optimistic philosophies of dialecticians, truth leads inevitably to freedom (since freedom is action in accordance with wisdom), while, in the philosophies of progress of logistic philosophers, freedom is a necessary condition for the discovery of truth (since freedom is action in accordance with the laws of one’s own nature). Yet the two histories exhibit the basic differences that separate knowledge and action: the development of knowledge has consisted in the multiplication of truths that men can verify and the extension of the methods of inquiry and verification to the problems of all aspects of human life, and the discovery of later truths has led both to the abandonment of earlier doctrines and to the discovery of interrelations and interdependences among the branches of knowledge; the development of human relations has consisted in the multiplication of freedoms that men can justify and to the extension of freedoms, in principle and promulgation, to all men without distinction or restriction of any kind, and the recognition of later rights—economic, social, and cultural—has not necessitated the abrogation of rights earlier recognized—political, civil, and religious—yet the question of the priority of the earlier or the later freedoms is one that separates Soviet philosophers and statesmen from those of the West, and the extension of freedoms to all mankind has proceeded by dividing and opposing men in parties, sects, races, nations, and peoples for the vindication of some freedoms for some men.

Greek conceptions of freedom divided men into freemen and slaves. Even those Greeks who formed an idea of the brotherhood and equality of all men found no plausible or effective means in their civilization of attacking the institution of slavery or the conviction of Greeks that Hellenes were fundamentally different from barbarians. The Greek development of the theme did include the doctrine that freedom is a “right” based on the nature of man and on the law of nature. Men had to wait until the eighteenth century for the development of the concept of a Bill of Rights which enumerates the forms of freedom and charges responsible governments with providing guarantees against their violation. The developments of the next two centuries vastly increased the number of rights or freedoms and the spread of their application without dis-
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crimination based on race, previous status, religion, sex, or nationality. Yet these differences of circumstance, doctrine, definition, and application do not affect the applications that can be given to Pericles' exposition of the ideal of freedom and its problems. Today, rhetoric is being re-employed and history is being repeated in the development of the theme of freedom. Part of the world has attached itself to the Athenian ideal of freedom; part of the world views that development of the theme with the suspicions expressed by the Corinthians, who thought it a deceptive cloak for the interests and aggressions of the rich and the powerful. Yet in both interactions of fear and suspicion, ancient and modern, both versions of the theme had been united, only a short time before, in the defense of freedom against a common tyrannical danger. The opposed notions led ultimately, in the ancient development, to a war from which Greek political forms and cultural life and civilization never fully recovered. In the retrospect of over two thousand years the war, which found its "immediate causes" in what men said and did, was clearly a tragedy in which the "real" issues did not justify the extremes to which men were carried, and they were not resolved by the actions men took.

The theme treated in the final essay is imitation; it is a theme used to explain the techniques of poetry, but if art is viewed as itself an object of imitation rather than as an imitation of nature, all human arts and all human activities are guided by criteria of imitation employed by techniques developed in rhetoric. Like love, imitation is a theme that can be applied to all human actions. Love is attachment in action to something valued; imitation is action designed to embody or produce a value. Differences in loves and in theories of love are due to differences in the objects of love; differences in imitations and in theories of imitation are due to differences in the objects of imitation. The different loves and imitations are assimilated to philosophy and distinguished from each other in the dialectic of Plato. Love is a madness which may turn man to the vision of the Good and the Beautiful or to the pursuit of pleasure—and poetry and rhetoric, which may be dangerous and immoral instru-
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There are philosophies whose exposition could not easily be confused with the development of a poem or the plot of a novel. There are novels which could be differentiated from histories (and indeed their authors often call them "histories" in the course of their fictions) only by determining whether or not their characters ever existed or performed the actions narrated. There are philosophers like Plato, Lucretius, Dante, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Santayana whose mode of expression is poetic, aphoristic, or literary and philosophers like Hume and Sartre who use comparable techniques to develop comparable themes successively in philosophy and history or in philosophy, fiction, and drama. The novels of Fielding, Balzac, or Hemingway present actions; the development of characters is appropriate to the action and makes it plausible; what the characters think and say is appropriate to the characters in their situations; whatever philosophy is expressed in the course of the narrative is easily identified as the thought of one of the characters or of the author. The novels of Rabelais, Melville, Dickens, James, Dostoevski, Kafka, Joyce, on the contrary, present actions that emerge into literal focus from the complexities of character, thought, and language; and the connections which they develop, far from being determined by events in time and space, supplant literal facts and give them meaning when they emerge. It would be idle to ask whether Everyman, or Christian, who represent the characteristics of all men or all men of faith, is more or less abstract than Tamberlane, or Tom Jones, or Cousin Pons, whose characters are based on the development of one human quality. The characters that Christian encounters in his pilgrim's progress are likewise motivated by simple traits, and rounded characters are sometimes formed on the model of the complexities of actual characters by placing a dominant characteristic in a variety of circumstances or by a necessity and probability suggested by poetic or ideal models. The world of Captain Ahab is no less real than the world of Clarissa Harlowe, but it is a world in which events are merged with ideas and in which puzzled critics try to find their bearings by identifying the compulsion or ideal symbolized by the white whale. Literal narratives separate the real from the illusory, but it is no less legitimate or effective, as truth and as art, to recognize the relativities of the processes reported and to leave the resolution of the issue of fact and fancy, as Dostoevski does, in the balance of characters who interpret, oppose their interpretation to that of other characters whom they interpret, then doubt and change their interpretations, and in which illusion may easily be truth or truth illusion. The symbolism of the world may be reflected in the symbols the artist uses, as Bunyan and Kafka built their worlds in dreams, or as the nervous sentence structure of James conveys and justifies states of mind and attitude, or as the learned puns and buried levels of symbolic structure of Joyce suggest the inexhaustibly rich content of daily and apparently trivial action. There are forms of artistic expression which have no univocal literal interpretation and which cannot be translated into emotional responses independent of thought or unrelated to action; and, what is even more important, the methods of interpretation and criticism that are adapted to such works apply no less effectively to works that have a literal meaning and an emotive purpose and make them bearers of truth and causes of action.

The techniques of poetry and rhetoric are focused in the essay on "Imitation and Poetry," not on the large themes of necessity or beauty, which might be used to mark the basic principles in which knowledge, action, and art are joined, but rather on the theme of imitation, which provides one of the lines of continuity in efforts to explain the nature of art, action, and knowledge, including the arts of science, philosophy, and life, and the sciences of history, art, and practical action. For Plato, imitation is a broad concept—things, ideas, and virtues as well as poetry are imitations. For Aristotle it is a narrow concept, limited to art and used to distinguish the natural bases of a poem or any other artificial object from the natural bases of a virtue or a science. Plato used the concept of imitation to relate theory, practice, and art. Aristotle used the same concept to distinguish art from knowledge and action. Yet for both, what was imitated was nature or reality. In the concepts developed later in the evolution of the theme, imitation changed its meanings with the...
change in the object of imitation: writers were enjoined to imitate the genius of other writers or the art evident in their works or to adapt great or common themes to appropriate language newly devised or borrowed from common language. The applications of imitation move from art to practice (as when Machiavelli expounds his new method of basing political action on the emulation of great men or great peoples, or Hobbes bases his new science of the state on the assumption that the commonwealth imitates the art of God) and to theory (as when scientists resort to the construction of models, or dialectical materialists and operationalists seek the test of theory in the reproduction or control of natural processes, in what Aristotle would have called the use of art to imitate and extend natural processes).

The inquiries of men concerning the things that surround them and the dialogue in which they communicate with each other are guided and influenced by themes. The terms and concepts in which those themes are expressed are ambiguous, and the relations of terms and concepts to one another in the development or expression of the theme alter and change. The theme may for a time bring together in one concept many related ideas and data, and then the unity may break and the connections be lost. The theme may for a time set up basic distinctions which, with changes of definitions, are abandoned as unwarranted dichotomies and abstractions, separating facts into parts without basis in reality. The theme may for a time take the form of a concept or theory that is applied to facts to which it later seems irrelevant. Changes in concepts following the development of a single theme may affect the relations among ideas, the meanings of individual ideas, and the facts accepted as relevant or warranted as real. Inquiry and discussion are affected and determined, not only by these changes, but also by the relations among the themes and the techniques. The four techniques and the four themes by which these interrelations are explored in the following essays are sometimes used to distinguish and separate fields and activities. Philosophy or science then employs a scientific method or a logic in the determination and statement of truth; poetry employs figurative language to depict and to arouse emotions, including the emotion of love; history is constructed of singular propositions which designate or imitate individual things, events, and their interconnections; practical propositions use a rhetorical or persuasive mode of discourse to stir men to action or to turn them from actions they had contemplated. Or, on the other hand, truth, instead of being distinguished from the facts of history, the constructions of poetry, or the operations of practical action, may be identified with any one of them, or all four may be conceived to be the same; and, in that reduction, any one of the four—truth, love, freedom, or imitation—may take precedence.

Similarly methods may be distinguished according to their principles, purposes, and data: history may be conceived as a method by which to reproduce individual happenings in their individuality; rhetoric may be conceived as a method by which a speaker influences an audience by starting from its preconceptions and attitudes; logic, dialectic, or the scientific method may be conceived as a method by which theories are formed to account for regularities or recurrences in a group of phenomena, to relate them to other regularities in systems of laws, and to derive consequences in application and prediction; poetry may be conceived to be a method of creating an object of art whose unity is not the same as the facts to which it is related but is created by the artist and appropriate to his medium and whose effects are not practical actions induced by playing on prejudice and preconception but aesthetic contemplation and purgation of passions and their impulsions to action. Or, in turn, each of the methods may borrow from the others: philosophic and scientific methods are often treated as arts, reduced to history, or adapted to rhetorical devices of discovery; poetry is often treated as a vehicle of truths, an instrument of social control or change, or a method of recounting history; practical devices of agreement or persuasion are often sought in a campaign of truth, in adherence and conformity to facts, or in poetic adornments; history has become a dialectic and a science, an art and an instrument for practical action.

The influence of Athens on the culture of the West has been set
forth in poetry that celebrates the glory of Greece while imitating its themes, meters, and forms; it has been traced in histories that follow the development of influences, distinguish stages, periods, epochs, and cultures, set forth the example of Greek heroes, geniuses, and institutions, and expound the formulations of problems and the inventions of hypotheses to solve them, while employing the historical methods originated by the Greeks and the historical data assembled in their histories; it has been explained in philosophies that acknowledge the influence or refute the errors of Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, or the Sophists; it has been illustrated or advocated in practical action and statement that pursue ideals dreamed of by Greek sages, poets, and politicians in circumstances, with instruments, and by institutions which the Greeks did not imagine. But all these statements and actions are part of the dialogue and the inquiry in which the themes of the Greeks assume many definitions and their techniques take on many forms. In a significant sense the real influence is in themes and techniques which elude and exceed literal restatement. The influence of Greek philosophy is not found in literal fidelity to doctrines or methods even by those who have professed to follow the positions or to use the methods of Greek philosophers; it is found rather in the living influence of Greek themes and techniques that is encountered even in the modification of concepts and the transformation of methods by men who know Greek philosophy only indirectly in doctrines and proofs influenced by ancient philosophy and who often rediscover ancient doctrines when they refute what they conceived to be the doctrine of Plato, Aristotle, or Democritus. The influence of Greek poetry is not found in literal imitation of Greek epic, tragedy, comedy, pastoral, or ode; it is found rather in the inspiration by which poetic themes and poetic devices have led to the creation of other forms or the use of other materials to attain like poetic ends. The influence of Greek practical ideals and human relations is found, not in the survival of Greek political, social, or economic institutions, but in the adaptability to changing circumstances of ideals which the Greeks expressed and modes of communication which they used and in forms of homogeneity that have emerged in the Western world as a result of the experiences and the expressions of the ancient Greeks. History, finally, has continued to discover characteristic periods, causal lines, exemplary models, and developments in the arts and disciplines; yet the influence of Greek history is found in no one statement of subsequent events as continuations of those which the Greeks recorded but rather in the aid which their insights and hypotheses have afforded to each succeeding age in rewriting history to the requirements and aspirations of later times, different places, and strange people.